Aristotle and the Aristoteleans

Article 3. Aristotle and the Aristoteleans

a) Aristotle; b) The Aristoteleans.

a) Ar ist ot l e (384-322 b. c.)

Life: Aristotle was born at Stagirahence he is called “The Stagirite”—on the shore of the Adriatic in Thrace. His father was Nichomachus, physician to King Amyntas of Macedon. His mother was named Phaestida. When Aristotle was about twenty-two years of age he went to Athens, and for the next twenty years he studied philosophy under Plato. Meanwhile he carried on researches in the natural sciences. After Plato’s death Aristotle spent some time in travel, and then was called by King Philip of Macedon to be tutor to the young Alexander the Great, then a lad of thirteen. When Alexander succeeded, to the kingdom, Aristotle returned to Athens and began to teach philosophy in the Lyceum of Apollo. It was his custom to walk up and down the shaded walks of the Lyceum while discoursing to his pupils, and, since the Greek verb peripatein means “to walk about,” he and his pupils were called “The Peripatetics.” Aristotle carried on his work of teaching for twelve or thirteen years. After that period his fame and in-fluence were so great that the Athenian politicians found his removal desirable, and accordingly had him accused of impiety, a fatal charge. Aristotle escaped condemnation by fleeing the city. He retired to Euboea, where he resided until his death in 322.

Works: Aristotle wrote many works, some in dialogue form, some in form more scientific. The dialogues, saving a few fragments, have all perished, but the other writings survive. Some parts of Aristotle’s works are of doubtful genuinity, and some changes and interpolations have certainly been made in the original text. Another unfortunate circumstance is that Aristotle’s writings are mere hurried notes written probably as sketches in outlining his lectures. Some critics are of the opinion that all the works of Aristotle in our possession are class notes made by pupils of the great philosopher. At all events, these works may be grouped under four heads, viz., Logic (Organon), Physics, Metaphysics, and Ethics.

