Schools of the Period of Decline

Article 2. Schools of the Period of Decline

a) The Terminist School ; b) The 14 and 15 Century Mystics.

a) The Ter minist School The Ultra-Realism of the Scotist School and the general craze for dialectic display, and in particular for subtle distinctions, induced a reactionary movement among some philosophers of the 14 and 15 centuries. This reaction was quite as excessive as what it opposed. The reactionaries took as their basic principle the so-called Principle of Parsimony (commonly called “Ockam’s Razor”) : Entities are not to be needlessly multiplied. They declared that most of the distinctions of the Scotists and the older Scholastics were needless. Applying their Principle in the matter of Universals, these philosophers developed a doctrine of Nominalism. Because the idea is a mere “mental term” which is to be expressed in the “oral term,” this Nominalism is accurately known as Terminism. Most of the Terminists were Franciscans. Notable philosophers of the School were: i. Peter Aureolus (died 1322), ‘‘Doctor Facundus”; ii. Durandus of St. Pourçain (died 1332), ‘‘Doctor Resolutissimus” ; iii. William of Ockam (about 1280-1348), “Doctor Invincibilis.” i. Pet er Aur eol us (died 1322), “Doctor Facundus.”

Life: Peter Aureolus (called also Peter d’Auriol, and Aureoli) was a distinguished alumnus and professor of the University of Paris in the early 14 century. He was made Doctor of Theology there in 1318, and the following year he was elected Provincial of the Franciscans of Aquitaine. In 1321 he was made Archbishop of Aix, and died in that office a year later.

Works: Peter wrote a Commentary on the Books of Sentences of Peter Lombard; and Quodlibeta, a discussion of various matters of philosophy.

Doctrine: Peter was a Scotist who, fired with zeal for the simplification of philosophy, developed a system which is nonScholastic, and even anti-Scholastic. In the matter of Universals he is a Conceptualist. He denies the real distinction between essence and existence in creatures. He rejects the proofs offered by Scholasticism in demonstration of the fact that the soul is the substantial form of the body in man. He denies the real distinction between the soul and its faculties.

Remarks: Peter Aureolus probably took inspiration for his anti-Scholasticism from Durandus of St. Pourçain, whom we are about to discuss. He is important as a forerunner of Ockam, the most notable philosopher of the Terminist School. While his direct influence upon Ockam was slight (for Ockam testifies that he skipped hastily through the writings of Aureolus, and this when he had most of his own philosophy formulated), he prepared, with Durandus, a receptive audience for the teachings of the Invincible Doctor. ii. Dur andus of St . Pour çain (died 1332), “Doctor Resolutissimus.”

Life: Durandus was of French origin. He studied and taught theology at the University of Paris. After spending some years in the Papal Court at Avignon, he became (in 1317) Bishop of Limoux. The following year he was transferred to the see of Puy, and in 1326 to the see of Meaux, in which he died.

Works: Durandus wrote a Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard.

Doctrine: Durandus, at first an ardent Thomist, grew impatient of the current fashion of calling upon the authority of Aristotle, and developed an independent treatment of philosophical problems. While he merely exercised his right in rejecting human authority, he made a scientific error in refusing to study the bases of accepted authority. Durandus was a vigorous and independent thinker, but he was not a deep or systematic philosopher. He freely criticized doctrines which he did not understand. For instance, he misinterpreted the Thomistic doctrine of sensible and intelligible species, then rejected them as inanities, and so took all value from the Universal as representative of essential reality. Rejecting, in consequence, the active intellect which forms intelligible species, he taught an implied Nominalism. He makes the specific nature of things the Principle of Individuation, i. e., he teaches that the individual is determined by this matter and this form, and that further identification of the individual is impossible, and would be useless if it were possible. He declares that God does not concur immediately in the actions of His creatures. God, having once and for all equipped His creatures for their proper activitiy (by creating them in determinate nature), needs to concur with them no further. God’s activity, then, with regard to creatures may be reduced to creation and conservation. That which is known as concurrence is involved in the creation of things.

