The Unity or Oneness of Being

Book Second

Properties of Being

This Book discusses those aspects of being which are called its transcendental properties or attributes, and studies all their implications. Further, the Book investigates the characteristics or properties of being, which, while not strictly transcendental, are nevertheless most general or universal. These matters are studied in two Chapters, as follows:

• Chapter I. Transcendental Properties of Being
• Chapter II. The Most General Properties of Being

Chapter I

The Transcendental Properties of Being

This Chapter studies three aspects or phases of being. These are not something different from being itself; they are not something new or additional which we must join to the concept of being. On the contrary, they are entirely coextensive with being and identical with it. But these aspects or phases of being are of great help to our inquiring minds when we come to study all the implications of the concept of being: they serve us as distinct points of approach to that study. For want of a better term we call these phases or aspects of being by the name properties or attributes, and, since they are identified with being itself, which is a transcendental concept, we call these properties transcendental properties or transcendental attributes of being. Such attributes are three, viz., unity or oneness, truth or trueness, and goodness. We shall study the three transcendental properties of being in three Articles:

• Article 1. The Unity or Oneness of Being
• Article 2. The Truth or Trueness of Being
• Article 3. The Goodness of Being

Article 1. The Unity or Oneness of Being

a) Meaning of Unity　　b) Classification of Unity　　c) Individuality and Individuation　　d) Identity and Distinction

---

a) Meaning of Unity

When we speak of the unity or oneness of being we do not mean that all things are really one and that there is no real variety or multiplicity in the world. There have been, and indeed are, philosophers to propound this strange doctrine. We call these teachers monists, and their doctrine monism; the terms are derived from the Greek monos which means “one only,” “single,” “alone.”

Monism has several varieties, although it is a doctrine which denies real variety. First, there is materialistic monism which ignores or denies everything but the bodily universe, and holds that things in this material world are no more different in their essences than biscuits from the same lump of dough or drops from the same sea. Then there is pantheistic monism which denies the existence of everything but God, and, in one way or another, identifies the world with God. A notable form of pantheistic monism is idealistic monism which denies the existence of the world as we experience it, and makes the universe a series or scheme of images in an Absolute Mind, that is, in God.

When we speak of the oneness of being we mean nothing monistic, nothing materialistic, pantheistic, or idealistic. We have already seen that all things are one only in the idea or concept of being and, even there, this oneness is not specific or generic but analogical. In reality as it exists outside our minds there is not being but there are beings; not thing, but things. By the unity or oneness of being (that is, by the transcendental unity of being) we mean that for a reality to exist or to be existible it must be that reality, that one thing, unbroken, undivided, unmultiplied or unrepeated.

Unity or oneness means undividedness and unrepeatedness. A thing is one, or has unity, inasmuch as it is itself, undivided into parts, and unrepeated as a plurality or multiplication or repetition of itself. To say that a reality has unity, therefore, is simply to say that the reality is itself, that it is this thing, that it is this one thing and no other. It is not suggested that a reality cannot be divided into parts if it has parts; it is only asserted that, as a fact, it is not divided into parts. Further, it is asserted that a unit (a reality which is one) is not at once itself and a repetition or multiplication of itself; it is not at once singular and plural. In passing, we must notice here that this self-evident doctrine which is derived immediately from the concept of being, and which is but a new way of expressing that concept, does not deny the possibility of a multiplied presence of one and the same unmultiplied reality. By a power greater than that which lies at the command of created natures, one single reality remaining that one single reality, may conceivably be present in more than one place. Thus the five loaves and two fishes which, at the command of Christ, fed a multitude of thousands, remained the five loaves and the two fishes; the Lord did not create new supplies of bread and fishes; He multiplied the presence of the original five and two, and each of these served at the same moment as the food of many. Similarly, Christ is one Christ; He is not multiplied into repetitions or multiplications of Himself; this is manifestly a metaphysical impossibility. But His presence is multiplied in the Blessed Sacrament, so that the same Christ is truly and literally present in every consecrated Host and in every part thereof, though there be millions of consecrated Hosts existing at the same moment in the tabernacles throughout the world or within the bosoms of thousands who have just received Holy Communion.

Some realities cannot be divided into parts because they are not made up of parts. Such realities are called simple, in the original Latin sense of that term which means “uncomposed,” “not compounded,” “not made up of parts,” and hence “indivisible.” Such a reality is, for example, the human soul; it cannot be divided into parts because it has no parts. But the unity of a reality does not depend upon its being a simple reality; a reality, a being, has unity whether it be simple or compounded. The unity of a reality consists in its being undivided and unrepeated; such unity consists in actual undividedness, not in indivisibility.

