The Great Philosophers of the Age of Perfection

Article 2. The Great Philosophers of the Age of Perfection The most important philosophers of the Age of Perfection of Scholasticism were :

a) William of Auvergne (died 1249).

b) Alexander of Hales (died 1245) Doctor Irrefragabilis;

c) St. Bonaventure (1221-1274) Doctor Seraphicus;

d) Roger Bacon ( 1214-1292/94) Doctor Mirabilis;

e) Albert the Great (1193-1280) Doctor Universalis;

f) St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) Doctor Angelicus;

g) Henry of Ghent (died 1293) Doctor Solemnis;

h) John Duns Scotus (1266/70-1308) Doctor Subtilis;

i) Raymond Lully (1234-1315) Doctor Illuminatus.

a) William of Auvergne (died 1249)

Life: William was born near the end of the 12 century at Aurillac, a town of France about 275 miles south of Paris. He was one of the more celebrated Masters of the University of Paris. From 1228 until his death in 1249 he was Bishop of Paris, and for this reason he is sometimes called William of Paris.

Works: He wrote On the Trinity; On the Soul; On the Immortality of the Soul; and On the Universe.

Doctrine: William is a Platonic Scholastic, but not a thorough-going one, for he rejects Plato’s doctrine of the preexistence of souls and of innate ideas. He also rejects Aristotle’s doctrine on the origin of ideas, viz., that the active intellect {intellectus agens} abstracts the intelligible essence or species of things from phantasms or images in the imagination derived from sensation, and impresses this species {species impressa} upon the passive intellect {intellectus possibilis}, which reacts to the impression by expressing the idea {species expressa}. William declares that the soul needs no faculty distinct from itself to form species and hence rejects the active intellect. He declares that the soul forms ideas in itself, granted that ideas of bodily things come somehow through the action of the senses. The knowledge of what are called first principles (that is, self-evident truths, like the truth of one’s own existence, of one’s capacity to reason rightly, and of the Principle of Contradiction) comes, he says, by special illumination of the intellect from God. In metaphysics William proves the existence of one Infinite God, the sole efficient cause of the world. Creatures are distinct from God, and, although God knows them all in Himself from eternity, their actual creation took place in time. Spiritual creatures are pure forms, but bodies are made of matter and form. In all this William is correct; but he wrongly teaches that bodies have as many substantial forms as they have distinct perfections. William was the first to distinguish the essence and existence of actual created things. In Psychology William teaches that soul and body in man are substantially united ; but his illustrations are dualistic (hence Platonic), for he compares the relation of soul and body to that of the harpist and his harp.

Remarks: William of Auvergne is called the “First Great Scholastic.” He was a man of clear thought, and he expressed himself through the medium of a vigorous style. He did not regard himself as a philosopher, but as an apologist whose task was to show the unbeliever the reasonableness of the Catholic Faith. While there are traces of Platonism in his work, it is Aristotelean at base, and one critic says of him, “In more than one question he is Thomist by anticipation.” For all that, he is usually listed with Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure as a Platonic Scholastic.

b) Al exander of Hal es (died 1245), ‘‘Doctor Irrefragabilis.”

Life: Alexander was born at Hales, in Gloucestershire, England, between 1170 and 1180. He studied philosophy and theology in Paris, and became a teacher of the latter science in the University. While holding this professorship he joined the Franciscan Order, and continued with his work of teaching after his religious profession. Fie was the first Franciscan to hold a chair in the University of Paris.

Works: His chief and perhaps only work is a general compendium of theology, called Summa Universae Theologiae. This work is framed on the order of Peter Lombard’s Sentences; and incidentally discusses many questions of philosophy.

Doctrine: In theology Alexander rightly teaches that God is pure actuality, the sum-total of all perfections actually realized without limit, and having no potency or capacity for receiving further perfection (Actus Purus’). But he mistakenly adds that we can have no knowledge of the nature of God, although we can prove His existence: we know that God is, not what He is. Creatures are made by God. All creatures, even spirits, are composed not only of existence and essence, but also of matter and form. Like William of Auvergne, Alexander admits a plurality of substantial forms in the same matter. In Epistemology (Theory of Knowledge) he holds that universal ideas of bodily things are formed by abstraction from sensations in the faculty of reason. Besides reason, man has two other soul-faculties, viz., intellect, by which he under stands spiritual substances, and intelligence, by which he understands first principles. For the functioning of intellect and intelligence a special divine illumination is required ; but this is not needed for the ideas which reason abstracts from sense data—the natural power of sense and reason being sufficient here. In Psychology Alexander stresses the independence of body and soul at the expense of man’s composite unity ; but he does not teach thorough-going dualism (i. e., mere accidental union of soul and body.) He teaches not only the existence of the soul, but also its essential properties, its immateriality and indivisibility.

Remarks: In his Summa Alexander notably developed the Scholastic Method. His influence upon his great pupil, Bonaventure, was another service rendered to philosophy. We notice in his doctrine a Moderate Realism of a peculiarly limited or qualified sort. We notice also that the “divine illumination” theory in knowledge (a heritage from St. Augustine) appears as it does in the doctrine of William of Auvergne. With Alexander, the History of Philosophy associates his Franciscan successor in the Chair of the Order in the University of Paris, viz., John de la Rochelle (Joannes de Rupella; 1200-1254). John agrees in the main with Alexander, but he denies that spirits are composed of matter and form. He makes intelligible species (i. e., abstracted essential representations which are intellectually grasped and expressed as ideas’) merely spiritualized imagination-images or phantasms. John de la Rochelle established more thoroughly than any other Scholastic of the period, the real distinction between existence and essence in creatures. Alexander of Hales and John de la Rochelle were the most potent influences in the intellectual formation of Robert Grosseteste, great Franciscan master of philosophy in the University of Oxford. Grosseteste was born about 1175. He died as Bishop of Lincoln in England about 1250.

c) Saint Bonavent ur e (1221-1274), “Doctor Seraphicus.”

