1. The Notion of Being Is an Analogical Notion
From all that has now been said of its structure it should
be obvious that the notion or concept of being, hence being
itself, can only be analogical. Being, as a concept, is manifestly
not equivocal; no true concept ever is. But even the
word "being" is not equivocal, since (among other things)
it does not convey completely different meanings. Nor is
the concept of being univocal, for it cannot be diversified
or contracted in the manner of a genus. It is therefore analogical,
embracing as it does all the modalities of being both
as to their differences and their identities. It is a concept
that is at once differentiated and undifferentiated or unified,
though not, of course, from the same point of view.
That the notion of being (hence being itself) is analogical
is so clearly the mind of Aristotle that there can be no
possible doubt of it; indeed, he may be considered the original
exponent of the thesis. St. Thomas made the teaching
his own, and after him Thomists consistently propounded
and defended it. In opposition are Scotus and his followers.
Scotus, to be sure, does not say that being, or the notion of
being, is a genus; yet he insists that it is a univocal concept,
hence abstracted from its inferiors by a perfect or complete
abstraction and thus containing them only potentially. In
Scotus' view, therefore, the notion of being has all the ear
marks of a generic concept. The classical and, it would
seem, unanswerable rejoinder to the Scotist position is this:
if the different modalities of being are extrinsic or foreign
to the concept of being, one wonders just what they are.
What, in other words, is there besides being? Also, if the
differences of being are not actually included in the concept
of being, what way is there for them to diversify being except
in the manner of true specific differences? But this is
to give the concept of being the identity of a genus, with all
the insuperabilities that entails.24
2. Which Type of Analogy Is the Analogy of Being?
Admitted that being and the concept of being are analogous,
we have still to determine the type of analogy that
pertains to being. The determination poses some difficulty,
for in the analogy of being can be found characteristics of
both principal types, i.e. attribution and proper proportionality -
metaphorical analogy is obviously ruled out. There
is no doubt, for one thing, that being is analogous by the
analogy of proportionality. What makes it so, it will be
remembered, is that all modes of being are being, formally
and intrinsically. This page of print, its color, its size, these
are each of them being, really and truly, and not merely by
a denomination extrinsic to being, that is not simply by
reason of some extrinsic relation to being, as the relation
of food to health.
Yet there are also aspects of being that serve to bring it under the analogy of attribution. This, as a matter of fact, is the viewpoint of Aristotle, according to whom there is a first analogate, substance, and other modalities of being are said to "be" by reason of some connection with substance. "Being," to quote him directly, "is taken in many senses, but all of them refer to one source. Some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substance, still others because they are processes toward substance, or corruptions or privations or qualities of substance. . . ." 25 St. Thomas himself applies the analogy of attribution to being from yet another aspect, the relation of created to untreated being. Being, in this context, is predicated primarily (per Arius) of God, who is selfexistent (per se) being; and it is predicated secondarily (per posterius) of creatures, who are being only by participation and by dependence from the being of God.
In the case of being, then, - as for that matter with other transcendental notions: the one, the true, the good - we are confronted with a sort of mixed analogy which includes both proportionality and attribution. Analogy of proportionality is, however, generally admitted by Thomists to be more primary and more fundamental, at least from the standpoint of our experience of being. This granted, we shall say with John of St. Thomas that being is analogous by an analogy of proportionality which includes, virtually, an analogy of attribution.
What this means, in effect, is that the concept by which being is initially grasped is not sharply defined; it is a notion that admits of further determination, since it comprises under its proportional unity all the modalities of being which experience reveals. Upon analysis the modalities are found to occupy an order, or several orders, and thereby our concept of being is considerably enhanced. In the area of material (intrinsic) causality there is one order, founded on substance, the primary modality in this respect. From the standpoint of transcendent (extrinsic) causality, whether efficient, final, or exemplary, there is further order and hierarchy, founded on the relation of participated to per se being, or God. Thus, while the concept of being has a goodly measure of meaning without explicit reference to the first principle of being, namely God, the full import of the notion will only be seen when the various modalities of being are recognized not merely as constituting an order, but an order that depends on the first being.26
3. The Notion of Being and Metaphysical Method
The conception of being that emerges from the foregoing
analysis leads to some important conclusions as
regards the science of metaphysics. To facilitate our account
of them we shall first recapitulate the main points thus far
established.
1. The notion of being as being is the end product of a distinct kind of abstraction from matter, which is properly called "separation" and which is performed on the level of judgment rather than that of simple apprehension. By this abstraction being as being is removed by the mind, not from reality nor from existence - indeed not, for the existent is the very object of metaphysics - but from all material conditions of existence; which is a far different thing from removing it from existence.
2. The notion or concept thus acquired is found, on analysis, to contain two aspects, essence and existence, the latter proportioned to and determining, in the sense of actuating, the former. Hence the recognition: being is what is.
3. This notion has the structure or constitution of an analogical concept; which is to say, it makes only imperfect abstraction from its inferiors. Consequently, the inferiors are actually retained in the concept of being, though but implicitly or "in confusion." And because the inferiors are actually retained, the unity of this original concept is but a unity of proportion, hence an imperfect one.27
4. Basically the analogy of being is an analogy of proportionality, a conclusion imposed by the fact that all modes of being, even to their ultimate differences, are truly being. But within the multiplicity of these modes there is discoverable a definite order, based on their relation to the first being. Viewed from this order, being has a further analogy, that of attribution, by which the analogy of being is thus rounded out.