The classic definition of unity is indivisio entis, that is, “the undividedness of a thing in its being.” A reality has unity inasmuch as it has undividedness and unrepeatedness in itself. Now, what is undivided in itself is, in this multiple world, immediately recognized as contrasted with other things, each of which is, in itself, undivided. Thus the immediate consequence of undividedness in a reality is its dividedness, or its being marked off as distinct, from everything else. Therefore, the definition of unity is properly rounded out by a phrase which indicates the distinction of a thing from other things, and we say that unity is the undividedness of a reality as such or in itself, and its dividedness or distinction from all that is not itself. The point is crisply expressed in the familiar Latin formula, unum est id quod est indivisum in se, divisum a quolibet alio.

Before taking up the classifications of unity, we must say a brief word about unicity or uniqueness. A thing has unicity, or is unique, when it is the only thing of its kind. Modern casual speech often employs the term “unique” in the sense of “unusual,” “strange,” “remarkable,” or “notably fine.” But the proper meaning of the term is “the only one of its kind.”

Whatever can be thought of as existing (i. e., any being) is necessarily thought of as one; it is necessarily one; whatever is existent or existible has unity. The very idea or concept of being makes this fact imperative and makes it evident. This sort of unity is called transcendental unity.

Hence we see the justice of the axiom, omne ens est unum; ens et unum convertuntur, that is, “Every reality has unity; being and oneness are synonymous and interchangeable terms.”

b) Classification of Unity

We distinguish I. Transcendental Unity and II. Quantitative Unity. Further, we classify transcendental unity as 1. Concrete Unity, 2. Abstract Unity, 3. Essential Unity, 4. Non-essential Unity. Certain minor distinctions of these classes must also be made.

I. Transcendental Unity is the unity of a being as such. Every reality, every existent and existible substance or accident, every possible object of thought or fancy, is itself, is that thing, is that one thing and no other. Whatever exists, exists in the oneness of its being; whatever is existible, can come into existence only as that one thing. Thus we see that the unity of reality transcends the boundaries of genera and species, of classes and kinds; not this or that sort of being only, but any being, every conceivable being, has its unity. Even as the idea being soars over the limits and boundaries of kinds and classifications, so unity (which is the synonym of being) soars over these limitations and applies to all reality. Rightly, therefore, do we name this unity transcendental. We say that transcendental unity is a property or attribute of being, because a property or attribute is that which belongs to a reality by natural necessity, and unity belongs by natural necessity to every being as such. Yet the terms attribute and property are used here by analogy, and not in strict and literal meaning. For transcendental unity not only belongs to every being; it is identical with the very concept of being. Inasmuch as a thing has being, inasmuch as it is itself, it is one, it has unity. The concept of being and the concept of transcendental unity are truly identical.

Transcendental unity is concrete or abstract, essential or non-essential.

1. Concrete unity is the unity of a thing (existent or existible) apart from the consideration of the mind. Things which actually do exist,—whether simple or compound, finite or infinite, spiritual or material,—exist as determinate things, and not as mental abstractions. In a word, each existing thing “in nature” has its own concreteness, its own individuality, its own singular or numerical or real or concrete unity. Concrete unity is the unity of an existent or existible thing as such, not the unity of a thing as conceived by the mind, or classified or predicated by the mind.

2. Abstract unity is the unity of a thing as conceived by the mind. The reality man, as grasped by the mind, has unity; it is one understood essence. Yet there are many men in nature outside the mind, each with his own individual and concrete unity. Human beings in nature are concretely or individually distinct, and each of them has concrete unity; conceptually or abstractly, all human beings are one; all are inferiors of the one idea; all are abstractly represented in the single idea man. The mind, as we have seen, conceives reality in universal, but reality is existible only in individual. The unity of a thing as grasped by the mind (i. e., abstract unity) is the undividedness and unrepeatedness of the idea itself and as such; the real essence which the idea represents may be repeated indefinitely in individuals which exist (or can exist) in nature outside the mind.

3. Essential unity is the oneness necessary to an essence in order that it may be itself. The essence man, for example, is one essence, and it is essentially one; for if this essential oneness be broken—if, for instance, the element of rationality be removed—the essence is no longer man. The essential unity of a substance is called substantial unity. The unity of an accident as such is essential to that accident. The essential unity of a compound substance is founded upon the merging or fusion of substantial elements in such wise as to constitute a new substance, that is, a substance not identified with any of the fused elements taken singly nor with their mere aggregate or sum. Thus a man is a substantial unit; he is a composite of body and soul; he is not body alone, nor soul alone, nor the mere sum of body plus soul; he is a single compound substantial unit.

4. Non-essential unity or accidental unity is the oneness of a plurality of things in some point that does not pertain to essence. The following types of accidental unity, as will be seen, are not perfectly exclusive all along the line, but, in some cases, may overlap: (a) Collective unity is the result of mere aggregation or juxtaposition, as in a handful of pebbles or a coachful of passengers. (b) Natural unity is the product of the forces of nature, as in a tree with its size, shape, number of leaves, etc. (c) Artificial unity is the unity produced by the art or craft of man. (d) Moral unity is the unity of a common purpose, interest, or aim in a plurality of persons or groups of persons.

