Other Recent Philosophical Movements
Pragmatism (James, Dewey), Bergsonism, phenomenology (Husserl), and other currents of late 19th and early 20th century philosophy.
Several important philosophical movements characterised the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Pragmatism (William James, 1842–1910; John Dewey, 1859–1952): truth is determined by consequences for human life and action; beliefs are tools for living rather than mirrors of reality. Henri Bergson (1859–1941): the fundamental reality is creative, temporal duration (durée); the élan vital drives organic evolution; intuition (not analysis) is the proper philosophical method for grasping the real. Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) founded Phenomenology: a rigorous descriptive analysis of consciousness and its intentional structures — the return 'to the things themselves' as they present themselves to consciousness. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900): the death of God, the will to power, the eternal recurrence, and the Superman who creates values beyond the slave morality of Christianity. Neo-Kantianism (Marburg school: Natorp, Cohen; Baden school: Rickert, Windelband) renewed critical philosophy as a foundation for the natural and human sciences.
Article 3. Other Recent Philosophical Movements
a) Spiritualistic Philosophy; b) Traditionalism; c) Ontologism.
a) Spir it ual ist ic Philosophy. The reaction against the earlier Materialism may be said to have begun in France in the so-called Vitalistic School of Montpellier under the leadership of the anatomist and psychologist, François Bichat (1771-1802). This reaction took on a more definite character when the influence of the Scottish School was felt on the continent, and Pierre Paul Royer-Collard (1763- 1845) spread wide the doctrines of the anti-Sensist followers of Thomas Reid. It appeared, more strongly defined still, in the philosophy of Maine de Biran (1766-1824), who proposed the doctrine of a human cognitive faculty superior to sense and endowed with consciousness and activity, together with an active will which is not determined or necessitated. The so called Spiritualistic School was established by Victor Cousin (1792-1867), successor of Royer-Collard as professor of philosophy in the University of Paris. Cousin at first professed a system of Eclecticism, founded upon the History of Philosophy. This History, he declares, shows that four systems of philosophy were always in existence among thinking men, viz., Sensualism, Idealism, Skepticism, and Mysticism. Man can do no more : these are his best fruits of philosophical effort. Let us then take them all, adhering to none to the exclusion of the rest, and we shall find the truth in its entirety. Later in life, especially after a trip to Germany, where he heard Hegel and Schelling, Cousin inclined towards transcendental idealism. In his last years, dissatisfied with the spiritual barrenness of the philosophical system he had professed, he leaned strongly towards Catholicism, but did not enter the Church. Cousin deserves great credit for the fact that he aroused interest in the History of Philosophy, and, in particular, for the effort he and his followers made to recommend Medieval Philosophy—condemned generally as unimportant—to the serious attention of scholars. Although imperfect, the works of the following followers of Cousin merit commendation : i. Charles de Remusat (1797-1875) ; ii. Rousselot; iii. Bartholomew Hauréau; iv. Saint-René-Taillandier ; v. Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire ; vi. Salomon Munk. Among the philosophers who follow Cousin in part are : i. Jean Damiron (1794-1862); ii. Theodore Jouffroy (1796—1842); iii. François Bouillier (1813-1899); iv. Emile Saisset (1814-1863); v. Jules Simon; vi. E. Caro; vii. A. Frank; viii. Paul Janet; ix. E. Naville. The reaction against Materialism appeared in Italy in the philosophy of Pasquale Galluppi (1770—1846), professor in the University of Naples, who professed a spiritualistic philosophy verging upon Christian spiritualism. Closer still to the Scho 354 lastic position was Agosto Conti (1822—1905), who extolled Scholasticism and its Catholic doctors. In Spain, James Balmes (1810-1848) professed a philosophy which is basically Thomistic, although it involves doctrines taken from Descartes, Leibnitz, and the Scottish School. Later philosophers in the School of Cousin who evinced new tendencies towards old doctrines were: i. Stephen Vacherot (1809-1897), who verges upon pantheism ; ii. Felix Ravaisson, who is idealistic and even pantheistic; iii. Jules Lachelier (1832-1918), who is a Kantian idealist; iv. Louis Liard (1848-1917), who is also Kantian; v. Emile Boutroux (1845-1921), who borrows from Leibnitz ; vi. Alfred Fouillée (1838-1912), who professes a doctrine of “idea-force” which concedes much to Positivism. Connected with the foregoing is Henri Bergson (born (1859), who revives the ancient doctrine of Heraclitus and teaches that becoming is the essence of things. This becoming is a reality which evolves itself spontaneously and consciously. It tends to self-concentration, and this it achieves in plants, and even more perfectly in animals. Part of this reality loses its consciousness and makes up the anorganic world. To rule the anorganic world conscious becoming drops its spontaneity and from instinct becomes intellect. Intellect indulges itself in schematic and abstractive views of things. But intellect is only a degraded or degenerated state of sense. To achieve truth one must abandon the intellectual or metaphysical realm and view reality (becoming, duration} directly. Finally, mention must be made of Rudolf Eucken (1846- 1926), late professor of the University of Jena, who, rejecting Scholasticism and Idealism alike, sought a system of philosophy which would show the falsity of Positivism and Materialism and make clear the value and purpose of human life.