Doctrine: In accordance with the classification of Aristotle’s works we discuss his Logic, Physics, Metaphysics, and Ethics in four sections. i. Aristotle’s Logic Aristotle was the inventor of Logic, or Analytic, as he called it. Not only did he invent this science, but he brought it to such perfection of development that very little of essential importance has been added to it since his day. Logic teaches men to come by correct thinking to conclusions that can and must be held with certainty as true. As may be seen from this description of the science, Logic is subdivided into two branches or sub-sciences, viz., 1) the science of correct thinking (Formal Logic), and 2) the science of true and certain knowledge (Material Logic). The human mind has three distinct operations : apprehending, judging, reasoning. A knowledge of the nature of these operations enables the philosopher to formulate the laws ac-cording to which they function, and these are called the Laws of Thought. We discuss each of the operations of the mind very briefly. (i) Apprehension. The senses present their findings to the mind. Say, for example, that the sense of sight reports ten representations or pictures of the circle, no two of which are alike in size, position, color. Now it is precisely the size, position, and color that the senses perceive. But the mind pierces beneath the sense findings and sees that each of the pictures represents a circle, one as truly as another, one exactly in the. same manner as another, in spite of the differences in size, position, color. In a word, the mind finds that size, position, and color do not signify in the actual thing that is represented (i. e., circle), and it therefore abstracts from such things as accidental and non-essential. Yet the accidental and non-essential things (size, position, color) really have a function; they distinguish one individual picture of circle from all other individual pictures. They are called, therefore, the individuating marks of the pictured circles, and, inasmuch as they are the marks by which the mind knows or notes that one individual picture is not another, they are called individuating notes. The mind in apprehending abstracts from individuating notes, lays hold of, grasps, or apprehends the essential thing or the essence which these notes clothe. The result of the abstraction and apprehension is the idea. The idea, then, or “simple apprehension” of a thing, is the essential representation of that thing in the understanding. It is well to remark here that when the mind has completed the abstracting process, cutting away (i. e., neglecting to consider) the individuating notes, the essential thing, the essence, which remains is called “an intelligible species.” Inasmuch as this “species” is put into the understanding, or impressed upon the understanding, it is called the impressed species or species impressa; inasmuch as the mind reacts to the impression, grasping or apprehending it, the species is called the expressed species or species expressa. The species expressa is the idea proper. Notice, then, that, according to Aristotle, the understanding has the power of forming its ideas by abstraction, i. e., by elaboration of sense findings, Contrast this true doctrine with the theory of Socrates that ideas are inborn and are to be worked out of their latent and obscure condition by the ironic and maieutic processes of discussion. Contrast this doctrine also with that of Plato, who taught that the formation of ideas is a mere recollection or remembrance of Subsistent Real Ideas known directly by the soul in a former existence. Neither Socrates nor Plato admitted the abstractive power of the intellect by which it rises from the findings of sense to essential representation by ideas. (ü) Judgment. Ideas or simple apprehensions are representations in the understanding of the essences of things. Ideas are simple, i. e., they involve no affirmation or denial, they represent simply, without mental comment on what is represented. Now the understanding has the function of comparing its ideas, of noting identities and distinctions, likenesses and unlikenesses, and of pronouncing or judging upon these relations. This judgment of the understanding upon the agreement or disagreement of its ideas is a basic thought process. In judgment the mind pronounces upon the agreement (affirmative judgment) or disagreement (negative judgment) which is found, upon examination, to exist between two ideas. In affirmative judgment the mind asserts that a certain idea agrees with or is to be predicated of another idea. The former idea is the predicate-idea, the latter is the subject-idea. For example, the understanding examines the content of two ideas, viz., man and animal. It finds these ideas in agreement, though not coextensive and identical. It sees that the idea animal is to be predicated of the idea man. The judgment follows : Man is an animal. Here we have an affirmative judgment or predication. Now there are five possible modes of predication, and these are called the Five Heads of Predicables, or simply Predicables. These are the following : Genus, Species, Specific Difference, Property (or Attribute), and Accident. Notice most carefully that these are modes in which the mind predicates one idea of another ; they are not classes of things existing as such outside the mind. The latter classification will be explained later on, but here it is necessary constantly to remind oneself that one is dealing with a matter of mind and not of extramental reality, granted always that there is an extramental basis for all here considered. A—Genus. When a predicate-idea is affirmed of a subjectidea as constituting something which the subject-idea holds in common with another idea, the predicate-idea is the Genus of the subject idea. Take the judgment, “Man is an animal.” Here the predicate-idea (animal) is affirmed of the subjectidea (man) as constituting that part of the subject (i. e., animality) which the latter has in common with another idea (i. e., brute animal). “Animal” is therefore the Genus of “Man.” B-—Species. When the predicate-idea is affirmed of the subject-idea as constituting it completely, so that subject and predicate are identical in content, or, in other words, so that the predicate completely defines the subject, then the predicateidea is the Species of the subject-idea. Take the judgment, “Man is a rational animal.” Here the predicate-idea (rational animal) is affirmed of the subject-idea (man) as constituting. it entirely and essentially and as completely defining the subject-idea. “Rational animal” is therefore the Species of “Man.” C—Specific Differ ence. When a predicate-idea is affirmed of a subject-idea as constituting that part of the latter by which it is distinguished from another idea with which it has a common Genus, then the predicate-idea is the Specific Difference of the subject idea. Take the judgment, “Man is rational.” Here the predicate (rational, i. e., being) is affirmed of the subject (man) as constituting that part of the idea man by which it is distinguished from another idea (i. e., brute animal) with which it has a common Genus. “Rational” is therefore the Specific Difference of “Man.” D—Pr oper t y or At t r ibut e. When a predicate-idea is affirmed of a subject-idea as constituting no essential part of the latter, but as belonging to it by natural necessity, then the predicate-idea is the Property or Attribute of the subject-idea. Take the judgment, “Man is risible, i. e., has the faculty of laughing.” Here the predicate (risible) is affirmed of the subject (man) as constituting no part of the idea man, but as belonging to that idea by natural necessity, since man, if wholly and perfectly constituted, inevitably has the faculty of laughing. “Risible” is thus a property of “Man.” E—Accident . When a predicate-idea is affirmed of a subject-idea as constituting no part of the latter, and as having no natural and necessary connection therewith, but simply as something that may be present or may be absent from the subject-idea without affecting it in essence or properties, then the predicate-idea is the Accident of the subject-idea. Take the judgment, “Man is a reading being, i. e., knows how to read.” Here the predicate (reading) is affirmed of the subject (man) as something that may belong to the latter, but by no force of essence or of natural necessity. “Reading being” is therefore an Accident of “Man” in the given judgment. The Five Predicables are the only modes of predication possible. When one idea is affirmed of another, the judgment or predication will always be generic, specific, specifically differential, attributive or proper, or accidental. As to negative judgments we may merely remark that the denial will be on all five scores, or the judgment will be so qualified as to make clear the precise modes of predication excluded or denied. Aristotle called the Five Predicables by the name Categoremata. But what of the extramental realities which the ideas represent ? In what classes do understandable things exist in nature outside the mind? There are ten such classes or Categories, also called Predicamentals. The Predicamentals or Categories are : Substance, and Nine Accidents. Every object of knowledge, every thing of which an idea can be formed, must be conceived either as a substance or as one of the accidents. A—Subst ance is that which can exist in its own right without requiring some other thing as a foundation or substratum in which to inhere, i. e., without requiring some subject-reality which it merely characterizes, modifies, qualifies, or affects. Of course, excepting God, the Infinite Substance, every substance requires a creating and conserving cause ; this is not the point, however. Granted the necessary creating and conserving cause, substance is conceived as something which can have its own proper existence as distinct from other things. Examples of substance are: body, man, angel, earth, air, water, fire, house, tree, hill. B—Accident (i. e., Predicamental Accident, not the Predicable Accident described above) is that reality which is not suited for independent existence like a substance, but regularly requires a subject-substance in which to inhere. Examples of accident: color (of a body), size, shape, temperature, motion, speed, temperament. There are nine accidents and these are called : Quality, Quantity, Relation, Place, Time, Posture, Habit, Action, Passion. Definitions of the accidents may be found in any manual of Scholastic Philosophy. Here it will suffice to offer an illustration. Consider the ideas expressed in the following sentence, and look to what extramental things each represents : “An old slave, six feet in height, and clothed in scanty rags, stood singing in his doorway at evening, his body swayed by the melody.” Here we find the expression of all the Predicamentals : substance: slave, i. e., a man, a human substance; quantity: six feet in height; quality: old; relation: slave (implies relation to master, i. e., servitude) ; place : in his doorway ;