5. Because the notion of being transcends any and all genera of being and extends to all its modes and to their every difference, this notion is pre-eminently a transcendental one (in the Scholastic sense of the word). What, then, will be the characteristics of the science whose object is represented in the notion of being here recounted? (With that, we return to the conclusions spoken of above.) a) The foremost characteristic is without a doubt its general orientation, which is decidedly toward the real. Metaphysics, in this view, begins and ends in reality. To be sure, it must, like every science, engage in abstraction - a double abstraction, at that; but this does not mean that it is cut off from the existent precisely as existent, nor from any of its modes. On the contrary, the notion of being signifies concrete reality itself, the whole and every last part of it. The reason, as we know, is that the notion abstracts imperfectly from its inferiors, which are therefore actually retained in it, albeit indistinctly or "in confusion." 28 Progress in metaphysical inquiry comes, therefore, not simply from the abstract analysis of concepts divorced from reality but rather from the very inspection of reality. Of course, concepts can be analyzed and systematically presented, as they generally are in textbooks and special treatises. But it must not be forgotten that in the Thomist view metaphysical analysis is mostly labor lost unless it stems, not only initially but continually, from contact with the complexity of reality itself and with the problems the complexity poses. If, then, we compare the metaphysics of St. Thomas with other metaphysical systems that loom large in philosophical history, we cannot but be impressed by its originality. Thus, whether it be Plato in antiquity, or Scholastics of the Scotist and Suarezian tradition, or still later the whole modern school from Descartes to Hegel; by all of these, being is generally conceived in the manner of a nature, which is to say of an essence, dissevered, or nearly so, from existence and treated as an abstract entity. Ontology, in this line of thought, tends to become a purely conceptual construction, cut off from reality. Such creations may not improperly be styled essentialist ontologies. Far different is the consideration of being by St. Thomas, who, while not in the least neglecting that determination of it which corresponds to its essence, is ever intent and insistent on that other, that ultimate determination or actuality of it, its concrete existence.
b) If next we compare the concept of being - in the Thomistic sense - with other scientific concepts, those employed by science in the more current meaning, we find the former both superior and inferior to the latter. The inferiority, such as it is, lies in the imperfect unity of the concept of being; the superiority, in its content, which, as implicit, is inexhaustible.
As we have said, or as much as said, many times over, the analogical concept is in the idiom of the Schoolman a "confused," hence "inadequate" concept - the "confusion," to note it again, referring to the way this concept comprises its inferiors, namely indistinctly or in wholesale fashion. A concept of this sort does indeed deliver its inferiors to the mind, but not "adequately," not perfectly. Since the concept of being is analogical, what the mind thereby knows it knows inadequately and thus imperfectly; and never is this inadequacy more acute than when we apply the concept to the transcendent being of God, whose proper mode of existence escapes us altogether. Unlike metaphysics, other sciences operate with univocal concepts, which provide knowledge compounded of genera and specific differences, knowledge which, in itself if not always in the knower, is precise and distinct. On this score, then, and to this extent these sciences have the edge over metaphysics. But the advantage is, as we have said, not all to one side. There are depths and dimensions of being not reached by the empirical method. Here metaphysics excels; for the metaphysical notion of being, and other analogical notions it employs, cut deeper and wider than the more familiar scientific notions, and together provide the mind with the wherewithal to discover areas of reality unknown and unknowable by the particular sciences. By these notions, to mention the prime instance, it is possible to gain some knowledge, however imperfect, of the very first principle of all being, even of God. Accordingly, by the method of analogy, the method proper to metaphysics, we have the possibility of an authentic science of theology. It is for the theologian, however, to spell out the role of the method in his science. Suffice it, then, to have called attention both to its limitations and to its real merits.
As before in regard to the orientation of St. Thomas' metaphysics, so now in the matter of its method comparison suggests itself with the famed essentialist philosophies of the past. And again we find marked differences. As by a natural propensity, every metaphysics of essentialist cast tends to become a rigid system, its whole development worked out deductively. Though not all the philosophers mentioned and alluded to previously display this tendency to perfection, it is no exaggeration to say that all of them yielded more or less to its attraction. Both Plato and Descartes give evidence of having been captivated by its promise, at least if the former's fascination for the dialectic (the method of the Dialogues) and the latter's dream of universalizing the mathematical method are any criterion. The consummation, however, of the deductive method is to be seen in the Ethica of Spinoza and the Encyclopedia of Hegel. With them the expectation others had nourished is realized, the dream come true; or so it seemed. To derive everything by deductive reasoning from one first principle, that was the great passion; and both Hegel and Spinoza pursued it to the hilt.
St. Thomas, it need hardly be said, studiously avoids such a course. To be sure, his metaphysical universe is not less characterized by order and hierarchy than the universe of these more recent philosophers; and with him, too, reason governs every stroke of the metaphysical pen. But, presided over by the analogical method, his thought is far more tempered to the exigencies of reality in all its diversity. There is in it room for all that is, and all in its place, yet no being suffers violence to its nature. Order there is, yes, but pure construction, no. Indeed, if it is part of the wise man to give the order of things, sapientis est ordinare, then true metaphysical wisdom is precisely a work of order. And this the metaphysical work of St. Thomas is, a work of order - the veritable order of things.