The Modifiers of Human Acts

a) Ignorance

Ignorance is the absence of knowledge—and, for our purpose here, it may be defined as the absence of intellectual knowledge in man. Ignorance is thus a negation of knowledge ; it is a negative thing. But when it is absence of knowledge that ought to be present, the ignorance is not merely negative, but privative. Thus, ignorance of the higher mathematics in a structural-steel worker is merely negative; but such ignorance is privative in the architect or engineer who designs steel structures such as bridges and the framework of buildings. Again, ignorance of Catholic belief and practice is negative in a Hottentot, but privative in a Catholic collegian. Ignorance has, indeed, a positive aspect when it consists not merely in the absence of knowledge, but in the presence of what is falsely supposed to be knowledge. Thus, if I see a stranger in the street, and realize that I do not know him, my ignorance of his identity is merely negative. But if I am misled by poor eyesight or by a resemblance in the stranger, and judge him to be a well-known acquaintance, my state of mind is positive towards him: I have what I judge to be positive knowledge of his identity. Such positive ignorance is called mistake or error. We are to consider ignorance in its effect upon human acts. Before stating the ethical principles which our study will justify, we shall make a preliminary study of ignorance itself, considering it in three ways, viz., i. in its object, i. e., in the thing of which a person may be ignorant; ii. in its subject, i. e., in the person in whom ignorance exists; iii. in its result, i. e., with reference to the acts that are performed in ignorance. i. Ignorance in its Object. —The thing of which a a person may be ignorant is a matter of law, fact, or penalty.

(a) Ignorance of Law is the ignorance of the existence of a duty, rule, or regulation. Examples: A motorist drives at the rate of forty miles an hour, not knowing that the local speed-limit is twenty miles an hour. A hunter shoots game in early October, unaware that the game-laws forbid such an act. A young Freshman leaves the campus during noon-recess, not knowing that his action is a violation of the college rules.

(b) Ignorance of Fact is ignorance of the nature or circumstances of an act as forbidden. Examples: A motorist knows the speed-limit, but unknowingly violates it because of an inaccurate speedometer. A hunter knows the game-laws, but reads his calendar amiss, and kills game one day before the season opens. A freshman knows that he must not leave the campus, but goes out of bounds through misinformation about the extent of the college property. —Thus ignorance of fact is lack of knowledge that what one is actually doing comes under the prohibition of a known law.

(c) Ignorance of Penalty is lack of knowledge of the precise sanction (i. e., an inducement sufficient to make reasonable men obey the law) affixed to the law. Examples: A motorist knowingly violates the speedlaw, not knowing that, in that particular locality, the set punishment for such an offense is a short prison term, in lieu of which no amount of money will be accepted. A hunter violates the game-laws, believing that, if apprehended, he will be merely fined, whereas the established penalty for his offense is the revocation of the license to hunt. A freshman wilfully leaves the campus, thinking that he will escape with an admonition not to do so again, whereas the fixed penalty for his offense is the suspension of all studentprivileges for a period of two weeks. ii. Ignorance in its Subject.—In the person in whom it exists, ignorance (of law, fact, or penalty) is either vincible or invincible.

(a) Vincible Ignorance (i. e., conquerable ignorance; ignorance that can and should be supplanted by knowledge) is ignorance that can be dispelled by the use of ordinary diligence. Such ignorance is, therefore, due to lack of proper diligence on the part of the ignorant person, and is his fault. Vincible ignorance is, in consequence, culpable ignorance. There are degrees of vincible ignorance: If it be the result of total, or nearly total, lack of effort to dispel it, it is called crass (or supine) ignorance. If some effort worthy the name, but not persevering and whole-hearted effort, be unsuccessfully employed to dispel it, the ignorance is simply vincible. If positive effort is made to retain it, the ignorance is called affected. To illustrate : A freshman who has been in college a month and does not know the college rules of order, is in the state of vincible ignorance in the matter. If he has made no effort, or scarcely any, to know the rules, his ignorance is crass or supine. If he has positively avoided learning the rules so that he may have a ready excuse for faults, and may be able to say when taken in violation of order, “I did not know the rule,” his ignorance is affected. If he has made some inquiries about the rules, or has tried once or twice, without success, to procure a copy of the rule-book, his ignorance is simply vincible.

