The Divine Operation of Creation

Before discussing the exercise of God’s power in the transient divine operations it may be well to say a word on this power itself. We have already seen that God is infinite in all perfection, and power, that is, the ability to make and to do and to accomplish, is in itself a pure perfection. Therefore God must have power. Further, since God is infinitely simple, all that God has, He is. God’s power is, therefore, really identified with the Divine Essence Itself; God is Infinite Power. We express this truth about God when we say that He is omnipotent or almighty. Our catechism expresses the same truth when it declares that “God can do all things, and nothing is hard or impossible to Him.”

There are several points to be noticed about the power of God. First, it is not a power that is exercised by effort. Effort suggests imperfection; it means the expenditure of power to overcome obstacles; but there can be no obstacles (or limits) in the way of illimitable power. God’s power is exercised by the Divine Intellect and Will. God is the perfect agens per intellectum et voluntatem (“Agent or actor by intellect and will”). With God, to will is to accomplish. Secondly, God’s infinite power is humanly expressed as an ability to do all things. And “things” is a word that means what it says; it does not mean contradictions, that is, denials of things. That God cannot make a square circle, or that God cannot make a “two-year-old colt in a minute,” is not a limitation of the unlimited Divine Power. For a square circle means a circle that is not a circle; in a word, it means nothing; it means not a thing but the cancellation and the denial of a thing. So a two-yearold colt that is only a minute old, is a two-year-old that is not a two-year-old, a manifest contradiction. Now, contradictions are intrinsic impossibilities; they are inconceivable as things because they are the opposite of things. This point we have already discussed and evidenced in the First Book of this manual. Thirdly, God’s power, looked at simply in itself is God’s absolute power. And God’s power, re- garded as it stands aligned with the other Divine Perfections,—such as Goodness, Wisdom, Justice,— is God’s ordinated power. Of course, this distinction is one required by our limited minds; for in God Himself all these Perfections are identified with each other and with the Divine Essence Itself. We say that all things are possible to God’s absolute power, but certain things are not possible to God’s ordinated power. For example, it is within the absolute power of God to take an unrepentant sinner into the glory of Heaven. But, since such an act on God’s part would conflict with the freedom of the human will on the one hand, and with Divine Justice on the other, we say that it is not within God’s ordinated power so to save a sinner against his will. When, therefore, we say that God is almighty or omnipotent, we mean that God, by the effortless exercise of the Divine Will (eternally illuminated by the Divine Intellect) can bring into being anything that is not a conflict in itself (and hence a nonentity, a nothing) or in conflict with the Divine Perfections. b) meaning of creation

Creation is a term often used in English in a twofold meaning. It is used to indicate the act or operation of creating, and it is used to indicate the fruit or product of this act. Thus we speak of the creation of the world as the operation whereby God produces the world. And we may, in emotional moments, sing “All up and down the whole creation,” using the word creation to indicate the world itself which is the fruit or product of the operation of creating. In our present study we use the term creation in its active or dynamic sense; we use it to indicate the divine activity or operation whereby God produces things out of nothing. There is a third use of the term creation which we must notice and wholly reject for philosophical purposes; it is that use in which the term is taken as a synonym for product; arrangement; thing made of elements or materials. Thus the milliner may speak of a hat as a “Parisian creation”; thus the poet may speak of his newest sonnet as the creature of his fancy, that is, as a thing created by his mind and imagination. Our study of the definition of creation will show us that this extended meaning of the term creation is wholly alien to our understanding of it in philosophy. Creation is the active producing of a thing in its entirety out of nothing. It is the producing of a thing, whole and entire, without using any materials of any sort. Philosophers say that the creation of a thing is the total production of the thing ex nihil sui et subjecti, that is, without any element or seedling of the thing being there to begin with (ex nihil sui), and without any materials or subject-matter (ex nihil subjecti) out of which the thing is to be formed. When we say that the Creator makes things out of nothing, we do not mean that “nothing” is itself a kind of material which is divinely shaped into realities. We mean that, whereas there is nothing to begin with, now, by an act of the Divine Understanding and Will, there is something real. Hence, our idea of creation involves no conflict with the axiom ex nihilo nihil fit (“Out of nothing, nothing is made”) since the axiom means that the production of things out of elements or materials requires that the elements or materials be there at the outset. But creation is not the production of things out of elements or materials, and hence the absence of these things is in no wise a difficulty to one who can create. Some philosophers, like Victor Cousin (17921867) and Aloysius Ferri (1826-1895), have defined creation in a way that suggests that God draws all creatures out of Himself. This sort of definition is pantheistic in implication, and seems to make the world of creatures part and parcel with the Divine Essence. We cannot accept such a definition of creation, for it would involve us in hopeless contradictions, making the changeless God one with the changeable world, and the Infinite and Necessary Being one with the contingent universe. Of course, if the phrase “out of Himself” is interpreted to mean “by means of His own unaided power and irresistible will,” it may stand unchallenged; but it is manifest that the phrase is not necessarily to be so interpreted; it is an indefinite phrase, capable of con- dieting interpretations, and hence it is unsuitable for scientific expression. When we say that God creates, we mean that God, by the power of His will, causes things to come into actuality without using any “materials” of any sort. We mean that God makes substances without requiring any source-substance out of which to make them. All bodily substances have their first origin in creation; thereafter,—since bodies are substantially changeable,—they normally produce other bodies by the process of substantial transformation called generation and corruption. All spiritual substances are directly created, nor can these generate further spiritual substances or undergo any corruption, for spiritual substances are not subject to substantial transformation. It may be asked whether this thing called creation is possible; whether there is not in the idea of creation an involved conflict or contradiction; whether there is not something in creation that is in conflict with God’s ordinated power; whether, finally, there is not something on the part of finite things that resists the notion of sheer production by way of creation. We must consider this question in its three points. i. Creation involves in itself, that is, in its very concept or idea, no contradiction or conflict. It is not an unthinkable thing like a square circle. Indeed, the concept or idea of creation is so far from being self- contradictory that it imposes itself as necessary upon the mind that seeks to account for the existence of contingent realities. For such things do not have to exist; their existence is explicable only on the grounds that they have been given existence, that they have been brought into existence. And, in last analysis, their being brought into existence must mean their being brought out of nothingness, that is, in their being created; for there can be no endless process of one such thing coming from another, and this from another, and so on forever. There must have been a first production of contingent things; there must have been a beginning, and a truly first beginning, of things that have in themselves no necessity or absolute requirement for existence. But a truly first production of contingent things is inconceivable except as creation. Therefore, on the score of the very idea or concept of creation, we find no conflict, no selfcontradiction, no impossibility. On this score, creation means something entirely possible. 2. Creation involves no contradiction or conflict among the perfections of God; it does not suggest something that is out of harmony with the ordinated Divine Power. For it does not involve the notion of a filling-up or filling-out of the Infinite Being by the existence of finite beings. If creation were conceived of as a thing required by God, or as an activity imposed upon God by extrinsic force or even by His