time: at evening; posture : stood ; habit : clothed in rags (note that habit of mind is quality) ; action : singing ; passion: swayed (passion means submitting to or affected by action). Aristotle does not always enumerate all ten Predicamentals, but from his ex-professo treatment of the subject and from his usual manner of speaking we know that he understood that there are ten. (üí) Reasoning or Inference. The third and most complex operation of the mind is that of reasoning. Reasoning is, loosely speaking, a round-about way of arriving at a judgment. In judging of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas the understanding is sometimes balked and cannot make pronouncement. It then employs a third idea, known in relation to each of the two about which judgment is sought, and so reasons out the judgment. Call the two ideas A and B, and the third idea C, and the process may be represented as follows: The mind cannot pronounce upon the agreement of A and B. Comparison of the two ideas, because of their obscurity, fails to make clear their agreement or disagreement. The mind therefore cannot pronounce A is B, nor can it declare A is not B. But the mind knows A is C. It also knows that B is C. Therefore it reasons out the judgment A is B : A is C B is C Therefore, A is B. A—Deduct ion. When reasoning proceeds upon the principles : “Whatever is true of a class as a whole is true of the members of the class” (Dictum de Omni) ; and “Whatever is to be denied of a class as a whole is to be denied of the members of the class” (Dictum de Nullo), the reasoning is called deductive reasoning or simply deduction. Examples of deduction are :