Life: Bonaventure was the religious name of John Fidanza, who was born in the Italian city of Bagnorea, in Tuscany. He came to Paris as a youth, entered the Franciscan Order at the age of seventeen, and studied under Alexander of Hales and John de la Rochelle at the University. There he succeeded John as Franciscan Master. He was afterwards made General of his Order, and then became Cardinal-Bishop of Albano, a suburban see in the Province of Rome. In 1274 he was called by Gregory X to the Council of Lyons, and died during its progress. His cherished friend and companion in the University of Paris, the great Dominican, Thomas Aquinas, died the same year while on his way to attend the same Council.

Works: Bonaventure wrote Commentaries on the Books of Sentences of Peter Lombard; Debated Questions; The Brevilo-quium, an abridged summa; The Journey of the Soul unto God; and a classification of human knowledge called The Relation of Arts to Theology.

Doctrine: St. Bonaventure was the chief mystical theologian of the 13 century and merits a place in the History of Philosophy as one of the principal scientific philosophers of his age. Ele is listed as a Platonic Scholastic, and this for several reasons : (1) he wished to preserve the traditions of his Order, which were Augustinian and Platonic without being anti-Aristotelean ; (2) he had studied in an age and in a School (Franciscan) in which Plato and not Aristotle was the chief authority; (3) Bonaventure was a man of mystical mind, a type that turns more readily to the poetic beauties of Plato than to the clear, cold intellectualism of Aristotle. In Metaphysics Bonaventure proves the existence of God (1) from the fact that the reflecting soul feels God’s presence; (2) from the changeless nature of truth which is grasped by our changeable and changing faculties; and (3) from the works of creation which proclaim their Maker. Bonaventure admits the Ontological Argument of St. Anselm as valid under certain limitations. He declares that the world has not been created ab aeterno. Bonaventure makes matter synonymous with potency, and form with actuality (act). All finite being is distinct from God, and individual creatures are distinct from one another. All creatures, bodily and spiritual, are composed of matter and form. Bonaventure teaches the “plurality of substantial forms,” a doctrine which maintains that, in addition to the substantial form which completes the being of a substance, there are subordinate substantial forms. The Principle of Individuation (i. e., that whereby individuals of the same species are distinguished one from another) is both matter and form. Prime Matter is potency, but not pure potency, indifferent to forms ; it has an actual being of its own. In Prime Matter (and in every potential thing) there is a sort of germ or inner energy which cooperates with external agents in working substantial change; and this germ-force is called the ratio seminalis. This doctrine of St. Bonaventure is an extension of the “ratio seminalis” theory of Saint Augustine, who taught that God in the beginning endowed anorganic matter with certain vital powers {rationes seminales} through which it evolved itself into determinate living things as time progressed. Bonaventure extends this doctrine to all substantial forms which can conjoin with matter. There is, he teaches, resident in matter itself some germ-force, some seedlings of all possible substantial forms which can unite with matter, and this force is brought into actual play by the action of external causes sufficient to produce the substantial change. In other words, there is in matter a cooperative power which goes along with the action of external causes in producing substantial change. For instance, when wood is burned, we have a change from the substance wood to the substances ash and the various chemical substances that make up smoke ; the external cause of the change is fire; and Bonaventure’s doctrine would mean that there was in the wood a cooperative or sympathetic power which was roused into activity by the action of fire, and which concurred with fire in producing the substantial change. This sympathetic, cooperative force is the ratio seminalis of the new substance (ash and smoke, in the example). In Psychology Bonaventure teaches that the soul, like all finite things, is made of matter and form. The soul is directly created by God. Although it is composed of matter and form, it has no extension, nor has it parts. The matter which is in the soul is not subject to change, and hence the soul, both as to its matter and its form, is naturally immortal. The faculties of the soul (intellect, will, memory) are indeed distinct from the soul, and these are not accidents in the soul, but substances! In Epistemology Bonaventure rejects the doctrine of inborn ideas (innatism), and asserts that ideas of sensile things are acquired by sensation and intellectual abstraction. Ideas of spiritual things are acquired directly by the reflection of the soul, the soul realizing itself as existent and endowed with faculties. Both modes of acquiring ideas demand the special concurrence of God. Bonaventure has been charged with Ontologism, but unfairly. Ontologism is the doctrine that man’s first idea is that of God ; that man somehow apprehends God directly, though very vaguely, and that in the light of this idea all others are formed. The language of Bonaventure seems at times to suggest Ontologism, but only when severed from its context. When he declares that the idea of God is the first idea, he does not mean first in order of time, but the most important, the basic idea in that knowledge which is unto salvation.

Remarks: The metaphysical doctrine of St. Bonaventure is at fault in the following points : ( 1 ) He makes spiritual beings composites of matter and form, whereas they are pure forms ; (2) He teaches a plurality of substantial forms in finite substances, including man ; whereas, as St. Thomas was to prove, there is in each substance but one substantial form, though there may be many accidental forms; (3) He states the Principle of Individuation as matter and form, whereas it is in-formed-nmtter alone; (4) He posits a gratuitous and needless theory of rationes seminales. In Epistemology Bonaventure’s distinction of modes of acquiring ideas is futile and without foundation. All our ideas, without exception, come to us through sensation and intellectual abstraction, comparison, synthesis, etc.

d) Roger Bacon (1214-1292/94), “Doctor Mirabilis.”