Remark: Durandus has no claim to great achievement in philosophy. His works are strongly reactionary, faulty in matter, superficial in manner. Yet he holds, with Aureolus, a place in the History of Philosophy because of the impetus he gave to the Terminist movement, which had its greatest philosopher in William of Ockam. iii. William of Ockam (about 1280-1348), “Doctor Invincibilis,” “Venerabilis Inceptor.”

Life: William was born at Ockam in Surrey, England. He entered the Franciscan Order, and pursued his studies at the University of Oxford. He studied under Scotus, but followed no master. He became involved in the disputes between Philip the Fair of France and Pope Boniface VIII, and suffered imprisonment and excommunication for his intemperate and unorthodox views. Fie was reconciled with the Church and with his Order before his death, which occurred in 1348 or soon thereafter.

Works: William wrote a Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard; Commentaries on Aristotle and Porphyry; Quodlibeta; and a Dialogue on the Temporal Power of the Popes.

Doctrine: William’s doctrine on human knowledge is the core of his philosophy. This doctrine, known as Terminism, appeared in the works of Aureolus and Durandus, but William was the first to give it systematic form and full expression. Hence he is called the “Venerable Inaugurator” of Terminism. Terminism is really Nominalism, or perhaps it is more accurately described as Conceptualism with a cast towards Nominalism. i. Theory of Knowledge.— St. Thomas had rightly taught that the formal object of the senses is the individual in concrete and material existence; while the formal object of intellect is the Universal abstracted from individual sense-findings. Hence the intellect does not directly and immediately perceive the individual as such; this is the function of sense; and from sense findings represented in phantasms the active intellect abstracts the intelligible species, which, being impressed by the active upon the passive intellect {species impressa’), causes the latter to react in the species expressa or idea. Scotus proposed a doctrine which clouded this clear distinction between senseknowledge and intellectual knowledge, not hesitating to ascribe direct knowledge of individual or singular realities to the intellect. William of Ockam adopted the Scotistic view and extended it. He distinguishes sense and intellective faculties, making both intuitive of individuals (i. e., making both sense and intellect apprehend singular realities by direct knowledge). Intellect has also an abstractive function, and this it exercises in forming its knowledge of something abstract (e. g., “unity”) from many individual things (e. g., “units”) ; and also in using its knowledge of individual reality when the object is absent. In Quodlibeta V, q. 5, William says, “The same knowledge can be called intuitive when the thing known is present, and abstractive when the thing known is absent.”—The act of knowing is a direct and self-explanatory process, and requires no species, either sensible or intelligible. In consequence of this doctrine William rejects the Universal as understood by the Scholastics, i. e., as an essential representation, or, in other words, as the representation in intellect of an essence common to extramental individuals. He makes the Universal a fiction of the mind, a mere grouping of individual objects of the intellect on a basis of similarity. This fiction, or concept of things, is called the term—it is the conceptual term, and finds exterior expression in the spoken term and the written term. ii. Physics and Metaphysics.— William, resting upon the Principle of Parsimony (“Ockam’s Razor”), denies the necessity of distinction between the “Metaphysical Grades,” between essence and existence in creatures, between the soul and its faculties. Notice that William does not admit even a rational or logical distinction in these cases. He does admit the distinction between matter and form in bodies, and follows Scotus in alleging a plurality of substantial forms in man. He teaches that the soul is spiritual and immortal ; but asserts that this cannot be known by reason unaided by Faith. Reason alone can prove neither the existence nor the nature of God; whatever we know of God is a matter of Faith. In offering argument for this last contention, William implicitly impugns the Principle of Causality, which demands that every effect must have its proportionate and adequate cause.