II. Quantitative Unity is predicable strictly of material things alone, of things subject to measurement and to numbering of amounts, elements, and parts. However, by analogy, we use the terminology of quantitative unity in speaking of non-material things and in the abstract sciences. A number is defined as “a multitude measured by one.” In figuring, that is in measurements of quantities in the abstract or in concrete, we employ numbers, and each of these is either a sum of ones (of units) or a division of ones (of units).

c) Individuality and Individuation

We have learned that a universal idea is the representation (or re-presence) in the mind of an essence regarded as capable of actualization in a plurality of things. When the universal represents a substance, it is called substantia secunda or secondary substance, and is thus contrasted with substantia prima or primary substance or the concrete reality which has the essence in singular which the idea represents in universal. This primary substance is what we mean by an individual substance, or simply an individual.

An individual substance has individuality; it has singularity. It has not only an essence which is (or may be) identical in kind with the essence of other things; it has its own concrete essence which belongs to itself alone and to no other. Thus, John Jones is a human being, and as such he is identical in species or in kind with every other human being; in this fact we discern his specification, that is, his assignment to a definite essential (i. e., specific) class of things. But John Jones is, in himself, a singular and concrete actualization of the essence man; he is this one human person and no other; in this fact we discern his individuation, that is, his assignment, not to a class, but to his place as a single existent member or item of his class. If we ask what he is, that is, if we inquire after his essence, we seek to specify him; so we say he is “a man.” If we ask who he is, that is, if we inquire which single one he is among the many with whom he shares a common specification, we seek to individuate him. We may say that the first question inquires after the fundamental “whatness,” and the second question inquires after the “thisness” of John Jones. His “thisness” is his individuality.

It is of the very nature of the universal that it be communicable, that is, that it be capable of existing as shared unto things. It is of the very nature of the individual that it be incommunicable, that it be incapable of being shared unto things other than itself. The essence man (a universal) is shared unto all human beings; the concrete essence of this man Jones (an individual) is not capable of being shared at all. Things can exist only in singularity or as individuals outside the mind.

Now, the accidental marks or points by which we recognize an individual substance among other individual substances of the same kind are called “individuating marks” or “individuating notes,” and these are summed up in an ancient Latin formula:

Forma, figura, locus, tempus, stirps, patria, nomen: Haec ea sunt septem, quae non habet unus et alter.

We may translate the couplet freely as follows: “Form, shape, place, time, blood, country, name, / In no two things are all the same.” In no two human individuals are all seven of these notes or marks found to be identical, not even in identical twins.

1. The Principle of Individuation.—Are the accidental features of a substance which enable one to recognize it as an individual to be considered the factors which make it an individual? Manifestly not. For an individual is a substantial thing, substantially distinct from all others, even from those with which it has an identity of species. Its individuation is therefore not a matter of mere accident. We must look beyond accidentals for our true Principle of Individuation, that is, for the true determining and constituting factor which makes an individual an individual.

May not each individual bodily substance be constituted an individual by its own rounded reality; may not its individuality be a phase of its essence? This cannot be. For if a substance were individuated by its essence, there would be no possibility of other things having the same essence; each individual would be unique; it would be the only thing of its kind. Yet trees are all trees; human beings are all human beings, equally, one as truly as another. For an essence can be communicated; it can be given to many; many things may be identical in point of essence. But we have seen that it is of the very definition of an individual that it cannot be communicated. St. Thomas Aquinas says, “That whereby Socrates is a man can be communicated to many; but that whereby Socrates is this man cannot be communicated to anyone but himself alone. If, then, Socrates were made this man by the same factor which makes him a man (i. e., by his essence), there could be no plurality of men any more than there can be a plurality of Socrates.”

Scotus (d. 1308), one of the most profound of Scholastic philosophers, held that a certain quality of “this-ness” attaches to an existing bodily substance as a kind of property formally distinct from the essence or nature of the substance itself; it is this property which constitutes the individual as such. Without presuming to criticize the Scotistic doctrine, we may say that the current interpretation of that doctrine as touching individuation of bodies does not appear to be satisfactory.

St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) proposes the principle of individuation most generally accepted among Scholastic philosophers. He teaches that an individual bodily substance is made individual by the fact that it is a material thing with quantity. The phrase used is materia quantitate signata, or, more simply, materia signata, which we may translate as “quantified matter.” We do not say that quantity individuates bodily substances, for quantity is an accident. We say that matter (a substantial principle of bodily being) individuates bodies inasmuch as it is marked by quantity. Quantity is an accident, but it is proper to matter, and existing matter is necessarily quantified; it is such matter, such substantial reality, that individuates bodily substances.