Life: Roger Bacon was born at Ilchester, Gloucestershire, England, and studied at Oxford and Paris. He entered the Franciscan Order and taught at Oxford, where he achieved great renown. He was a man of fiery spirit and of bitterly critical tongue. Once he was exiled and twice imprisoned for insubordination.

Works: Bacon wrote Opus Majus (The Greater Work) in seven parts: (1) The causes of error in intellectual judgment; (2) The relation of Philosophy and other sciences to Theology; (3) tract on language; (4) tract on mathematics; (5) tract on optics; (6) tract on experimental sciences; (7) tract on moral science. Bacon also wrote Opus Minus (The Lesser Work), an abridgment of the foregoing; and Opus Tertium (The Third Work), a synthesis and commentary on the other two. He also wrote treatises on the multiplication of species, and a compendium of philosophy.

Doctrine: Bacon follows the older Franciscan school in his philosophical doctrines. Thus he teaches the “plurality of substantial forms” theory, spiritual matter, rationes seminales, special divine illumination in understanding. In his doctrine on certitude he professes a kind of Traditionalism, i. e., he teaches that God gave to our first parents the knowledge of those truths which the mind cannot solve of itself (such as the question of Universals is, in his opinion) and this revelation was handed down by tradition. Sad to say this primitive revelation has been lost sight of among men; we must apply ourselves diligently to the study of history and of languages (philology) so that we may trace it out and formulate it again. Our knowledge is acquired from three fountain heads: authority, reason, and experience ; and experience is prerequisite to the function of authority and reason (divinely illumined). Experience for the student and scientist takes the shape of experiment. Hence, experiment is the one valid scientific instrument. Deductive reasoning is unscientific; the only reasoning of value is induction from observation and experiment.

Remarks: Bacon has been aptly called the forerunner of modern Positivism, the doctrine which sets scientific value only upon truths ascertained positively by observation and experiment. He is hailed by many as a great philosopher, yet he is vastly overestimated. His erratic views, his fiery advocacy of his own doctrines, and his intolerance of opposition made him an extremist and rendered his actual contribution to philosophy almost negligible.

e) St . Al ber t t he Gr eat ( 1193-1280), “Doctor Universalis.1’

Life: Albert the Great (Albertus Magnus) was born at Lauingen in Suabia, a member of the family of the Counts of Bollstaedt. The date of his birth is in dispute, being variously given as 1193, 1195, 1206, 1207. He studied at Padua and Bologna. In 1223 he entered the Dominican Order, and taught thereafter at Cologne and Paris. He was made Bishop of Ratisbon in 1260, but resigned his see three years later. He engaged in various activities in the interests of the Faith, but spent most of his later years teaching and writing at Cologne. Plis contemporaries knew him as Albert of Cologne, and esteemed him the ablest philosopher of the time. His greatest pupil was St. Thomas of Aquin. Albert died at Cologne in the convent of his Order in 1280. He was canonized and declared a Doctor of the Church by Pius XI on December 16, 1931, and his feast fixed for November 15.

Works: Albert’s works constitute a library in themselves. They cover the field of philosophy, theology, natural science, and Scripture commentary. For an exhaustive list of his works consult De Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy, Vol. I, PP- 395~396 (Translation by Messenger; published by Longmans, 1926.)

Doctrine: Albert was called “The Universal Doctor” on account of the great number and variety of his works and the erudition which they display. He is the first Aristotelean Scholastic, as he was the first to recognize the true worth of the Stagirite. He purified the doctrine of Aristotle from much Arabian interpolation, and showed that it was marvellously well suited for the exposition of Christian dogma. Yet Albert did not bring Scholastic Philosophy to the peak of perfection ; this work was reserved for his famous pupil, St. Thomas. In the main, the philosophic doctrines of Albert are in agreement with those of St. Thomas.

Remarks: Albert was an original thinker, but he had reverence for the achievements of his predecessors. By his exposition of Aristotle’s tract on Physics, as well as by his own studies and experiments, he gave a real impetus to the study of the physical sciences. Thus he did far more for the development of natural science than did the erratic Roger Bacon. Albert had an analytical mind and could enlarge grandly upon his findings, but he lacked the genius of synthesis.

f) Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), “Doctor Angelicus.”

Life: St. Thomas of Aquin, called “The Angelic Doctor,” was born in 1224, 1225, or 1226, in the town of Roccasecca, Italy, of Landolf, Count of Aquino, and the Countess Theo-dora Caracciolo. He received his early education in the great Benedictine Abbey at Monte Cassino, and followed the secondary and graduate studies in the University of Naples. Much against the will of his relatives, he entered the Dominican Order in 1243. He studied under Albert the Great both at Paris and Cologne, and in 1252 began his teaching career in the University of Paris. With Bonaventure, his cherished friend, he received the Master’s Degree in Theology in 1257. Called to Rome in 1261, he taught in the Eternal City, and afterwards at Bologna. In 1269 he returned to Paris, and after teaching for two years in the University, was called back to Italy. Thereafter he taught successively at Rome, Bologna, Viterbo, Perugia, Naples. He was summoned by Pope Gregory X to the Council of Lyons, but took sick on the way, and was forced to accept the generous hospitality of the Benedictine Monastery of Fossa Nuova near Maienza. He lingered here for some weeks, continuing his studies and instructions in spite of his illness. He died on the 7 of March, 1274. His dear friend, St. Bonaventure, died the same year while in attendance at the Council of Lyons.