b) Tr adit ional ism. The rationalistic or spiritualistic reaction against Materialism was itself the occasion of reactionary movements. Many, opposed to Rationalism as much as to Materialism, developed new solutions for philosophical problems, especially for that of human knowledge and the possibility of certitude (the Critical Question). Some of these had recourse to authority as the basis of certainty {Traditionalism), while others revived the Ontologism of Malebranche and based human certitude upon the direct or intuitive vision of God, the Divine Exemplar of creation. The basic doctrine of Traditionalism is that individual man cannot attain to truth and certainty by his unaided powers. He must have help, and this help comes : ( i ) from God, who revealed necessary truths to primitive men; and (2) from society, which has preserved this revelation and transmits it by tradition. This doctrine has, say the Traditionalists, a clear confirmation in the existence of human speech; for, they maintain, man could not have invented speech ; it must have been given to him by God : and therefore God did make a revelation to men. Notable Traditionalists were: i. Joseph de Maistre (1754-1821), forerunner of the rigid Traditionalists, who minimized man’s unaided rational powers, and asserted the need of authoritative tradition for certainty about the relations of the supernatural with the natural, about the operations of Divine Providence in man’s free acts, and about fundamental political ethics. ii. Louis de Bonald (1754-1840) defines man as a spirit which employs a body (“l’homme est une intelligence servie par des organes”) ; yet, in spite of this exaggerated spiritualistic doctrine, he affirms the sensistic thesis that man cannot think without speech. Speech could not have been invented by man, for it would require thought to invent it, and thought requires speech. Consequently, speech must have been given to man by the Creator. But if man received speech from God, he must, also have received the thoughts of which speech is but the sensible expression. Therefore, concludes De Bonald, God must have given the first men speech and the primary necessary truths (thoughts) which were to be handed down by tradition to posterity. iii. Félicité de Lamennais (1782-1854) distinguished individual reason and general reason. The first, the reason of the individual man, is suited only for doubts ; it can achieve no certainty of anything. But general reason, or the consensus of humanity, is the infallible rule of certitude, and faith in this general reason is the only motive of certainty. The general reason is the storehouse and the reliable conserving agency of truths divinely revealed to primitive men. iv. Louis Bautain (1796-1867); Augustine Bonnetty (1798-1879) ; Joachim Ventura de Raulica (1792-1861) ; and Casimir Ubaghs (1800-1875) professed a mitigated Traditionalism, teaching that the human mind is, indeed, powerless to acquire truth unaided, but once it has been furnished with the certainties it holds by faith, it can demonstrate or prove these as true and certain. Ubaghs was partly Traditionalistic, partly Ontologist. v. With the Traditionalists must be mentioned the father of so-called Fideism, Daniel Huet, Bishop of Avranches in France, whom we have already mentioned among the skeptical philosophers of the 17 century. Fideism teaches that while human reason cannot attain to clear certitude, it can achieve probability, and then divine Faith supplies what natural powers cannot acquire unaided.
c) Ont ologism. While Traditionalism posits the ultimate criterion of truth in God’s revelations to men, Ontologism makes this criterion the 357 direct or intuitive view of God. Obviously, this vision is not the Beatific Vision of the Blessed, but it is, nevertheless, a true intuition of the Divine Essence. Ontologists were : i. Vincenzo Gioberti (1801-1852), who maintains that the order of things in real nature {ontological order) must coincide with the order of thought {logical order) ; that is to say, the first truth in the logical order must be the first fact in the ontological order, viz., God. The idea of God is the Divine Idea which is the principle of all our knowledge. Since God created all things, He has in Himself the ideas or exemplars of all things; and thus to know God is to know all things in God. We do not indeed know all things clearly in our knowledge or idea of God, nor are we conscious of our direct vision of Him. What we find obscure and mysterious in the field of knowledge makes us suspect the existence of a still higher and more remote world of mystery; and this it is that Revelation makes known to us. The immediate vision of God and the general view of all things confusedly in that vision, is the source of the list (greater or smaller) of distinct thoughts, or points of knowledge, and these are confirmed by the reflective power of reason; reason aided by speech applies the distinct elements of its knowledge of things. ii. Antonio Rosmini-Serbati (1797-1855), a saintly priest, and the founder of the Religious Order called the Institute of Charity, teaches that the mind has the innate idea of being (which he identifies with the idea of God) and forms different concepts by applying this idea in sensation. God is the intellectual light of man; and the communication of the idea of Being before man’s birth makes the soul rational. Some of Rosmini’s doctrines were condemned by the Church, and were at once retracted. iii. The most prominent follower of Rosmini was Pestalozza. Gioberti was followed by Terenzio Mamiani (1800—1865). In France, Ontologism was taught by Alphonse Gratry (1805- 1872). A mixture of Ontologism and Traditionalism was taught about the middle of the 19 century in France and Belgium. In Belgium we find the following philosophers of this School : Moehler, Claessens, Laforet, and Casimir Ubaghs. In France we find: Fabre and Branchereau. Ontologism was skilfully and effectively refuted by the famous Dominican philosophers, Thomas Zigliara and Albert Lepidi. Controversy on the subject of Ontologism among Catholic philosophers was closed when this theory was condemned by the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office in 1861.