Morality and Its Norm

a) Description of Morality

Morality is that quality of human acts which leads us to call .some of them good and some evil. Now why do we call anything good or evil? We have already seen the answer to this question, but we must here recall and enlarge our knowledge of the matter. A thing is good inasmuch as it can answer a tendency, appetite, desire. In other words, it is good inasmuch as it serves as an end of such tendency. Thus, I call my coat a “good coat” if it furnishes me what I want in a coat, viz., warmth, style, fit, good cloth, good tailoring, etc. I call my automobile good if it does what can be reasonably expected of it in the way of speed, comfortable riding, rich appearance, etc. What I expect of my coat and automobile are the ends I wish to achieve by means of the garment or the motor car. Inasmuch as the coat or the car serves any or all of the ends desired, it is good; inasmuch as it fails to serve these ends, I say it is not good. Now in the matter of human acts—where moral good or evil is the point in question—there is always a last end towards which the action tends. Objectively, this is the Summum Bonum, the Limitless Good, God. Subjectively, the last end of human acts is perfect happiness in the possession of the Summum Bonum. Such being the end of human action, it follows that human acts are good inasmuch as they serve to carry the agent on towards the attainment of this end, and not good, or evil, inasmuch as they fail to lead towards the last end, or even lead away from it.

b) The Norm of Morality

In the Article on Law we learned that there is an eternal plan for the ordering or government of all acts and movements in the universe, and that this plan directs things towards their last end. But, as we also learned, man is free and rational; he is not coerced

(in the field of free choice) by the plan, but is meant to recognize it by his reason and freely follow it in all his free or human acts. Human acts which are in harmony with the eternal plan are good; those not in harmony with it are evil. Now, the eternal plan is the Eternal Law, which is the Divine Reason (and Will) expressing itself in the ordering of the universe. Thus human acts are good or evil inasmuch as they agree or conflict with the Divine Reason. Now how is the Divine Reason recognized by man? Obviously by human reason, which pronounces on individual human acts—in a word, by Conscience. Hence, the Eternal Law (Divine Reason) on the one hand, and conscience (human reason) on the other, constitute the Norm of Morality. From this it will be seen that we were right when we said that human acts are good or evil inasmuch as they agree or conflict with the dictates of reason (divine and human). The Divine Reason, or the Eternal Law, is the ultimate Norm of Morality. But that which serves man immediately in. action, that which is available to his proximate use, is human reason pronouncing upon the good or evil of individual human acts: in other words, conscience is the proximate Norm of Morality. Summing the matter up, we say that the Norm of Morality is, remotely and ultimately (but primarily), the Eternal Law; while proximately (but secondarily) it is conscience. In reality, then, there are not two norms but only one; for conscience is the judg-

c) Definition of Morality

ment of human reason recognizing and applying the Eternal Law in individual human acts. } r c) DEFINITION OF MORAtlTY Morality is the relation of hufnan acts to their norm. Morality is that quality (or property) of a human act whereby it measures up to what it should be as a step towards the objective last end of human action, or fails so to measure up. It consists therefore in the relation existing between human acts and the norm of morality. The morality of an act, its character as good or evil, is not a mere external denomination or classification ; it is not a mere label pasted on arbitrarily; It is something that belongs inevitably to the human act as such, either to the act considered objectively as a deed performed, or to the act considered as characterized by its circumstances, particularly the circu’mstance called the end of the agent. Some ethicians have placed the essence of the morality of human acts in freedom. This doctrine is false. It is true that a human act is a free act’; and, in a true sense, it is a moral act (i. e., has morality, is right or wrong, good or evil) because it is free. But freedom does not constitute morality. Morality is the property of a free act, that is, it is an inevitably present characteristic of a free act. But it consists „ formally, as we have said, not in freedom itself, but ioi in the relation which the act bears toward the norm or measure of what it should be—toward the Norm of Morality.

d) Division of Morality

i. Material and Formal—A human act considered in itself as a deed performed stands in relation to the Norm of Morality as materially good or evil. A human -act considered as conditioned by the agent’s understanding and will, stands in relation to the Norm of Morality as formally good or evil. Sometimes the terms objective and subjective are used respectively for material and formal in this connection. Thus, a lie is objectively or materially evil: it is a thing that is evil in itself, as a deed done, for it conflicts with the Norm of Morality. But a lie which a person mistakenly deems to be permitted and justified in certain circumstances, is, while materially evil, not subjectively or formally so. ii. Intrinsic and Extrinsic.— Material or objective morality is intrinsic when the human act, as a deed performed, stands by reason of its very nature in relation to the Norm of Morality as good or evil. Material or objective morality is extrinsic when the stand or relation of an act to the Norm of Morality is determined, not by the nature of the act itself, but by the prescription of positive law. Thus, murder is intrinsically evil. Eating meat on Friday is extrinsically evil.

Summary of the Article

In this short Article we have learned much that is of prime importance. We have described morality; we have studied the Norm of Morality; we have defined morality and have explained the force of the definition. We have distinguished the morality of human acts as material and formal (or objective and subjective), and material morality as intrinsic and extrinsic.

Since the morality of human acts consists in their relation to their norm (the measure of what they should be), it becomes necessary to ask, what points of contact exist between human acts and this norm. In other words, it is necessary to understand what phases of the human act may be measured by the norm. These points or phases, when measured by the norm, show the act as measuring up or not measuring up to that norm; in a word, these points determine the good or evil of the act. Hence they are called the determinants of morality. Now the human act may be considered in itself as a deed done, i. e., as an object, and in its circumstances. These, then, are the determinants of the morality of the human act. In studying the act in its circum-