Works: Omitting the exegetical, homiletic, and ascetical writings of St. Thomas, we note the following works in philosophy and theology : i. Commentaries on Aristotle (written 1260-1272) ; ii. Commentaries on Peter Lombard’s Sentences (1250- 1260) ; iii. Free and Debated Questions (1260-1272); iv. Opuscula (Little Works—among which we mention one On Essence and Existence) (1256) ; v. Summa Contra Gentiles (Four books in exposition of orthodox Faith by the light of reason, and in refutation of infidel doctrines by the same light (1258-1264) ; vi. Summa Theologica (Summary of Theology), the monumental work of the Saint. Parts I & II (1267-1271); Part III (1271-1273). The last book was left unfinished.

The Summae are remarkable for (i) great scope; (2) clearness of exposition; (3) lucid order of questions; (4) immense authority with philosophers and theologians of subsequent ages.

Doctrine: St. Thomas’ doctrine is strictly Aristotelean. Albert the Great had partially purified Aristotle’s works of the extraneous and falsified matter with which it was commingled in the translations of the Arabians; Thomas completed the work, and set forth the Aristotelean philosophy in its pure form. This philosophy he developed and completed, clearing away obscurities, and rounding out a unified and perfected system of philosophy. Nor did Thomas, in his devotion to Aristotle, neglect other philosophers. He was well versed in the Greek philosophy then available to Europeans, as well as in the works of the Fathers, the Arabs, the Jews, and preceding Scholastics. Among philosophers who were high in his opinion after Aristotle were Plato, St. Augustine, PseudoDionysius, and Boethius. With all these he is not, of course, in constant agreement, but his was a mind large enough and keen enough to recognize genius and to pay it tribute, even when he could not’ agree with its doctrinal achievement. In passing, it must be said that, in theology as well as in philosophy, St. Thomas attained the most wonderful order and unification. We shall discuss the doctrine of St. Thomas in some detail in a series of paragraphs. i. Saint Thomas Aquinas was the first writer to express a full and perfect doctrine in this matter. He says that every science has a material and a formal object. The material object is that with which the science deals, the subject-matter of the science. The formal object is the special mode of treatment given to the material object. Now theology and philosophy are, in respect of their material objects, much at one; for both treat of God, of man, and of this world. But the two sciences are perfectly distinct in their formal objects; for theology deals with its subject-matter (material object) under the light of divine revelation, while philosophy investigates its material object under the unaided light of human reason. Thus the two sciences are clearly distinguished, the scope of each being determined with the determination of its formal object. Philosophy serves theology inasmuch as it enables the theologian to deduce scientific conclusions from articles of Faith. Theology serves philosophy inasmuch as it acts as a guide, a directive norm, or as a light upon the path of the philosopher showing him fields of research and making clear the limitations of his powers. Since both philosophy and theology are sciences, their body of doctrines is true and certain, and between two bodies of truth there can never be contradiction. The truths of theology, known by the supernatural light of revelation, are possessed with the double certainty of Faith and (for the most part) reason; and the certainty of theological knowledge has, therefore, a higher character than that of philosophic knowledge. Theology is the Queen of Sciences because its object is divine. Philosophy is the Queen of Human Sciences, inferior and subservient to theology, which is its guide, its test of perfection, and its supernatural complement. Philosophy can be called the handmaid of theology because of its inferior position, and because it lends itself as an apt instrument to the scientific exposition of theology. But theology dictates no truths to philosophy, it builds up no proofs; it merely illumines and guides the philosopher in his purely rational inquiry. ii. In Formal Logic St. Thomas adds nothing essentially new to the doctrine of Aristotle; but in Material Logic he develops the teachings of the Stagirite to a notable degree. For example, he adopts Aristotelean Moderate Realism in the question of Universals, and proceeds to show that metaphysical grades are not really, but only virtually distinct in the same individual. To illustrate : Man is a rational animal; that is to say, the idea “man” consists of the two notes or metaphysical grades, “animality” and “rationality.” Now in man there is not a real distinction between his animality and his rationality ; one cannot distinguish two parts of man corresponding to the ideas “animality” and “rationality,” which are the metaphysical grades of the idea “man.” Yet these things are virtually distinct in man, i. e., the power or virtue of animal functions (nutrition, growth, generation, etc.) is obviously a different sort of thing from the power or virtue of reasoning. Again, St. Thomas gives full expression to doctrines merely indicated or outlined by Aristotle. For example, he explains in detail the transcendental nature of the idea of Being, showing that it is not a genus, and that it applies to its inferiors analogically and not univocally, and that the analogy in such application is one of proper proportion (i. e., founded on similitude) and not one of attribution (founded on a relation other than similitude). (Consult the Article on Aristotle’s Logic, supra.) In his theory of knowledge, St. Thomas shows that all ideas come from sensation plus intellectual abstraction. He rejects the old Franciscan theory that a special divine illumination is required in the mind for the formation of ideas of spiritual things and the first principles of reasoning. He distinguishes three grades of abstraction, and three corresponding grades of ideas. Thus, the things which are immediately grasped by the senses furnish the mind with images (i. e., phantasms in imagination) from which physical ideas are directly abstracted. Our ideas of sensible things (man, body, plant, etc.) are, therefore, physical ideas. By a further abstraction we acquire ideas of mere intelligible quantity, and these are mathematical ideas. To illustrate : I have ideas of two, four,, one hundred, a pound, a yard, etc., apart from the number or measurement of any particular body. I know that two and two make four, without considering the “two” and “two” as apples, or mountains, or men, or any particular sort of reality. That is to say, I grasp the idea “two” as an understandable quantity, and not as a sensible or bodily reality present in a given object or objects. Above the mathematical abstraction, and in the highest place, comes metaphysical abstraction, which prescinds from all bodi-liness and from intelligible quantity and considers and includes only that which is understandable and predicable of material and immaterial being alike. Ideas formed by such abstraction are called metaphysical ideas (e. g., ideas of being, unity, goodness, truth, substance, accident). The mind not only abstracts ideas from sensations reflected in imagination (phantasms’), but it reflects upon them, compares them, compounds them, and so derives further ideas from them (derivative or abstractive ideas). Thus the mind rises to a knowledge of things spiritual (angel, soul, etc.) and even to the idea of God. In the part of Logic which deals with demonstration, St. Thomas speaks of science more profoundly than does Aristotle. He shows the proper relative position and rating of sciences (subordination of sciences’), and distinguishes these, according to the grades of abstraction, into Physical, Mathematical, and Metaphysical Sciences. iii. In his writings in the field of physical sciences Thomas teaches that all physical being, all being subject to change, is composed of act and potentiality. Bodily being is moreover composed of Prime Matter and Substantial Form. Prime Matter is pure potentiality, and has no existence apart from forms ; Substantial Form gives to Prime Matter its first act (i. e., actuality). Flatly