2Z2 own goodness, it would conflict with the Divine Perfections and so would be impossible to God’s ordinated power. But we have already seen that God is not affected by creatures; that there is no real relation on God’s part towards them, even though there is an essential and real relation on the part of creatures towards Him; God is wholly and infinitely complete and perfect in Himself without creatures. For the rest, God’s power would be incomplete, and not infinite, were creation impossible to Him. The idea of creation as truly possible is included in the very idea of the Divine Power. Nor is the idea of creation in any conceivable disagreement with the Divine Wisdom, the Divine Justice, the Divine Goodness, or any other of the perfections of God; on the contrary, it appears, both at first sight and upon penetrating study, to be in complete harmony with all the Divine Perfections and a worthy external expression and manifestation of them. Therefore, on the score of God’s ordinated power, we find no conflict or contradiction in the idea of creation. On this score, creation means something wholly possible.

5. Creation manifestly involves no conflict on the part of things created, that is, on the part of creatures. For such things are existible; they can exist, as is evident in the fact that they do exist; they can receive existence, and indeed must receive existence if they are to have it at all. But creation is neither more nor less than the very first giving (and receiving) of existence ; it is the giving of existence by the Creator, the receiving of existence by the creature. So far from being out of harmony with the notion of contingent things, creation is necessary to explain the first existence of such things. The meaning of the term creation is, therefore, a consistent and an intelligible meaning. Creation as the fundamental production of contingent substances is conceivable as something entirely possible. We have, later on, to discuss it as something inescapably actual, as an incontrovertible fact. But first we must round out our study of the meaning of creation by inquiring whether it means an activity proper to God alone, or one communicable by God to creatures so that creatures in their turn may create.

We must assert at once that creation is so entirely proper to God alone that creatures cannot serve, even instrumentally, as creating agents. Only God can create; creatures cannot be creators either as principal agents or as instrumental agents. We pause upon the three points of this statement.

1. Only God can create. A being capable of creating, that is, of bringing substances into actual existence without using any pre-existing materials, is a being wholly independent of such materials; such a being has no dependency on substances outside itself.

This is manifestly true. For where there is nothing of finite substance to begin with, nothing by way of start or element or seedling, and nothing by way of materials out of which to construct a substance {nihil sui et subjecti) there is no conceivable way of effecting the production except by sheer intellectual power, that is, by sheer will. And a will that can produce substances by its own simple exercise is manifestly an independent will, an effortless will, an unhampered or unlimited will. Now, the concept of such a will is the concept of an infinite will. And only God is infinite ; only God is Infinite Will. Therefore, only God can create.