All fruits are wholesome (i. e., the whole class of fruits is wholesome) ; But oranges are a fruit (i e., a member of the class’) ; Therefore, oranges are wholesome. No fruits are harmful (i. e., harmfulness denied to the whole class fruits) ; But oranges are a fruit (i. e., member of the class) ; Therefore, oranges are not harmful. B—Induct ion. When reasoning proceeds upon the principle: “What is true or false of the individual members of a class is true or false of the class as a whole,” the reasoning is called inductive reasoning or simply induction. Induction is called complete when that which is known to be true or false of each and every individual member of the class is inferred as true or false of the class as a whole. If, for example, I find by experiment that every one of the known metals is heavier than water, and infer that “All the known metals are heavier than water,” I have a piece of complete induction. Induction is called incomplete when that which is found to be true or false of some members of a class is inferred as true or false of the class as a whole. Now if these members of the class be thoroughly representative of the class, and if they be tested and examined under varied conditions and circumstances, so that it becomes apparent that the point affirmed of them must belong to the very nature of such members, then the induction is incomplete but sufficient. This sort of induction is obviously the only sort of reasoning available in the experimental sciences, and its conclusions must be accepted as scientific certainties. If, however, induction is based upon experiment or study of some non-representative members of a class, or if the study and experiment is not thorough and varied, or if the specimens or members studied are very few, then the induction is called incomplete and insufficient, and its conclusions have no scientific value beyond the impression which they may create in the mind of the investigator to carry him on to closer study and experiment. Aristotle does not deal professedly with incomplete but sufficient induction, but he teaches its value implicitly and incidentally. Here it is to be noticed that Deduction and Induction are not opposed methods of reasoning. They are supplemental. Induction seeks to establish a general truth so that individual scientific truths may be deduced therefrom. The three operations of the mind, viz., apprehension (forming the idea), judgment, and reasoning, are expressed respectively in the Term, the Proposition, and Argumentation. The most perfect form of Argumentation is the Syllogism, which is a form of argumentation consisting of three propositions so connected that when the first two are given, the third necessarily follows. The examples given above in explanation of deduction are syllogisms. Aristotle treats of the syllogism at length, describing its Figures, or various valid arrangements of its terms, and its Moods, or various valid arrangements of its propositions with respect to their scope or extension. He also states the Laws of Syllogistic Reasoning. In all this Aristotle did a wholly original thing. He asserts that he learned nothing of the syllogism from any teacher, but worked out the entire doctrine by his own study. ii. Aristotle’s Physics Physics is the science of that being which is subject to change. There are four kinds of change : change of substance (corruption and generation); change of quality (alteration; as, for example, from hot to cold) ; change of quantity (growth and diminution); and change of place (local motion). Since the bodily universe is the most changeable of beings it is the foremost object of the science of Physics. Aristotle admits change and multiplicity in the world as realities, and thus he contradicts the Eleatics, who declare that change and variety are illusions.

Now all bodies—solid, liquid, gaseous, living, non-living— are at one in this point : they are bodies. There is something, therefore, in all bodies, some substratum, some substantial principle, which is common to them : it makes bodies bodies. There is also in bodies something substantial which distinguishes them into different species or essential kinds of bodies. By reason of the first substantial principle each body is a body; by reason of the second substantial principle each body is this essential kind of body. The first substantial principle is called Prime Matter; the second is called Substantial Form. To illustrate all this : Consider a boy seated on a rock under a tree. Here are three bodies : boy, rock, tree. They are all bodies, each as truly as the others : hence they have some common substantial principle. This is Prime Matter. Yet the three bodies are essentially different kinds of bodily substance ; they are, respectively, human substance, mineral substance, vegetal substance. In other “words, the Prime Matter in each of these three bodies is determined in such a way that the bodies are essentially or specifically different kinds of bodies. This determinant in each of the bodies is its Substantial Form. The doctrine of Prime Matter and Substantial Form is called “Hy-lomorphism” from two Greek words which mean, respectively, “matter” and “form.” Prime Matter does not exist separately. It exists only with Substantial Forms in bodies. In other words, it exists only in an in-formed condition as the universe of all bodies. Prime Matter and Substantial Forms come together as substantial co-principles to form bodies; neither is a complete substance; together they form a complete bodily substance. Prime Matter is not increased or diminished : it is indestructible unless God annihilate it. It is called indifferent, that is to say, it has no propensity, no leaning, no preference for union with any one Substantial Form rather than another. When a body is changed substantially—as wood, for example, is changed by being burned up—the Prime Matter is not destroyed. What happens is that one Substantial Form is displaced by another, the Prime Matter remaining the same. In the example of burned wood, the Substantial Form which made the body wood and not metal or other substance, is displaced by the Substantial Forms of ash and the various chemical bodies known collectively as wood-smoke; but the Prime Matter remains unchanged. The Substantial Forms of all potential bodies (i. e., bodies not actual, but which may become actual if existing causes be put into action) are latent in the “Potentiality of Matter,” that is to say, such Forms are latent in the capacity of Prime Matter to become any sort of possible body. From this general statement is excluded the Substantial Form of the human body, which is the soul, a spiritual being, not latent in the potentiality of matter nor reducible thereto as other Substantial Forms are when they cease to in-form matter in bodies. The human Substantial Form (i. e., soul) can exist separately from matter, without in-forming matter, and when it leaves the body at death it continues in separate existence. Prime Matter is “pure potentiality”; it is purely indeterminate; it is not at all a determinate kind of bodily being in itself ; it is only that substantial substratum which is common to all bodies, which is the basis of change in bodies without being changed itself. Prime Matter, therefore, has no distinct existence in itself. It is a reality, but not an actuality in the strictly philosophical sense of that word. To be made actual, to be actuated, it requires that a Substantial Form unite with it or in-form it. The two incomplete substantial principles of a body (i. e., Prime Matter and Substantial Form) come together to make a single complete substance, not a dual or double one. Prime Matter and Substantial Form are incomplete substantial co-principles which together constitute complete bodily substance. Prime Matter is one; but there are as many Substantial Forms in kind as there are specifically different kinds of actual and possible bodies.