contradicting the Franciscan theory of plurality of forms, St. Thomas teaches that more than one Substantial Form cannot actuate (in-form’) the same Prime Matter simultaneously. Spiritual substances are pure forms, and contain no matter whatever. Angels are, then, pure forms ; they are substantial, separate (non in-forming) forms. The human soul is likewise pure of all matter in itself; it is the substantial, in-forming (non-separate) form, of the living human body. The Principle of Specification (that by which one species is distinguished from others) is the form; and the Principle of Individuation (that by which one individual is distingushed from others of the same species) is matter con-ditioned by quantity (quantified matter). Since angels are free from all matter, they are not individuated, but each is specifically distinct from all the others. Here St. Thomas contradicts Albert, for the latter had taught that the Principle of Individuation was both matter and form. Of the human soul Thomas teaches that it is the sole substantial form of the body; it is the single principle of man’s threefold life activity, vegetal, sentient, and rational ; it is spiritual, simple, immortal ; it is wholly present in every part of the body which it in-forms ; it does not exist before the body, but is created and infused at the same instant; it has faculties of intellect and free-will. St. Thomas defends the doctrine of the Active Intellect in individual men against the Arabian theory of an abstract universal intellect (active, or both active and passive) common to all men, and numerically one in itself. He declares and proves that the human will has freedom of choice, and shows how free choice is exercised and the object’ upon which it is exercised. He believes the intellect superior to will {intellectualism}, not the will superior to the intellect (voluntarism). Superiority of intellect is shown in the fact that the intellect grasps its object (achieves knowledge), while the will only tends towards its object; and also in the fact that the ultimate practical judgment of the intellect is the core and basis of the free operation of the will. After discussing these matters of Psychology,—which Thomas with Aristotle assigns to Physics,—he treats of the origin of living things other than man. He agrees with Aristotle in asserting that it is absurd to say that life originated from a chance arrangement of nonliving things. Living things come from living things, and ultimately they are traced to the act of the Creator. Thomas errs in one point : he thinks that certain imperfect living things (such as worms) may come from rotting matter and not from a proper germ or seed. But, lest he posit an effect without sufficient cause, he explains that rotting matter gets the power to germinate such life from the influence of the heavenly bodies which are controlled by angels. In points that depend upon mere experiment St. Thomas made errors in his Physics : laboratory science had not yet been developed in his day. But in so far as Physics overlaps the field of speculative philosophy, he treats of it with accuracy. iv. In Metaphysics Thomas notably develops the Aristotelean teaching. Speaking of being as it is in the intellect (i. e., of truth, certitude, science), he explains the nature of logical truth, of certitude, the causes of certitude, the aptitude of the mind for achieving truth, and the supreme criterion of truth. He teaches that the knowing faculties are naturally infallible when properly constituted and engaged upon their proper object; and thus he declares formally objective the qualities of things which the senses perceive.—St. Thomas posits a real distinction (and not a mere distinction of reason) between the essence and existence of every created being. This doctrine, which opposes that of the Franciscan School and also that of Albert the Great, is absolutely fundamental in the Thomistic System. Some critics have tried to show that St. Thomas did not hold this opinion, and these have done violence to his expressions that their end might be attained; but the matter is clearly proved from his own works, and from the opposition this doctrine aroused among his adversaries (contemporary and subsequent) ; it is also proved by the fact that his pupils plainly state that such was his teaching.—Thomas extends Aristotle’s doctrine on causes, and deals profoundly with the efficient cause, distinguishing this as principal cause and instrumental cause. The instrumental cause receives its efficiency transiently through the action of the principal efficient cause. Thus even a bodily instrument may receive efficiency in a transient manner from a spiritual principal cause. Based on this doctrine is St. Thomas’ theory of ideas; for abstraction takes place through the transiently communicated efficiency of the active intellect, a spiritual faculty (faculty of the soul) which operates upon, or elaborates, the material images (phan tasms) drawn from sensation. In the First Efficient Cause (God) efficiency as act and power is identified with the Divine Substance ; but in creatures efficiency as act and power is an accident really distinct from the substance of the efficient creature. This doctrine contradicts the common teaching of the 13 century that efficiency as act and power in creatures is not distinct from their substance. Thus faculties are really distinct from the substance of the creature which possesses them.—In speaking of Uncreated Immaterial Being (God) Thomas brings Aristotle’s doctrine to fullness and perfection, drawing upon the philosophical achievements of the Fathers, and particularly upon that of St. Augustine. He proves that God exists as the efficient, final, and exemplary cause of the universe. He rejects as invalid the Ontological Argument of Anselm, showing that such a priori argument presupposes, but leaves unproved, the validity of the idea of God as representative of an actuality; and hence such an argument is inconclusive. Speaking of God’s concurrence in the acts of Flis free creatures, Thomas teaches that God concurs not only simultaneously, but also antecedently, moving His free creatures to determinate infallible action which is in accordance with their nature, and consequently free. God is the First Mover, and movement or action cannot ultimately originate outside of Him. God moves every being to action according to its nature. Free being is moved to action according to free nature. Hence God’s antecedent concurrence (or Physical Premotion, as it is called) does not destroy or contradict free-will in His rational creatures (angels and men). v. In Ethics St. Thomas greatly perfects Aristotle’s doctrine, for he has the guiding light of Christian Revelation to serve his genius, and this the Stagirite did not possess. Aristotle did not go beyond earthly life in fixing his sanctions and norm of morality, and in determining the last end of man. Thomas teaches that man, in every deliberate (human) act acts to an end, and ultimately to a last end, which is perfect happiness. Since man’s desire and tendency towards happiness is unlimited, nothing short of the Infinite Good can satisfy it perfectly. Therefore God, the Infinite Good, is the Summum Bonum, the end to be attained. God is himself the Object {objective happiness) in which man’s happiness {subjective happiness) is to be achieved. Man cannot attain perfect happiness in this life, because God cannot be perfectly possessed here; but man can approximate perfect happiness by knowledge and love of God and the exercise of virtue. In the life to come man can achieve and possess God by the aid of the special illumination called the Light of Glory; that is, man can behold God as He is {Beatific Vision) and rest for evermore in perfect happiness without the possibility of losing it.—God’s understanding joined in the unity of Essence with his will directs all things to Himself as to their proper end. This Divine Reason (understanding and will) is the Ultimate Norm of Morality; it is the ultimate measure of human activity; that which accords with It is good, and that which is out of line with It is evil. The Proximate Norm of Morality (through which the Divine Reason, the Eternal Law, is applied in human activity) is human reason recognizing the Ultimate Norm,— in a word, Conscience.

