Conscience

a) Definition of Conscience

Conscience is the practical judgment of reason upon an individual act as good and to be performed, or as evil and to be avoided. i. It is a judgment of reason, that is, it is a reasoned conclusion. Although the term conscience is also used to designate the act of reasoning out the right and wrong of a situation before choosing what to do, it is more properly employed, as in our definition, to signify the judgment which is the conclusion of that act of reasoning. Now, an act of reasoning requires a principle, or set of principles, from which the process of reasoning proceeds. By principles we mean things known with certainty with which we may compare new facts or proposed actions and so discover new truths—new applications of the principles. Thus, before we can reason out the truth that the angles of a triangle are equal to 180°, we must have a grasp of certain mathematical principles: we must know, for instance, that when parallels are cut by a transversal, the alternate interior angles are equal, and that opposite angles are equal. Knowing these facts, we can proceed to the proof of the theorem in question. These facts are principles, that is, startingpoints whence one may reason to further truths or to individual application of the original known data. Similarly, in matters of right and wrong, we must have moral principles to start with. We acquire these principles,—many of them,—in early life, and when we have a workable grasp of them, we become responsible for our conduct, we cease to be infants, and we are said to have “come to the use of reason.” Now, this acquired equipment of moral principles is called synteresis. Synteresis is the starting-point of the reasoning process which ends in the judgment of conscience. This reasoning process may proceed so smoothly and swiftly that we are not aware of it as a reasoning process at all; indeed, this is ordinarily the case. Still, the process is always a fact, if only an implicit fact. Thus, when we are confronted with a possible course of action, we compare it mentally with our moral principles, and conclude that it is good and hence to be done (or at least permitted), or evil and hence to be avoided. For example: suppose I am face to face with a difficulty from which I might extricate myself by a clever and fictitious explanation of my conduct. My moral reasoning goes on as follows:

Lies are never allowed (principle from synteresis) ; The explanation which suggests itself to me is a lie; Therefore, this explanation is not allowed (judgment of conscience).

ii. Conscience is a practical judgment. This means that it has reference to something to be done, i. e., either the performance or the omission of an act. The reasoning process always ends in a judgment, but not always in a practical judgment. When, for instance, one concludes the proof of the theorem which states that the angles of a triangle equal 180°, one expresses that conclusion in a judgment; this judgment, however, does not indicate a course of action (practical judgment), but enriches knowledge by the addition of a newly recognized truth (speculative judgment). It is obvious that conscience is a practical judgment. It is a judgment that commands, forbids, allows, or advises, according as it declares an individual act obligatory, prohibited, permissible, or prudent. It is a judgment which says: “Do this!” “Avoid that!” “You may do this!” “It would be well to do that!” In a word, conscience is a dictate. iii. Conscience is a judgment upon an individual act, here and now, in these present circumstances, to be performed or omitted. It is also a judgment upon an individual act after it has been performed or omitted. But it is always an individual judgment upon an individual act; it is not a general moral judgment or principle (for such judgments belong to synteresis), but it is the reasoned judgment, drawn from a general principle and an individual act; it applies the general moral principle in individual action. Before action, conscience judges an act as good and to be performed (i. e., as something obligatory, advisable, or permis- * sible), or as evil and to be omitted. After action, conscience is a judgment of approval or disapproval.

b) .i.vSTATES OF CONSCIENCE

b) States of Conscience

When conscience is a judgment in accordance with fact, that is, when it judges as good that which is really good, and as evil that which is really evil, then it is correct or true. Strictly speaking, there is a distinction between correct conscience and true conscience, but for practical purposes the terms may be regarded as synonymous. Conscience that is not true is erroneous. Conscience that is erroneous without the knowledge or fault of the agent, is called invincibly erroneous or inculpably erroneous, while conscience that is erroneous through the agent’s fault, is culpably erroneous. ii. When conscience is an altogether firm and assured judgment, in which the agent has no fear whatever of being in error, it is called certain conscience. Conscience, when certain, must be obeyed, whether it be correct or invincibly erroneous./For reason demands that we obey law as manifested with certainty by the intellect, and the dictate of certain conscience is such a manifestation, even though the conscience be invincibly erroneous.—Conscience that is not certain, i. e., that is hesitant, that is a judgment in which the agent is aware of the possibility of error, is called doubtful or dubious conscience. The agent whose conscience is dubious is said to be in doubt. If the doubt concerns the existence or applicability of a law or moral principle, it is called speculative; but if the doubt concerns the lawfulness of an individual act to be performed or omitted, it is a practical doubt. Now, it is never permissible to act while in the state of practical doubt. Such doubt must be resolved, must be dispelled and replaced by certitude, before action can be goodATo act while in the state of practical doubt about the good or evil of an action, is to “take a chance” of the action being evil, and in so far to approve of the action even as evil; but reason requires that evil be positively avoided. When conscience is doubtful, but grounded upon solid reasons, it is called probable conscience, and the agent is said to have a probable opinion. We shall discuss the matter of probability (the doctrine of which is called probabilism) in the next section of the present Article.

