The Skeptic School | Catholic Philosophy

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Ancient Scepticism begins with Pyrrho of Elis (c. 365–275 BC), who taught that things are indeterminate and unknowable — we cannot say of anything that it is rather than is not, or both rather than neither — and that the appropriate response is epoché (suspension of judgment), leading to ataraxia (tranquillity). The Middle Academy (Arcesilaus, Carneades, 3rd–2nd centuries BC) adopted a form of probabilism: we cannot achieve certainty, but we can act on the probable. Sextus Empiricus (2nd–3rd century AD) systematised the sceptical arguments — the five tropes of Agrippa (infinite regress, disagreement, relativity, hypothesis, and circularity) — in the form in which they were transmitted to the Renaissance and early modern period, providing the challenge that Descartes' methodic doubt and Hume's empiricism attempted (in very different ways) to meet.

Article 3. The Skeptic School

a) The Pyrrhonian Skeptics; b) The Academian Skeptics;

c) The Neo-Pyrrhonians. Socrates and Plato refuted, but did not eradicate, the Skepticism of the old Greek Sophists. We have seen that the Minor Socratic Schools lapsed into Skepticism, and that the skeptical tendency showed itself in the Middle Academy and the Third Academy. Even among the Peripatetics there was that disorder and disagreement which favored the spread of frankly skeptical opinion in matters intellectual. The Skeptics of this age were concerned, like the Stoics and the Epicureans, with the ethical question—the question of man’s happiness and the means of attaining it. Three branches of the Skeptic School are to be discussed : The Pyrrhonian, the Academian, and the Neo-Pyrrhonian.

a) The Pyr r honian School was founded by Pyrrho (about 360-270 B. c.). His doctrine, and that of his School, may be summed up thus : We can know nothing of the nature of things, nor can we be sure that sensations give us a true report of objects in the world. Therefore it is useless to dispute about the object of knowledge; wisdom dictates that we suspend all judgment about matters that can never be settled with definiteness and certainty. Argument merely upsets the mind, and reaches no conclusion in any case. The one thing worthy of the interest and labor of the philosopher is the matter of happiness and the means of attaining it. Now happiness consists in ataraxia or imperturbability of mind, and for this man must strive. Argument and speculation in which non-skeptical philosophers indulge so freely is not only futile, as has been noted, but is ethically wrong, since it prevents man from achieving ataraxia. Members of the Pyrrhonian School were, in addition to its founder, Timon of Phlius (325-235 b. c.), called “The Sil-lographer” because he wrote satires (silloi) on the old non-skeptical philosophers ; and Philo of Athens.

b) The Academian School has already been mentioned among the Academies after Plato, as the Third Academy. Arcesilaus (about 316-241 b. c. ) introduced skepticism into this Academy when he was its scholarch. He taught a doctrine of mitigated skepticism, declaring that, while clear certitude cannot be attained, one may reach probably certain knowledge by the use of the knowing faculties. To support the doctrine that pure certainty is impossible, this School proposed many arguments in demonstration of the thesis : “Nothing can be proposed and proved which will not admit of contradictory proof also.” That probable certainty is attainable is a concession; and no good reason is offered for making it, except that the practical circumstances of life require one to take at least the things of sense pretty much at face value. This doctrine of probability is extended to Ethics; one is assured that one need not take pains to know what is objectively right and wrong, since this cannot be known with certainty; one may be satisfied to accept the prescriptions of law and custom in the matter of morals, for these give probable certainty about right and wrong. Notable members of the Third Academy were: Carneades (about 210-129 b. c.); Clitomachus the Carthagenian (died about no B. c.) ; and Philo of Larissa (1 century b. c.), with whom the New Academy originated.

Remarks: The theory of probability proposed by the Aca-demians is illogical and unstable ; sooner or later it must develop into some positive doctrine of certainty, or it must lapse into absolute skepticism. The Academian Skepticism gave place to Eclecticism, of which we are to speak in the following article.

c) The Neo-Pyr r honians (i century b. c.) tried to offer a rational basis of argument for the old Pyrrhonian theory. They argued, for example, that a man will perceive an object differently at different times. The object presumably remains the same, but different subjective dispositions in the beholder (youth, age, sickness, health, etc.) as well as varying conditions in the object perceived (proximity, distance, motion, rest, etc.) will cause perception to vary. Thus one does not perceive a wheel in the same way when it is at rest and when it is revolving rapidly; a distant mountain is perceived as something different from the same mountain seen close at hand ; a thing perceived in youth will appear different to the same beholder in myopic old age. How then can one ever be certain that one perceives a thing as it is? Again, the Neo-Pyrrhonians argue, the question of certainty involves the doctrine of causation. If men claim certainty in anything, they claim it in the cause-and-effect relation of things; and they feel that they thoroughly understand a thing when they know it in its causes. Now, as a matter of fact, there is no such thing as a cause. If there were a cause, it would necessarily occur at one of three points of time, viz., before its effect, simultaneously with its effect, or after its effect. But a cause cannot occur before its effect; else it is a cause before it is a cause! A cause cannot follow its effect—the notion is obviously absurd. And if a cause concur simultaneously with its effect, no one can tell which is cause and which is effect in the concurring events. Of course, the Neo-Pyrrhonians apply their doctrine in the field of Ethics. If there is no certainty, there is no certain right or wrong, no certain good, no certain evil. The moral effort must be directed towards ataraxia, imperturbability, evenness of life, peace. Peaceful surrender to the inevitable fact that certainty is not to be had is the best that can be hoped for in the sphere of intellect and in the sphere of action or conduct which depends upon understanding. The Neo-Pyrrhonian denial of causality does away with the causes of the world, notably with the efficient and final causes. Thus the existence of God and His Providence in the world are denied. Notable Neo-Pyrrhonians were Aenesidemus of Crete; Agrippa; and Sextus Empiricus of Nicomedia (2 century after Christ). The last named was the greatest and the last of the Greek Skeptics.