Aristotle teaches that the bodily universe has always existed in the condition in which we now find it {eternity of matter}. The heavenly bodies, he says, are naturally incorruptible, being of a nature superior to that of earthly bodies. The earth is the crudest of all the great cosmic bodies, and is therefore at the bottom (or centre) of the universe. The heavenly bodies move about the earth {geocentric system}. The earth itself has no movement. Aristotle speaks in some detail of the figure and movements of the heavenly bodies, and of their arrangement and mutual relations. In speaking of earthly bodies Aristotle expounds the doctrine of generation and corruption, condensation and rarefaction, and discusses the nature of a mixture of elements. The elements of bodies here on earth are air, earth, fire, and water —things intensely contrary in qualities. From the proper mixture and balance of these contrary elements different kinds of bodily things emerge. The heavenly bodies, as already explained, are different in essential structure from earthly bodies ; they are not made of the four elements ; they constitute a fifth element or “fifth essence” {quinta essentia, quintessence}. Notice, however, that these structural differences do not affect the basic nature of all bodies, terrestrial and celestial; for all are ultimately composed of Prime Matter and Substantial Form, even the elements. The soul is the Substantial Form of the human body. It is spiritual and immortal. It possesses understanding or intellect, by which it forms and expresses ideas, judgments, reasoning. The intellect has an active and a passive power; the former (Agent Intellect) abstracts understandable essences or intelligible species from the findings of sense: the latter (Passive Intellect) recognizes and expresses the abstracted mental images as ideas. The soul is immediately created by God; it had no pre-existence before being united to the body. Animals and plants have a life-principle or soul {psyche} as well as man. Man has the functions of plant life and animal life as well as his own proper function as a reasoning and willing being. Yet he has not three souls or life-principles, but only one, which is spiritual and rational, and which is the principle of all man’s vital functions, vegetal, animal, and rational. The life-principle of plants and brutes is reduced at their death to the potentiality of matter, while man’s soul is deathless. Hi. Aristotle’s Metaphysics Metaphysics deals with being as being. The idea of “being” “ is the most abstract of all ideas. “Being” may be described as “Anything that exists or can exist in the order of mind (logical order) or of extramental reality (ontological or real order.)” Everything that exists or can be thought of as existing is “being.” All things come together in a common point, or on a common basis, as “being.” “Being” is the most universal idea; it is the basis of all ideas ; everything of which we can form an idea is represented to the mind as some thing, i. e., as being. The idea of being is transcendental, that is to say, it soars ■* above the reach of understanding when we would classify it as different kinds of being; it transcends such classification. We cannot say, for example, that bodily being and spiritual being are different kinds of being as being ; for a body is being quite as truly as a spirit is being. It has been said that the universal idea of being includes in the class of things which it denotes (i. e., in its extension’) all things actual and possible. Now the things which a universal idea denotes, the things included in the extension of a universal idea, are called the inferiors of that universal idea. Thus the inferiors of the universal idea “man” are each and every human being that exists, has existed, will exist, or could exist. Again, the inferiors of the universal idea “animal” are all brute and rational animals, actual or possible. Lienee, the inferiors of the universal idea being are all things that are or can be, all things that can be thought of as existing. Now there are obviously very great differences among the things that are and can be. A body is very different from a spirit ; yet we have said that each is truly being: still, a body and a spirit are not beings in the fullness of identity. Again, finite being is very different from infinite being (God) ; both are being, but they are not being in completeness of identity. For this reason we have the Aristotelean principle : “The universal idea Being does not apply to its inferiors univocally (i. e., in precisely the same measure of exactness, which would make all inferiors identical in essence) but analogically (i. e., in a manner not precisely the same in each case, yet not wholly different in any two cases).” Thus being, which defies classification into different kinds of being as such, is nevertheless distinguished analogically. From the idea of being Aristotle develops certain self-evident principles. The chief of these principles is the Principle of Contradiction, which may be expressed thus : “A thing can not be and not-be at the same time in the same manner.” Another principle is the Principle of Identity and Difference, which may be thus expressed: “A is A; not-A is not-A; i. e., that which is, is; that which is not, is not.” Still another self-evident principle derived from the very idea of being is the Principle of the Excluded Middle: “Either a being is or it is not; there is no middle state between being and not-being.” These principles, drawn from the idea of being, which is the root and basis of every idea, may appear so obvious as to be ridiculous ; yet they are the foundation of all valid thought and reasoning. Like the first axioms of geometry, these principles appear so evident that it seems a bit silly to state them with all the importance of emphasis. Yet the axioms of geometry make geometry possible as a science; and, in like manner, the self-evident principles derived from the idea of being make all science possible. In his metaphysical writings Aristotle discusses and defines such things as : principle ; cause, material cause, formal cause, efficient cause, final cause ; nature ; element ; the necessary ; the contingent; unity; substance; identity; diversity; likeness; difference ; unlikeness ; opposition, contrary opposition, contradictory opposition, etc. ; being per se and per accidens; being with reference to the true and the false ; the ten categories ; being in actuality and in potency. The last topic is of the greatest importance, and must be noticed here. Potentiality (being in potency) signifies capacity to receive perfection not at present possessed. Act (being in actuality) signifies perfection now possessed. An existing being possesses the perfection of its present existence; it is actually what it is : yet it may be modified in its nature or accidents so that it becomes something else. Towards this something else, towards this new substantial or accidental perfection, the existing being stands in potency. Thus we may say that an existing being is actually what it is, potentially what it may become. The capacity for modification (perfection) in an existing being is called subjective potency. The capacity of a non-existing being to receive existence is called objective potency, i. e., pure possibility. The more actuality a being has, the more perfect it is, for actuality means possession of perfection; and, correspondingly, the more a being is in potency, the more imperfect it is. Now a being that has the fullness of actuality, that is, actually so perfect that no perfection can be even thought of which it does not possess, is pitre act or pure actuality. Such a Being is obviously infinite. Aristotle therefore defines God as Pure Actuality or Pure Act (Actus Purus). Conversely, a being which has in itself no determinate actuality at all, a being that is simply and solely in potency to all that it may become, a being that has not even a determinate leaning or inclination towards one sort of actualization rather than towards another—such a being is pure potentiality, it is purely potential being. And for this reason Aristotle defines Prime Matter as pure potentiality. God alone is Pure Actuality. Prime Matter alone is pure potentiality. All other things are made up of actuality and potentiality. God is simple, that is, He has no parts, is not divisible. God is one, infinite, eternal, immutable, distinct from the world. In speaking of God’s knowledge Aristotle is somewhat obscure; he seems to say that God does not know the world, since inferiority in the object of knowledge would be an imperfection in the All-Perfect—an obvious impossibility. But St. Thomas rightly interprets Aristotle as teaching that the inferior things are not the formal object of God’s knowledge, but that God knows all things in the formal object of His knowledge, and this formal object is God Himself. Indeed, if any sort of knowledge were outside the Divine Intellect, God would stand in potency towards such knowledge; and Aristotle’s definition of God excludes all potency from the Divine Being. Of God’s operations outside Himself (i. e., of creation, conservation of creatures, providence) Aristotle speaks at some length in his Metaphysics. Some interpreters say that while Aristotle makes God the final cause of the universe (i. e., the end for which the world was made), he does not make God the efficient cause (i. e., the creating, producing cause) of creatures. This view of the Aristotelean position must be challenged directly. In the first place, Aristotle never expressly states that God is not the efficient cause of the world. On the contrary, he makes use of God’s final causality in illustration of His efficient causality. It is true that Aristotle denied transient activity in God ; and rightly, since this would involve imperfection in the All-Perfect. But he asserted God’s efficient causality in moving (eternally) the eternal matter of which the universe is composed (according to his doctrine). Eternal matter does not mean uncaused matter; that matter is eternal does not do away with the necessity of an efficient cause acting ab aeterno. Again, in the second place, the citations made from Aristotle’s text in proof of the position here assailed, are all readily understood as denials of transient activity in God, that is, of activity which would be a mere actualization of potency in God—and in God there is, of course, no potency at all. In the Fifth Book of his Physics Aristotle touches this matter of causes of the world; and, while he says he does not intend to speak of the “substantial origin” (creation by efficient cause) of the world, he does so, none the less, by implication ; and he calls God the First Cause and the First Principle of all things. And, obviously, “First Cause” and “First Principle” mean the first efficient cause. Besides God, Aristotle admits secondary motors or causes in the world. These are “separate intelligences,” and each has been assigned charge of one of the heavenly spheres, which it rules and moves. In the last two books of his Metaphysics, Aristotle mentions and refutes the ancient doctrine of “separate substances,” especially the Platonic doctrine of Real Subsistent Ideas. We must notice here, before passing on to the study of Aristotle’s Ethics, that the Metaphysics of this old master is a body of profound doctrine, true in almost every detail. Omitting certain vague doctrines about God and the existence of separate intelligences ruling the spheres by efficient action, the Aristotelean Metaphysics appears to be altogether reliable. Aristotle’s Metaphysics is the most disorderly of his treatises ; for it is nothing more than a collection of class-notes, hastily jotted to be elaborated later before his pupils. His division of his matter is not accurate nor logical; he introduces much discussion extraneous to the subject in hand. Yet for all these defects, Aristotle’s pages on Metaphysics are some of the most valuable ever written. iv. Aristotle’s Ethics Ethics, or moral science, treats of man’s free activity in relation to an end which he is to achieve. Aristotle divides thé subject into departments called Monastic, Economic, and Political, which treat respectively of the individual, the domestic, and the civil functions of applied moral principles.