Remarks: Only a detailed study of the works of St. Thomas (especially the Summae) can give the student of philosophy or its history an adequate idea of their wealth of matter, their enormous scope, their wonderful construction, their concentration in one marvellous synthesis of all the fruits of theology and philosophy. Here we have given only a slight account of the leading doctrines ; not even an outline of Thomism could be attempted in such a manual as this. We can only say that St. Thomas perfected Scholastic Philosophy. In his hands it took on its final and perfect form as a body of principles eternally true. These principles have continuously new application, as the partial sciences of research unfold new facts and develop new data; but the principles do not change. Therefore Scholasticism, as St. Thomas left it, has been completed once and for all time. But its application, its extrinsic growth, admits of unlimited extension. During the life of St. Thomas many, even members of his own Order, opposed him. Opposition was, indeed, inevitable, and this for two reasons, (i) Thomas was thoroughly Aris-totelean, and Aristotle was held in suspicion, and often in dislike, because of the faulty and interpolated translations of his works which Christian Europe had received from the Arabs. (2) Thomas rejected many a tradition reverently preserved in different Schools, such, for instance, as the theories of plurality of forms, rationes seminales, special divine illumination in the forming of the higher kinds of ideas, subtle matter as an element in spiritual substances, etc., etc. Of the opponents of Thomas and Thomism we mention the following: i. Dominicans: Roland of Cremona; Robert Fitzacre; Hugh of St. Cher; Peter of Tarantaise. ii. Franciscans: William de la Mare; Richard of Middleton; Matthew of Aquasparta; William of Falgar; Peter Olivi; Roger Marston; John Duns Scotus (of whom we are yet to speak). iii. Secular Clergy: Henry of Ghent (discussed on page 246) ; William of St. Amour ; Gerard of Abbeville. The opposition of these men caused Thomism to be condemned in the Universities of Paris and Oxford. The Masters of Theology of the University of Paris were assembled in 1277 to condemn false doctrines, and of the 219 propositions condemned as Averroistic some were tenets of Thomism. A few days after the Paris meeting, Archbishop Robert Kilwardby of Canterbury (Dominican) had some Thomistic doctrines condemned at Oxford as dangerous. In 1284, and again in 1286, Archbishop John Peckham, successor to Archbishop Kilwardby in the see of Canterbury, renewed the condemnation of Thomism. After 1286 we find no more condemnations, and Thomism gradually came into its own. Little bands of its defenders appeared among the Dominicans, and then in other Orders and among the secular clergy. In 1278, before condemnations had ceased, there was a General Chapter of the Dominicans convened at Milan, and during its sessions some of the Oxford delegates were reprimanded for their opposition to Thomism; in another General Chapter of the same Order, held at Paris in 1279, it was decreed that Thomism might be taught in Schools of the Order. Credit for the movement in favor of Thomism is due, in part at least, to the following: i. Dominicans: John Quidort; Thomas Jorz; Thomas Sutton; Hervé of Nedellec. ii. Secular Clergy: Peter of Auvergne; Godfrey of Fontaines—although the latter is not thoroughly Thomistic. iii. Humbert of Preuilly (Cistercian), and Giles of Rome (Augustinian). Through the efforts of these and many other defenders, Thomism spread through the Schools. After the canonization of St. Thomas in 1324 the opposition of Oxford ceased and the Paris condemnations were formally revoked. By the middle of the 14 century Thomism had full sway in all Dominican Schools, and in very many Schools conducted by other Religious Orders and by the secular clergy. The influence of Thomism is shown not only in the scholarship of the time, but also in that enduring monument of literature, the Divina Commedia of Dante Alighieri (1265-1321), which has been called, “Aquinas in verse.” It is a remarkable and sad circumstance that Scholasticism was waning in influence before it was recognized in its perfect Thomistic form. It has been reserved for a later day (may we not say our own day?) to revive this instrinsically perfect system of philosophy and to give it its proper place. It cannot be doubted that if the modern Neo-Scholastics prove faithful to their task, Thomism, the stone rejected of the builders, will become at last the glorious head of the corner.

g) Henr y of Ghent (died 1293), “Doctor Solemnis.”