c) Forming One’s Conscience c) FORMING one’s CONSCIENCE To “form” one’s conscience is to get rid of doubt and achieve certainty; it is to make up one’s mind clearly and definitely on what is required in a given individual instance; it is to reason out the right and wrong of a given situation. Now, it is not always possible to have absolute certitude (i. e., certitude so perfect as to exclude even the possibility of error) in matters of conscience. But it is always possible, directly or indirectly, to achieve moral certitude, i. e., such certitude as excludes all prudent doubt. Moral certitude is sufficient and requisite for the guidance of the consciencejudgment when there is question of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an act here and now to be determined upon. One may never act in a practical doubt, but must banish the doubt and achieve moral certitude.

How is this to be done ? Either directly, by studying the act itself and its moral determinants and so gaining a clear knowledge of its moral quality as good or evil, or, when such study is not feasible or is found fruitless, indirectly, by applying the reflex moral principle: A doubtful law does not bind. To illustrate: i. John finds among the effects of his deceased father a valuable set of books which, on the testimony of various receipts for payment, were bought upon the installment plan from a publishing company which is no longer in existence. From records available to John it appears that his father died owing the publishing company one hundred dollars. John asks himself : “May I keep the books and do nothing about the matter of payment, or must I give one hundred dollars to pious causes so that I shall not remain in unjust possession of that which does not belong to me?” Here is the situation, the doubt. John attempts to solve the matter directly by investigation. He knows that his father was a strictly honest man, that he paid his bills promptly as they fell due. Could he have paid the bill, and mislaid the receipts ? Hardly, for he was as careful to preserve receipts as to pay his bills. Could the bill have been paid and no receipts rendered by the publishing company? Not likely, for John’s father was not the man to make continued remittances and receive no official recognition of payment. John makes inquiries about the publishing company, and learns that it failed through mismanagement; that much money was paid into its offices and left unaccounted for, and that many of its outstanding dues were not received. The doubt remains. On the one hand, John has the incomplete record which seems to indicate his father’s indebtedness. On the other hand, the character of John’s father, and the fact that he never made mention of this indebtedness, seem to indicate that the bill was paid. Evidently, then, the matter is not to be composed by direct study and investigation. Then, and only then, is John free to apply the reflex principle: A doubtful law does not bind. Notice that the law here is found by diligent inquiry to be doubtful—not, indeed, in itself, but in application. Thus, John may say: “I have made due inquiry, and my doubt remains. The law which requires me to give to every man his due is here of doubtful application, and, in that sense, a doubtful law. Now, a doubtful law does not bind. Hence, I am not bound to pay out one hundred dollars, but may remain in justified possession of the books.” Thus does John banish doubt and achieve moral certitude. ii. Jones has a valuable hunting-dog which so annoys the neighbors by baying at night that several of them have threatened to poison it. Smith, a neighbor of Jones, is annoyed by the dog, but has no intention whatever of killing it. Smith puts poisoned food about his stables for the purpose of killing rats. Later, Jones finds his dog dead, accuses Smith of poisoning it, and demands payment. In a law-suit,

