Eighteenth Century Empiricism

Article i. Eighteenth Century Empiricism

a) Sensism; b) English Moralism; c) French Materialism,

a) Sensism. Locke’s work On the Human Understanding had great vogue among his countrymen, and certain Anglican churchmen declared that it was a source of truth and wisdom second only to Holy Scripture. The elegant style of this work was as great a factor in its acceptance as were its philosophical doctrines. Locke had but lightly touched upon matters of morality and religion in their bearing upon leading philosophical questions, but his followers remedied this deficiency. The great sensist left no well-instructed pupil to carry on his work and develop his philosophy in a manner consistent with its principles. For this reason it is no matter of surprise that some of his ardent followers deduced from Lockian principles absurdities which would doubtless have merited the hearty condemnation of the master. However, it is but just to say that the germs 310 of these absurdities are really latent in Locke’s philosophy, the influence of which, as we have noted elsewhere, makes inevitably for idealism and skepticism on the one hand, and for materialism on the other. Of those who extended Lockian Sensism to the moral order we shall speak on pages 312 and 313. Here we mention the philosophers who evolved the materialism latent in Locke’s philosophy : i. Henry Lord Bolingbroke (1662-1751) denied the spirituality of the soul and declared that there is no moral or political order which comes of Divine Law. ii. John Toland (1670-1722) attacked all religion, especially Christianity, and pantheistically identified God with the material world. iii. Joseph Priestley (1733-1804) denied the spirituality and immortality of the soul, but declared for the existence of a God distinct from the world. iv. David Hartley (1704-1757) was not a thorough-going materialist, but he professed theories which involve the denial of the spirituality and immortality of the soul. He taught that man’s intelligence differs from that of the brutes only by reason of its more vivid impressions. In Holland, Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733), an admirer and follower of Locke, taught a completely materialistic doctrine, denying the need of religion and declaring that there is no objective distinction between good and evil. In Spain, Benedict Feijoo (1676-1764), a Lockian philosopher, denied the essential distinction between sensation and intellection, declaring that brutes can reason. In France, the Deists and Materialists (of whom we shall speak later) praised Locke; of those that followed the great Englishman without falling into sheer materialism, the most important was : The Abbé Stephen Bonnot de Condillac (1715-1780), a priest of Paris, and the author of The Origin of Hitman Knowledge and Treatise on Sensations. He asserts the existence of a spiritual soul in man, but limits its knowledge to sensation and material elaboration of sensation. He teaches that the founts of knowledge are sensation and reflection. The mind, receiving impressions through sensation and retaining them by sense-memory reflects on them, and arranges the various impressions into harmonious groups of associations. In his later work {Treatise on Sensation’) Condillac revises his doctrine and rejects reflection as a source of knowledge distinct from sensation itself. Thus he makes sensation alone the fount of all knowledge. Sensations do not bring us into immediate understanding union with objects outside us (though such objects do exist), but only to a knowledge of ourselves as affected or modified.

b) Engl ish Mor al ism. When Bacon, Locke, Hobbes, and others had spread Empiricism and Sensism throughout England, nearly all immediately subsequent philosophers developed this doctrine into either materialism or deism, and dealt with the matter of morality in the light of their theories. Materialism denies the existence of spirits; hence it rejects the immortality and spirituality of the soul, and the existence of an Infinite Spirit (God). Materialism is thus fundamentally pantheistic. Deism admits the existence of God (and even the existence of the spiritual soul), but denies Divine Providence and God’s government of the world. Deism teaches that God, having made the world, has cast it aside as a child abandons a toy and concerns himself no more about it. There is, therefore, no Eternal Law which governs the world; and the actions of free creatures in the world have not to conform to any Divine Standard. The moralists of this period in England posit the norm of morality in some inrooted instinct, taste, or sense of nature, which causes men to draw a line of distinction between good and evil. This distinction is not born of reason ; it is a blindly subjective norm; it is rather of the sensual than of the intellectual order ; or, if it be called an intellectual thing, the word “intellectual” is understood in a sensistic manner. Notable among the moralists who held “moral sense” as the norm of morality were : i. Anthony Ashley Cooper, Count Shaftesbury (1671- 1713), a pupil of John Locke; ii. John Butler (1692-1752), a pupil of Shaftesbury; iii. Francis Hutcheson (1694-1747), an Irish professor at the University of Glasgow; iv. Adam Smith (1723-1790), a celebrated economist, professor at Glasgow. Besides the philosophers who placed the norm of morality in some sense or instinct, there were other English moralists who, without discovering the true norm, rejected the theory of “moral sense.” Such were, among others : i. William Wollaston (1659-1724); ii. Samuel Clarke (1675-1729); iii. Adam Ferguson (1724-1816).