Man tends towards happiness; he seeks happiness. Now hap-piness consists ultimately in the knowledge and contemplation of truth, and particularly divine truth. This is the end, the Great Good, the summum bonum, which man must strive to attain. The measure of man’s progress or retrogression in the work of achieving this end, or, in other words, the norm of morality, the test of good and evil, is only vaguely hinted at in the writings of Aristotle. Moreover, Aristotle mistakenly limits the objective happiness of man to the present earthly life. To achieve the summum bonum man must practise the moral virtues; nor can he be fully happy without the proper functioning of all the bodily organs and members. Aristotle makes a thorough study of the moral habits called virtues. Man is by nature a social animal. He is, first of all, inclined towards conjugal society, marriage. This society must be stable and permanent, for the ends of marriage demand its indissolubility. With conjugal or domestic society Aristotle considers the societas herilis, or the master-and-slave society. He teaches that some must rule and some must serve, and says that this is a requirement of nature itself. But he does not advocate slave ownership. He perceives the evils of slavery, and declares that master and slave should be friends, and that slaves should never be compelled to suffer violent or inhuman treatment. Aristotle defines the State as “a multitude of men sufficing to procure for themselves the necessaries for living well.” The State is not the owner of its citizens, nor their superior. Aristotle denies and refutes the Platonic doctrine of State absolutism, and holds that the State exists only to promote the happiness and the virtue of its citizens. Speaking of forms of government in the State, Aristotle mentions three forms which he calls good, and opposes to these three evil forms. The first good form of government is Monarchy, or the rule of one properly equipped for the office. To this he opposes the evil form of Tyranny, or the rule of one who conducts the government in such wise as to serve his own individual ends, and cares not for the public utility. The second good form of government is Aristocracy, or the rule of a few wealthy and noble citizens who have the common good at heart. Opposed to this is Oligarchy, or the rule of a few who make the government the instrument of the rich citizens to the detriment of all others. The third good form of government is the Free Republic, in which representatives of all classes of citizens conduct the rule. Opposed is Democracy or the rule of the many who despise the interests of the wealthy and noble citizens and serve only the others. There is no best form of government suited to all times and conditions; the circumstances and character of a people will determine what is the relatively best form of government, i. e., the form best suited for that people at that time. But, seemingly pressed for an opinion, Aristotle says that he regards a Monarchy tempered by an intellectual aristocracy as the nearest approach to an absolutely best form of government. No pagan philosopher dealt so profoundly and scientifically with moral matters as did Aristotle. He easily outstrips all predecessors in his doctrine on the happiness of life, the nature and the division of moral virtues, the nature of human passions and free-will, the natural tendency of man to life in society, the stability and permanence of marriage, the right of ownership and other natural rights, and many additional matters. Yet Aristotle’s splendid moral edifice is incomplete, for he does not treat of the beatitude of the life to come, nor of the eternal sanctions of the moral law; and he omits the all-important matter of the supreme norm of morality, that ultimate rule to which man’s free activity must conform to be good, and from which any defection is evil.