(a) If quantified matter (which is a bodily reality) is the principle of individuation, there can be no strict and literal individuation of complete spiritual substances. Each complete spiritual substance is constituted as one thing by its own essence, and is therefore a species in itself.

(b) A bodily substance is fundamentally constituted by the union of prime matter and substantial form. The substantial form is the determining principle, the active substantial factor which makes the substance the essential kind of existing body that it is. Hence the substantial form constitutes the body in its actual and complete essence, i. e., its species, and we therefore call the substantial form the Principle of Specification. But to constitute the substance in its singular and concrete existence, the substantial form requires the cooperation of matter. Matter (materia prima) is wholly passive and potential. It is in-formed matter that makes the bodily substance, and it is in-formed matter that is individuated.

(c) When we say that quantified matter is the principle of individuation, we do not mean that a certain and definite amount of matter, capable of clear expression in terms of cubic inches, yards, or meters, enters into individuation. A baby changes its measurements constantly, but its individuality is not changed at all. Quantified matter is matter subject to the three dimensions. It is mensurable, but does not necessarily have just these dimensions, which at a given moment it actually possesses, to constitute the individual substance.

(d) Accidents are said to be individuated by their inherence in individual substances. The whiteness of a snowdrift is the individual whiteness of this snowdrift; the whiteness of the page before my eyes is the whiteness of this page. Further, accidents are individuated by their space and time relations to individual substances in which they occur.

d) Identity and Distinction

I. Identity is a term derived from two Latin words (idem, and entitas) which mean “the same thing” or “the same entity.” Inasmuch as a thing is itself, it is identical with itself. A special act of mind is required to hold in view the fact that what the different aspects present to knowledge is truly one, is truly identical. On the other hand, things really distinct and even separate in the realm of nature outside the mind may be identified in the abstract view, grasp, or concept of the mind.

The identity of a thing with itself in the order of nature outside the mind is called real identity. When one and the same objective reality is regarded under distinct aspects by the mind, we say that the identity of the object is real but not formal or logical. Conversely, identity may be formal without being real. Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Lincoln, Wilson, Roosevelt, and others, are all identified in the concept “President of the United States”; they are seen in formal or logical identity. But, manifestly, these are different persons, not identified but distinct and separate in the real order of things. Hence we say that their identity is logical or formal, but not real.

Logical or formal identity is a matter of degrees or of kinds. All men are identified formally in the specific concept man; this is specific identity. All men and beasts are identified in the concept animal; this is generic identity. Of all points which serve as the basis of accidental identity, quantity and quality are the most notable. Things identical in quantity are said to be equal or to have equality; things identical in quality are said to be alike or similar.

In all this, we have been considering being as static. The Principle of Identity thus abstracts from the fact that creatural being is steadily subject to change and is continually undergoing change, substantial or accidental or both.

II. Distinction is the absence of identity in a plurality of things. Distinction is real or logical.

1. Real distinction is the distinction which exists between thing and thing. It is the lack or absence of identity in the order of reality outside and independent of the mind. Real distinction is major or minor. (a) A major real distinction is a distinction between one thing and another. (b) A minor real distinction is often called a modal distinction.

2. Logical distinction (called also distinction of reason) is a distinction which exists in the mind’s view of things, and not in the things viewed. (a) A purely logical distinction has no foundation in reality; it is wholly in the mind. (b) A logical distinction with a basis in reality is commonly designated by the Latin phrase distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re. This distinction is often called a virtual distinction.

Closely allied to the subject of individuality, and of identity and distinction, is that of multiplicity or, more properly, of multitude. A multitude is a plurality of units or individual things, each of which is unidentified with (is really distinct from) the others. A multitude, inasmuch as it is measurable by a unit (that is, by one of the individual items or instances that compose it) is called a number. Therefore a number is defined as “a multitude measured by one.”

Summary of the Article

In this Article we have learned the meaning of unity or oneness. We have seen that transcendental unity is synonymous with being itself, so that a being as such is necessarily one. We have classed transcendental unity as concrete and abstract, essential and non-essential, and we have made certain sub-classifications. After studying transcendental unity, we have discussed quantitative (mathematical) unity. We have investigated the question of individuality and individuation, and have established the principle of individuation among bodily substances as materia signata, that is, matter marked or conditioned by quantity, without, however, involving set and determinate measurements of the quantity. We have noticed the principle of manifested individuality, and have listed the individuating notes by which each individual is recognizable among those with whom it has a common essence or specific nature. We have studied identity and distinction, and have noted that each is real or logical. We have made important sub-classifications of distinction, especially of logical distinction, which is either based on reality (cum fundamento in re) or is due entirely to the needs and limitations of the mind (sine fundamento in re). We have added a word on multitude and number.