The Interaction of Intellect and Will

a) The Distinction of Intellect and Will — b) Mutual Influence of Intellect and Will

a) The Distinction of Intellect and Will

Between the intellect and the will there is a real distinction. Both are faculties of the soul, but they are faculties for essentially different services, and so are said to be really distinct. They are two faculties, not two phases of one.

We have seen that the faculty of intellect serves man in a variety of ways, as understanding, memory, intelligence, reason, consciousness, conscience. Yet the intellect is one faculty. For the services it renders are all in the realm of supra-organic knowing. There is indeed a distinction between intelligence and reason, between understanding and conscience. But these are not faculties distinct in kind; they are names for the one intellect functioning in its various ways.

The will is one faculty — the faculty of rational tending, of choosing, of loving in the intellectual sense. It is really distinct from the intellect, for it is a tending-faculty, and the intellect is a knowing-faculty; and knowing and tending are essentially different things.

b) Mutual Influence of Intellect and Will

The intellect and will are in constant and profound mutual interaction.

The intellect influences the will in two main ways. First, the will always requires anterior action on the part of intellect: nothing can be willed unless first known — nihil volitum nisi praecognitum. This is an absolute and unconditional rule. Before the will can tend towards any object, the intellect must present that object as good and thus render it appetizable. The intellect acts here as a final cause in moving the will: it presents to the will the object, the good, towards which the will thereupon moves.

Second, the intellect acts as a final cause in moving the will, while the will acts as an efficient cause in moving the intellect. The intellect presents the good; the will tends towards it. But the will also directs the intellect — moves it to consider this object rather than that, to attend to these aspects rather than those, to bring its full power to bear on the problem at hand or to desist from inquiry.

The will influences the intellect as an efficient cause. The will moves the intellect to consider particular questions, to hold or release its attention, to pursue or abandon lines of inquiry. This influence of will upon intellect is of the greatest moral importance. A man who habitually directs his will towards truth, who sincerely desires to know what is really good and really true, will find that his will forms and disposes his intellect to see clearly and judge truly. A man whose will is habitually biased — who wills to believe what flatters him, or what excuses his conduct, or what justifies his desires — will find that his intellect becomes correspondingly darkened and disposed to rationalize rather than to reason.

We compared the intellect to a spot-light and the will to the hand that guides it and controls the direction of its beams. In the example of the intemperate man, the intellect is allowed by the guiding will to focus its light upon the immediate pleasure to be had in drinking; the consequences and ugly circumstances of the act are allowed to remain in darkness. Thus we see that the object, despite all evil that comes of it, is seen under the aspect of the desirable, the satisfying, the appetizable. In a word, the object is chosen as good. — Consider the man who declares that he would like to lead a virtuous life, yet continues to lead a bad life. The judgments of the intellect are of two kinds: speculative and practical. A speculative judgment pronounces on the truth or falsity of a fact or situation; it recognizes a state of affairs. A practical judgment is one that enunciates something to be done or avoided. Now, the will follows the practical judgment of the intellect, for the will is a doing-power, a choosing-power. The mere recognition of virtue as good and desirable is not yet a practical judgment; it is speculative; it is the pronouncement of intellect upon the status of a thing; it is the recognition of a state of affairs. Only when the intellect presents virtue as not only good but also to be done now, in the present circumstances, does the practical judgment emerge. And at this point the will follows — or refuses to follow, in which case it turns the intellect’s attention away from the practical demand and back to the merely speculative.

We have studied the mutual influence or interaction of intellect and will. We have found that, while the will always requires anterior action on the part of intellect, intellect does not always require the activity of will for its function. Further we have learned that the intellect acts as a final cause in moving the will, and the will acts as an efficient cause in moving the intellect. We have added a word about the relative perfection or nobility of intellect and will.

Summary of the Article

We have studied the mutual influence or interaction of intellect and will. We have found that, while the will always requires anterior action on the part of intellect, intellect does not always require the activity of will for its function. Further we have learned that the intellect acts as a final cause in moving the will, and the will acts as an efficient cause in moving the intellect. We have added a word about the relative perfection or nobility of intellect and will.