Remarks: Aristotle was the greatest philosopher of the ancient world, and, indeed, it is not extravagant to say that his was the greatest merely human mind that the world has ever known. Though lacking the guiding light of the true Faith, he brought philosophy to such perfection that he achieved an almost flawless system of scientific truth. He missed the truth, for the most part, only in such matters as cannot be rightly investigated without the light of revelation as a guide to study. In the Middle Ages Christian philosophers found Aristotle’s philosophy in singular harmony with their Faith, and it has served ever since, as it served the great Aquinas, as a scientific basis for the exposition of religious doctrine. Every age honored Aristotle as one of the truly great and learned men of the world, a man for the ages. But it was not until the twelfth and the following centuries that he came fully into his own. From the twelfth century onward Aristotle may truly be called the greatest factor in the intellectual development of Western Christian peoples. Aristotle’s philosophy is almost wholly his own. In principle he is traditional and Socratic ; but in method and presentation of doctrine he is thoroughly original. He was the first to employ the analytic-synthetic science of Logic. He was the first to give due recognition to the value of induction from facts of internal and external experience; and since induction is the all-necessary instrument of the natural sciences, Aristotle is justly called “the Father of Natural Science.” Aristotle deserves this title not only for his metaphysical theory which serves as a basis for natural science, but also for his investigations and studies in the department of this science itself; his treatise On Animals, for example, shows how accurately he studied living beings, and what wonderful things he was the first to discover about them.