2. Creatures cannot create as principal agents. This truth is manifest from the foregoing argument, for no creature is possessed of infinite will, and infinite will is required in the principal agent or principal cause of the creative act. 5. Creatures cannot create as instrumental agents. The statement means that no creature can serve God in creating, as a tool or instrument or bodily member can serve man, for example, in his activities. In the act of writing, for instance, man uses the conjoined natural instruments of arm, hand, and fingers, and the artificial instrument of pen or pencil. The man is the principal agent or cause of the writing, but to effect the writing he uses the instrumental causes or agencies of bodily members and writing-tool. Now we assert that God cannot use creatures as His instruments in creating, nor does this mean a lack of perfection in God; on the contrary, it indicates the Divine Sufficiency which requires no instruments for its activities. For the requiring of instruments is a mixed or non-pure perfection, involving imperfection. That a man can write with movements of hand and application of pen or pencil, is a perfection; that a man must employ these instruments to produce the writing, is a limiting thing and an imperfection. But in God there is no shadow of imperfection. Certainly, then, God could never require the service of instruments in creating. But neither is it limiting the power of God to say that He cannot use instruments in the creative activity. For an instrument must have some connatural fitness for the service in which it is employed, and no creature has the fitness, the infinite fulness, requisite to serve as the physical channel of creative power; hence, the impossibility of using creatures as instrumental agents in creating is the inadequacy of creatures and not the inadequacy of God. To convey infinite power physically by means of an instrument (were that even conceivable) would require infinity in the instrument as well as in the principal agent or cause. But the thought of an infinite instrument (that is, an infinite creature) is a selfcontradictory thought; it indicates something sheerly and intrinsically impossible, as a square circle is im- possible. Hence, since finite instruments are inadequate, and since infinite instruments are unthinkable, we say that no instrumental cause or agency can be used in creating. Further, the use of an instrument is always the employment of it upon some subject, upon something preexisting which receives the instrumental action. But creation is an activity which deals with no subject, no preexisting item, element, or material, for it is the production of a thing in its entirety out of nothing. Therefore, no instrument could render any conceivable service to the creating God. By creation, then, we mean that activity,—which is so proper to God alone that creatures cannot serve even instrumentally in its exercise,—whereby the Divine Power produces realities in their entirety, using nothing preexisting as the font or source of the production. c) THE FACT OF CREATION

The world of finite realities challenges our attention and demands a sufficient accounting. We must face and answer the question of the first origin of contingent things. And our answer must be one of three: for 1, either the world,—that is, the universe of finite, changing things about us, and ourselves as part of that universe,—has had no beginning, or 2. the world is only a part or phase of God’s own being and substance, or 5. the world has its origin in the creative action of God. All theories on first origins in the universe are reducible to these three and to these only. Now, we find the first two of these theories wholly unacceptable as in open conflict with experience and with reason, and thus we are compelled to accept the third theory, the theory of creation, as the true and factual doctrine. The world had its first origin in creation; the world was created; the world is a world of creatures. Let us glance at some reasons which compel this conclusion. 1. The world cannot be, as the materialists say, an eternal and unproduced universe. For what is eternal and unproduced must have in itself the sufficient reason for its existence, the ratio sufficiens existentiae suae, which is required to account for every actuality. But an actuality that has in itself the sufficient reason for its existence is pure actuality; it is necessary being, and, by that fact, it is infinite, absolutely simple or uncomposed, and changeless. Now, it is manifest that the world is not necessary, but contingent; not purely actual, but also potential, not infinite, but limited; not simple, but a manifold or compound; not changeless, but full of motion or change. Therefore, the world is not eternal and unproduced. But if it is not eternal and unproduced, it has had a beginning, an origin. We cannot, therefore, accept the theory which declares that the world has had no origin, no producing cause.

2. The world cannot be, as the pantheists say, an outpouring of God, or a phase of God’s being and substance. First of all, such an outpouring or phase would be a kind of evolution or development of the Divine Substance, and this would involve potentiality in God who is Pure Actuality; it would involve change in the Immutable Being; it would involve development or improvement in the All Perfect. These are manifest contradictions and are wholly impossible. Further, to identify God in any manner with the world is to impose upon God the properties and inseparable characteristics of the world. It is to make God finite, compounded, contingent, whereas, as we have already proved, God is infinite, simple, necessary. Reason forces us to reject the pantheistic theory of the first origin of the world. 5. If the world is neither unproduced, nor somehow identified with the Divine Substance, it is a world that has had its origin as something other than God. Now, there is no conceivable first origin of things other than God except an origin by way of creation. Therefore, the world has had its first origin in creation; the world was created; creation is an actual fact,

Summary Of The Article

In this Article we have discussed the Divine Power, and have seen that God is necessarily almighty or

omnipotent, and can do all things which involve no intrinsic contradiction (and hence are nothings or net-things’). We have distinguished the power of God as absolute and ordinated, according as it is considered in itself or in conjunction with the goodness, justice, wisdom, and other perfections of God. We have defined creation as the active producing of a thing in its entirety out of nothing. We have justified this definition and have rejected faulty ones, such as those proposed by Cousin and Ferri. We have seen that creation is something wholly possible, since it is thinkable in itself, it does not conflict with the Divine Perfections, and it involves no conflict on the part of things to be produced by it. Further, we have found that creation is inevitably a direct exercise of infinite power, and is therefore an activity so proper to God alone that creatures cannot serve, even instrumentally, in its exercise. We have seen that creation is not only possible but that the first origin of things other than God must lie in God’s creative action, and that, in consequence; creation is a fact.