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Smith is vindicated, but he is an altogether upright man and wishes to do no injustice by taking advantage of a court decision. He is in a state of doubt. On the one hand, it is altogether possible that the dog came to grief by eating the poisoned food which he had placed for rats. On the other hand, it is quite as possible that some other distraught neighbor directly poisoned the animal. Studying over the question brings Smith no nearer to its solution; and, of course, it would be futile to inquire among the neighbors about the real cause of the dog’s death, since none of them offered any evidence when Smith was under trial. The doubt remaining insoluble or invincible, it becomes permissible for Smith to apply the reflex principle: A doubtful law does not bind, and so, with moral certitude, to decide that he is free from obligation towards Jones. It is possible, then, to achieve moral certitude in one of two ways: i. by direct study and investigation which clears away doubt and gives certain knowledge, or, this failing; ii. by application of the reflex principle: A doubtful law does not bind. Now, it may be asked, when is a law doubtfid? A law is doubtful when there is a solid and prudent reason for uncertainty as to its existence or applicability in a given case. And such reasonable uncertainty may arise either from the fact that there is no discoverable reason for the existence or applicability of a law, or from the fact that there is an actual and positive reason against the existence or applicability of a law. When a law is doubtful, then its dubious state is due to the existence of a solidly probable reason, which, negatively or positively, makes for uncertainty in the matter of the law’s existence or applicability. Now a solidly probable reason is a reason that would be regarded as sound and sufficient by a good and prudent man; in complex matters, we should require such a reason as would meet the approval of a good, prudent, and learned man. One who relies upon such a reason is said to have a probable opinion. Out of this situation emerges a doctrine for forming one’s conscience, —a doctrine called Probabilism. Probabilism teaches that when there is mere question of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an act, a solidly probable reason favoring its lawfulness suffices for moral certainty and renders the act permissible. The reasoning upon which Probabilism- is based may be set forth as follows :

A doubtful law does not bind; But a law against which a solidly probable reason militates is a doubtful law : Therefore, a law against which a solidly probable reason militates does not bind.

Probabilism is of great use in dispelling doubt and forming one’s conscience, but its use is best limited to matters of business and to the field of human positive law. In the more abstract questions of morals there is grave danger of applying Probabilism too quickly and without proper justification. It must always be remembered that Probabilism is deduced from a reflex moral principle which has no place in the legitimate formation of conscience unless the direct method (of positive study and investigation of the actual situation) proves impossible or fruitless in the matter of dispelling doubt. There is one case in which Probabilism cannot be made to serve at all, viz., in the case of a certain end absolutely to be achieved. Thus, even when there is a solidly probable reason that a convert to the Catholic faith has been validly baptized, the sacrament will be administered conditionally upon his reception into the Church. For Baptism is absolutely necessary to salvation, and probability has no service to render in the matter, since certainty is directly achievable. Let the student consider the following cases and judge where Probabilism may serve: i. A physician has a sure remedy for a certain disease. He has also a second remedy which, he has very strong reasons for believing, will effect a cure more rapidly, and with less discomfort to the patient, than the first. May he use the second remedy ? ii. Pasteur found his anti-toxin for hydrophobia most effective when used on animals. No other remedy for the dread disease was known. A child that had been bitten by a mad dog was brought to Pasteur. Could he administer the anti-toxin, although it had never before been used in the treatment of a human being r iii. A nurse knows that a certain physician—a skillful and capable man—has once, through hurry and the mistake of a lay attendant, caused the death of a patient by administering a lethal drug. She doubts whether she is obliged to declare the matter and have the physician dismissed from the hospital staff. She realizes that the death of the patient was a most unfortunate accident, and that the physician will most probably be very careful to avoid such accidents in future. Still, the man destroyed a human life, and perhaps the persons who employ him slibuld be made aware of the fact. How is the doubt to be resolved ? iv. A tenant doubts whether he has paid his rent for a certain month. His landlord, a careless man in his accounts, is also in doubt. Must the tenant pay the rent? If he decides to do so, may the landlord accept it? v. A hunter sights an animal far off among the trees. He feels sure that it is a deer; still he realizes that it is possible that the animal may be a horse or cow belonging to a farmer of the neighborhood. May he fire? May he fire even if he is willing to pay handsomely in case of error?

Summary of the Article

In this Article we have defined conscience and have explained every phrase of the definition. We have distinguished conscience from synteresis, and have explained it as a practical judgment, distinguishing it on this score from speculative judgment. We have studied the states of conscience, and have learned what is meant by a true or correct conscience, an erroneous conscience, an invincibly erroneous conscience, a certain conscience, a doubtful or dubious conscience, and a probable conscience. We have discussed what is meant by “forming one’s conscience,” and have discovered the situation in which it is lawful to apply the reflex principle that a doubtful law does not bind. We have studied Probabilism. We may sum up the principles explained in the Article as follows: 1. A certain conscience is to be obeyed, even when invincibly erroneous. 2. It is never lawful to act while in practical doubt; moral certainty must-be acquired. 3. Only when direct means are unavailable, or fail to lead to certainty, may one employ the reflex principle that a doubtful law does not bind. 4. In question of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an act to be performed or omitted—direct certainty being unachievable, and the reflex principle being employed—one may follow any solidly probable reason (opinion), even to the neglect of a more probable one. 5. One may not follow a probable opinion, even a most probable opinion, when there is question of a definite end to be achieved, and sure means to its achievement exist.