Life: Henry’s early life is not known. He was Canon of Tournai in 1267, and was made Archbishop of Bruges in 1276. After 1277, when he was made Doctor of Theology, he was a prominent professor in the University of Paris. He died in 1293 ; the place of his death was either Paris or Tournai.

Works: Henry wrote a Summa Theologica (Summary of Theology), and Quodlibela, discussions of a variety of questions.

Doctrine: Henry teaches that, while philosophy and theology are distinct sciences, philosophy has no claim upon our study except as an aid to the study of theology. He disagrees with St. Thomas in the matter of The Principle of Individuation, which, he says, is not quantified matter, but some vague reality, rather a negation than a positive entity, which is distinct from matter and belongs to the individual as such. He denies the real distinction between existence and essence in creatures. He admits in man (and in man only) a plurality of forms, viz., the form of corporeity and the soul. He denies Thomas’ doctrine of intelligible species (abstracted essences) and makes physical ideas mere spiritualized phantasms. He holds that there is no real distinction between the soul and its faculties. He professes voluntarism, or the superiority of will to intellect. Lastly, he revives the old Augustinian and Franciscan doctrine of a special divine illumination for the formation of ideas above the physical order.

Remark: We have noted here only such parts of Henry’s philosophy as disagree with Thomism; many other parts not mentioned here are Thomistic. Henry deserves credit for an able refutation of skepticism. His influence—reactionary for the most part—prepared the way for the doctrines of the great Scotus whom we are now to discuss.

h) John Duns Scotus (1266/1274-1308), “Doctor Subtilis.”

Life: Scotus was born somewhere in the British Isles, probably in Scotland. He entered the Franciscan Order at an early age, and pursued his studies at Oxford. Afterwards he taught at Oxford, then went to Paris, where the fame of his teaching was unbounded. He received his Doctorate at the University of Paris, and continued to teach there until 1307, when he was called to Cologne to refute certain heretical doctrines which were gaining headway in that city. He died in Cologne in 1308.

Works: Scotus wrote Commentaries on Aristotle; Opus Oxoniense (“The Oxford Work”), a commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, written at Oxford; Opus Parisiense (“The Paris Work”), a theological treatise in four books, written at Paris ; Quaestiones Quodlibetales, discussions of various questions, and other works. Many writings long attributed to Scotus are now recognized as spurious.

Doctrine: Scotus is the founder of the Later Franciscan School, which is, in some respects, more Aristotelean than the Older School, although it retains and exaggerates the Realism of the latter. Scotus exercised a splendidly acute critical talent in examining (and attacking) the doctrines of the Averroists, Thomas of Aquin, Bonaventure, Giles of Rome, Richard of Middleton, Roger Bacon, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Henry of Ghent. Scotus reposes little trust in unaided human reason, and requires Faith as the basis of certitude. He was a man of very subtle mind, and wrote in a style that is concise without being clear. His arrangement of matter follows a definite but very intricate order. For these reasons, his works do not make easy reading. We shall discuss his doctrine very briefly in a series of paragraphs :

i. Scotus stresses the distinction between philosophy and theology, and seems to differentiate the sciences on the basis of both Material and Formal Object. He makes philosophy a science very inferior to theology, and holds that a purely rational science cannot deal adequately with many of its own problems, but must look to Revelation for its proofs. ii. Scotus taught a formal distinction based on the nature of a reality in which specific grades of being are distinguished (distinctio actualis formalis ex natura rei). This is often called “the Scotistic Formal Distinction,” and has been described as a little less than real distinction and a little more than logical or mental distinction. We shall not attempt here to determine the exact character of the Scotistic Formal Distinction. This difficult matter is a delicate and even dangerous point of argument, and available sources of criticism all too frequently quote Scotus’ commentators, friendly and unfriendly, instead of quoting and judging the actual doctrine of the great Franciscan himself—a doctrine, it must be admitted, not easy and perhaps not possible to know in its fullness. iii. The Principle of Individuation according to Scotus, is not quantified matter, as St. Thomas teaches, but a reality which is superadded to a being already constituted in its specific nature. This reality is called the thisness of the thing (haecceitas). iv. Essence and existence are not distinguished in created being by a real distinction, but by a formal distinction, which is something more than logical and something less than real. v. Scotus’ doctrine of Universals is a qualified Moderate Realism which was developed logically by his followers into Ultra-Realism. vi. For the rest, Scotus accepts the plurality-of-forms doctrine, even for man, and declares that there is in man a form of corporeity (or body-form) in addition to the soul which is the substantial form of the living body. He holds will superior to intellect (voluntarism). The judgment of intellect in no wise moves the will, but is a mere condition for the will’s free action. The immortality of the soul cannot be proved by reason alone. Scotus declares that the concept of being is univocal. In Physics, he rejects the rationes seminales theory, but posits direct intervention of God in every generative act.