b) The Ar ist ot el eans, or t he Per ipat et ic School . Among the more important Aristotelean philosophers must be mentioned : i. Theophrastus of Lesbos (about 375-288 b. c.), who wrote many works, best known of which are his Treatises on Botany, Mt. Angel Abbey Library St. Benedict, Oregon 97373 and his Ethical Characters, or lifelike delineations of types of human personality. He completed and enlarged Aristotle’s Natural Philosophy, devoting special attention to the department of botany. In Ethics he insists upon the choregia (plenitude, abundance, or sufficiency) secured to virtue by possession of material goods. ii. Eudemus of Rhodes (4-3 century b. c.), who studied under Aristotle. He wrote the so-called Eudemian Ethics, which is a summary of Aristotle’s teaching in this field. He shows in his writings a leaning towards the Platonic theology. iii. Strato of Lampsacus (3 century b. c.), who made studies in the science of physics. His general doctrine shows a latent atheism and materialism. He died in 270 b. c. iv. Aristoxenes of Tarentum, who wrote of music, and taught that the soul is the harmony of the body and originates in the body as sound in the strings of a lyre. v. Dicaearchus, who accepts the theory of Aristoxenes, and argues therefrom that the soul is not immortal. vi. Other Aristoteleans were : Lycon, Ariston, Critolaus, Diodorus. To avoid confusion later on, we may mention some Aristoteleans by anticipation: vii. In the first century after Christ, the following commentators on Aristoteleanism were notable : Andronicus of Rhodes, who put the text of Aristotle’s works in order; Boethius of Sidon; Nicholas of Damascus, who edited a compendium of Aristotelean doctrine differently arranged from the work of Andronicus; Demetrius of Phalerus; Alexander of Aphrodisias, a celebrated commentator, but Aristotelean only in name, for he denies the immortality of the soul, rejects divine providence as incompatible with man’s free-will, teaches that the active intellect is one with God and calls the passive intellect an acquired faculty: and in all this he profoundly influenced the later Arab philosophers and those of the Alexandrian Renaissance.

viii. Porphyry (3 century after Christ) and Galen (2 century after Christ), as well as Philoponus and Simplicius (6 century after Christ) are counted important commentators on Aristotle and interpreters of his doctrines.

POST-ARISTOTELEAN PHILOSOPHY (300 B. c. to Christ) This Chapter discusses the Greek Philosophy of the period of decline. With Aristotle the Golden Age came to an abrupt end; no definite progress was made in the philosophy of the succeeding age, and the body of accumulated doctrine was not kept in integrity. Greek Philosophy retrograded. Skepticism, Materialism, and Pantheism became widespread once more. Two causes may be assigned for this decline in philosophy: First, the great teachers, and particularly Plato and Aristotle, were not popular in the sense that their doctrine was generally known and easily understood; and the followers and pupils of the masters were too few and of too meagre intellectual capacity for the work of keeping the inherited doctrine intact and pure. Secondly, external circumstances furthered the decline. In 338 the yoke of Macedonian rule was imposed upon liberty-loving Greece, and in the 2 century b. c. came the subjugation to Rome. The cultivation of the arts and sciences, so favored in the days of liberty, fell off and finally disappeared under foreign domination. The one common question discussed by post-Aristoteleans of different schools was the ethical question, i. e., the question of man’s happiness and the objective thing in which happiness is to be found. The chief Schools of this period (omitting the Aristotelean or Peripatetic School discussed at the end of the last Chapter) were the following, which we shall treat in separate Articles : 103