c) Fr ench Mat er ial ism. During the 16 and 17 centuries English students and scholars frequently visited France, and spent some time in the French universities. During the 18 century French scholars began, in numbers, to repay the visits of their neighbors across the Channel. Many of these returned to France strongly imbued with the Empiricism and Sensism of the School of Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke. Thus did the English philosophy of the 17 century become current in 18-century France. Nor did this philosophy go undeveloped among the French thinkers; it was quickly evolved into materialism and moral sensualism, and also into skepticism. Of the French Empiricists and Sensists who lapsed into materialism, or into a doubtful attitude about the existence of a God distinct from the world, and the immortality and spirituality of the human soul, the more important were : i. François Arouet, called Voltaire (1694-1778). He was born in Paris, but received part of his education in England. He did immense harm to the cause of Christianity and was so great a factor in the unsettling of the social order that he is justly regarded as one of the “Fathers” of the French Revolution. Voltaire was a deist. He admitted the existence of God— but of a God that had cast off the world. He was a man of keen but shallow mind, and had the diabolical zeal of a complete destructionist ; ii. Charles de Montesquieu (1689-1755); iii. Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), who presented an extreme social philosophy in his Social Contract; iv. Claude Helvetius (1715-1771), who defended private utilitarianism as the basis of ethics; v. Denis Diderot (1713-1784), who professed on evolutionistic monism in natural philosophy ; vi. Jean d’Alembert (1717-1783), who inclined towards positivism; vii. Julian de la Mettrie (1709-1751), a physician, who was a complete materialist. The foregoing philosophers either make outright denial of the existence of a God distinct from the world, and of the immortality and spirituality of the human soul; or they profess agnosticism in the matter,, declaring that certainty as to the nature of God and of the soul is not achievable. For this reason they oppose the Christian religion. They reject the Eternal Law as the supreme norm of morality, acknowledge no last end of man to be attained in a life to come, and lay down a norm of ethical conduct which is reduced to private utility, and they determine an action as good or evil in accordance with its power to make for the goods and pleasures of this life, or contrariwise {Moral Sensualism). Rousseau, following Hobbes, states as a fundamental ethical truth that man is not naturally a social being but a solitary. Society makes demands upon its members which limit their individual liberty; and, says Rousseau, it would be absurd to say that man was by nature inclined to a limitation of his own liberty. Still, solitary man finds many difficulties which block his way to a continued and comfortable life, and against such obstacles his individual power is often vain. For this reason primitive man sought to increase his power by union with others. This accounts for the origin in the world of social groups. Man freely entered society (by free contract’), and freely remains a member of it, although remaining so spells a limitation of his liberties. He is called upon to obey laws that are imposed upon him without reference to his personal and individual choice in the matter. This is an evil. But, granting that society has its advantages, it should be so constituted as to reduce this evil (the limiting of individual liberty) as much as possible. Therefore, the people should determine the form of government under which they live; the people should make the laws. Since it is obviously impossible that each and every citizen should have the full of his individual will in these matters, it will suffice if the will of the majority of citizens prevails. We see here that Rousseau makes the same error as Hobbes in thinking that man is not naturally inclined to life in society. But unlike Hobbes he does not exaggerate the power of social government (the State), but, on the contrary, minimizes it, and tries to make individual citizens the real determinants of law and order.