Remarks: Scotus had a very keen and subtle mind, and his multiplication of distinctions is hard to understand. Perhaps no philosopher in the course of history has called forth such divergent criticisms as has Scotus. Some declare that his doctrine, rightly understood, is wholly in accord with Thomism; others say that it contains the germ of every modern error. Some hold that Scotus clouded the whole science of Metaphysics ; others no less ardently aver that he clarified it. Many say that he made philosophy a welter of complexities that no mind can understand; others sincerely believe that he simplified philosophy. Recent critical investigation, however, shows that many works and doctrines, supposedly of Scotus’ authorship, and the occasion of controversy, are not truly Scotistic at all. The influence of Scotus was enormous. The opponents of Thomism turned to him as to a champion. The Franciscans followed Scotus, as the Dominicans followed Thomas. The two Schools are still in existence, especially in matters of speculative theology. The chief Scotists of medieval times were : i. Francis of Mayron (died 1325), the “Acute Master of Abstractions.” He was a teacher at the University of Paris, and a thorough-going Scotist ; ii. Antonius Andre (died 1320), “Doctor Dulcifluus”; iii. John of Bassoles, “Doctor Ornatissimus”; iv. Walter Burleigh, “Doctor Planus et Perspicuus”; v. Alexander of Alexandria; vi. Nicholas de Orbellis, whose writings served as a text for Scotist students; vii. Lychetus of Brescia.

The Thomists who opposed Scotism during the 14 and 15 centuries were the following above others : i. Hervé of Nedellec (died 1323), who bitterly attacked Scotistic doctrine on the one hand, while on the other he rejected the basic Thomistic doctrine of a real distinction between existence and essence in creatures. ii. John of Naples (died 1336), who took up the defence of the Thomistic theses condemned at Paris in 1277 under Archbishop Stephen Tempier ; iii. Durandus of Aurillac (died 1380), who defended Thomism against Durandus of St. Pourçain ; iv. John Capreolus (1380-1444), a Dominican of the Province of Toulouse, who taught at Paris for some years. His Book of Defences was deservedly celebrated as a clear exposition of Thomism and a sharp refutation of opposed doctrine. Capreolus was known as the “Chief of the Thomists.” v. St. Antoninus (1379-1459), Dominican, who was made Archbishop of Florence in 1446. He wrote a Summa Theologica in which he treats chiefly of moral matters in Thomistic style.

i) Raymond Lul l y (1235-1315), ‘‘Doctor Illuminatus.”

Life: Raymond Lully was born at Palma, on the Island of Majorca. He entered the Third Order of St. Francis and devoted himself to the conversion of the Mohammedans and to the overthrow of Averroism. He died a martyr to the truth under the assaults of the Mohammedans. But for the somewhat heterodox character of his doctrines, he would probably have been canonized.

Works: Raymond wrote eleven folio volumes. Of these works we mention as important for philosophy his Ars Magna (“Great Art”) and his Twelve Principles of Philosophy.

Doctrine: Reason cannot attain to the highest truths unless aided by Faith. But once furnished with the aid of Faith, rea-son can demonstrate all truth, even revealed mysteries. In Universals Raymond was an Ultra-Realist. He held the strange doctrine of a kind of motor-soul indwelling in the world. Raymond invented a Logical Machine (a piece of mechanism somewhat resembling a comptometer, with letters and figures to represent the elements of thought), with which he thought he could prove any true proposition.

Remarks: Raymond’s exaggerated notion of the power of reason,—granted, divinely illumined reason,—to penetrate all mysteries is a sort of Christianized theosophy. His opposition to the paralyzing Averroistic doctrine of a “twofold truth” probably led him to the excess of making all truth subject to demonstration. Raymond, like Roger Bacon, is only part Scholastic. Another prominent part-Scholastic of Raymond’s time was the English Franciscan, Roger Marston (died about 1300), Lully’s theosophy was revived in the 15 century by Raymond of Sabunde (died 1432). Raymond’s opposition to Averroism was timely, for the pernicious theory of Twofold Truth gained a place in the schools towards the end of the 13 century. It appeared in the University of Padua in Italy, introduced by Peter d’Abano (died 1315), its chief exponent in Italy was John of Jandun, who brought his Averroistic tenets from Paris, where the Twofold Truth doctrine was taught in the University by Siger of Brabant (died about 1284), Boethius, called the Dacian (died about 1280), and Bernier of Nivelles (died at the end of the 13 century). The 13 century was a constructive age. It assembled, developed, and synthesized the works of preceding ages in philosophy, theology, and other sciences. It was an age of men rather than of schools ; and it was dominated by the great Masters of Scholasticism. It was perhaps the most brilliantly intellectual age the world has ever known.

THE DECLINE OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY (13OO-I450) The present Chapter deals with the causes which induced the decline of Scholasticism and with the more important philosophies that replaced it in favor and influence during the 14 and early 15 centuries. The Chapter is, therefore, divided into two articles: Article i. Causes Which Induced the Decline of Scholasticism. Article 2. Schools of the Period of Decline. Article i. The Causes Which Induced the Decline of Scholasticism With St. Thomas Scholasticism reached completeness and perfection. There was no longer any opportunity for intrinsic development in this great System ; for indefinite development is not possible in philosophy as it is in the arts. Philosophy— true philosophy—is a body of true principles; and is therefore stable, unchanging ; and once perfected, it must remain so forever. The only development which can accrue to it is extrinsic, and consists in the extension and application of its principles in the interpretation of the findings of the physical sciences which go on developing indefinitely through every age. And just as true philosophy, once completed, cannot have further intrinsic development, so also it cannot suffer intrinsic retrogression or decline. It may decline e.vtrinsically; it may cease to 252