Remarks: Terminism had many followers, for it had two attractive features : ( x ) it dispensed with the endless distinctions and sub-distinctions of Scotism; and (2) it offered a seemingly light and easy solution of the most complex problems of philosophy. Yet these attractive features were deceiving, and Terminism does not justify its claim as a serious interpretation of the universe—the function of true philosophy. On the contrary, Terminism is full of implicit philosophical errors, some of which were openly developed before the middle of the 14 century. For this reason the University of Paris forbade the teaching of Terminism, and it was condemned by Pope Clement VI in 1346. Nevertheless, Terminism had its defenders during the 14 and 15 centuries in the Universities of Heidelberg and Cologne. The chief Ockamists were : i. John Buridan (died about 1360) ; ii. Marsilius of Inghen (died 1396) ; iii. Thomas Bradwardine (1290-1349), a professor at Oxford, who developed Ockamistic Terminism into “Theistic Determinism,” making God’s will the determining cause of all our actions, and so destroying the freedom of the human will ; iv. Nicholas of Autrecourt (middle 14 century), who de-veloped a system of radical subjectivism, maintaining that nothing can be known for certain but the Principle of Contradiction. Thus he denied the Principle of Causality, the possibility of proving the existence of God as First Cause, and even the possibility of stating as self-evident the fact of our existence, or of the objective existence of the world. Thus, all our certainty (except that of the Principle of Contradiction) comes from ourselves, or is subjective, and does not concern things as they are apart from our consideration, i. e., objectively. Nicholas merely developed the latent skepticism in Ockam, who had destroyed the quidditative or essential value of knowledge and made our concepts empty terms.

b) The 14 and 15 Cent ur y Myst ics. The 14 and 15 centuries saw a revival of Mysticism, both orthodox and heterodox. The chief orthodox Mystics were : i. Blessed John Ruysbroeck (1293-1381); ii. John Gerson (1363-1429) ; iii. Peter d’Ailly (1350-1420); iv. Denis the Carthusian (1402-1471) ; v. Thomas Hemerken (Thomas à Kempis), author of the famous Imitation of Christ (1380-1471). Among the heterodox Mystics we mention : i. Blessed Henry Suso (died 1366), who was not consciously unorthodox in doctrine ; ii. Master Eckhart of Hochheim (about 1260-1327), a Dominican, who was unorthodox, but not contumacious. He had 22 propositions condemned, but appealed to the Papal Court. He died before adverse decision was rendered. iii. John Tauler (1290-1361), who with Suso may be said to have prepared the way for Protestant Mysticism in Germany in the 16 century. iv. Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), whose doctrine contains latent theosophy and pantheism, although its author sturdily denied this fact. Nicholas was a Cardinal. He is remembered also as a scientist, and as the originator of the scientific movement which appeared in full flare in the 16 century. He taught the rotation of the earth on its axis, a truth which Copernicus afterwards set forth in scientific form.

TRANSITION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY (1450-1600) The study of the Greek and Latin classics was never utterly extinct among Christian peoples. Many of the Fathers of the Church, notably SS. Augustine and Jerome, and many ecclesiastical writers of the Middle Ages, praised the literary monuments of antiquity and imitated their polished style in their own writings. The esteem in which the pagan classics were held was increased in Italy and throughout Europe in the 14 century by the writings of Dante Alighieri, Francesco Petrarca, and Giovanni Boccaccio, the “Fathers of the Italian Language.” I Now the Christian writers of the later Middle Ages, especially in centuries following the 13, allowed themselves to grow careless in their expression and to profess a contempt for the niceties of Latin style. The new and popular flair for pagan elegance struck against this indifference on the part of Christian writers, and developed a priggishness which regarded as barbarous not only the style but much of the matter contained in contemporary Christian works. Greek literature, imperfectly known in Europe before the 13 century, was made available throughout the West during thé 14 and 15 centuries. Commerce with the Greeks, the attempts of ecclesiastical powers to unite the Eastern Schismatics with Rome, and, finally, the fall of Constantinople and the settling of fugitive Greeks in Western Europe, were the occasions that led to the intemperate zeal for Greek learning that characterized this time. 262