(b) Invincible Ignorance is ignorance that ordinary and proper diligence cannot dispel. This sort of ignorance is attributable to one of two causes, viz.: either the person in whom the ignorance exists has no realization whatever of his lack of knowledge, or the person who realizes his ignorance finds ineffective his effort to dispel it. Hence, invincible ignorance is never the fault of the person, in whom it exists, and it is rightly called inculpable ignorance. Invincible ignorance has two degrees, viz.: If no human effort can dispel it, it is physically invincible. If such effort as good and prudent men would expend to dispel it— taking into account the character and importance of the matter about which ignorance exists—is found to be ineffective, the ignorance is called morally invincible.1 To illustrate: A Catholic eats meat, wholly unaware that the day is Friday. Here his ignorance is invincible—even though in itself it could be easily dispelled by asking the nearest person for the day of the week—and even physically invincible, because no effort can be used with effect where there is no realization whatever that effort is needed. A further illustration : A man is seeking for a seventeenth century pamphlet to which he finds himself constantly referred in learned books on the subject of economics. After months and months of searching through-libraries and following elusive clues, the man discovers that there is only one copy of the pamphlet in existence; that this copy is in the library of a recluse who resides in a foreign country, far across the sea; and that, although one may be permitted to read it, the pamphlet may neither be borrowed nor copied. The man is in the state of invincible ignorance with regard to the contents of the pamphlet. His ignorance is not physically invincible, for he could make a voyage to the land of the recluse, and study the pamphlet in the latter’s library. Still, this course would involve difficulties and inconveniences out of all proportion to the 1 The word morally has no direct relation in the present use to morality, but to characteristic action of men. Thus, ignorance is morally invincible when such effort as would be truly characteristic of good and prudent men in the circumstances, is found powerless to dispel it. In common language, ignorance is morally invincible when it would be extremely difficult to dispel it.

importance of the matter about which ignorance exists. We say, therefore, that the man’s ignorance of the contents of the pamphlet is morally invincible. iii. Ignorance in its Result.—Here we consider ignorance (of fact, law, or penalty) with reference to acts performed while ignorance exists.

(a) Antecedent Ignorance is that which precedes all consent of the ’ ri11. A man, wholly unaware that to-day is a holyday of obligation, misses Mass. He would certainly not miss Mass if he were conscious of his obligation. His ignorance is antecedent to his act of missing Mass, and we say that the act is done through or in consequence of ignorance. Antecedent ignorance does not differ from invincible ignorance.

(b) Concomitant Ignorance is that ignorance which, so to speak, accompanies an act that would have been performed even if the ignorance did not exist. A nominal Catholic misses Mass, not aware that the day is a holyday. Yet, even had he known, he would have missed Mass. His act of missing Mass does not come from ignorance, but happens in company with his ignorance, and we call the ignorance concomitant. An act done in concomitant ignorance is non-voluntary.

(c) Consequent ignorance is that which follows upon an act of the will. The will may directly affect it, or supinely neglect to dispel it. Thus, consequent ignorance does not differ from vincible ignorance. A careless Catholic suspects that the day is a holyday but deliberately refrains from making sure, and does not attend Mass. If he positively avoids knowledge in the matter, his (affected) ignorance is directly willed; if he fails to acquire knowledge through sheer carelessness, his (crass or supine) ignorance is indirectly willed. We may sum up the classification of ignorance in the following scheme: ‘of law in its object- of fact of penalty simply vincible ‘vincible- crass or supine affected ignorance in its subject—morallyinvincible— physically

‘antecedent in its result— - concomitant directly willed consequent— indirectly willed

The ethical principles which emerge from our study of ignorance as a modifier of human acts are the following: first principle: Invincible ignorance destroys the voluntariness of an act. Voluntariness, as we have seen, depends upon knowledge and freedom. Freedom, in its turn, depends upon knowledge of the field of free choice. Ultimately, then, voluntariness depends upon knowledge, and is impossible without it. Now, invincible ignorance is an inevitable absence of knowledge. Therefore, an act, in so far as it proceeds from invincible ignorance, lacks voluntariness, is not a human act, and is not imputable to the agent. —To illustrate: A good Catholic, wholly inadvertent to the fact that the day is Friday, eats meat. In so far as the act is an act of eating meat, it may be both voluntary and free; but in so far as the act is an act of violation of the law of abstinence, it is neither voluntary nor free. The act of eating meat, in so far as it is a violation of the law of abstinence, comes from invincible ignorance, and is therefore not a human act for which the agent is responsible. —A further illustration: A Catholic child uses very evil language, totally unaware that such language is sinful. Later in life, the child realizes the sinfulness of foul speech, and carefully avoids it. The child also begins to worry about the past. Yet such worry is unjustified, for the past evil was committed in invincible ignorance, and therefore it lacked voluntariness, was not a human act, and is not imputable to the child. second principle: Vincible ignorance does not destroy the voluntariness of an act. Vincible ignorance is not an inevitable lack of knowledge. On the contrary, it supposes knowledge in the agent of his own lack of knowledge and of his duty of dispelling ignorance. Hence, the agent has knowledge which bears indirectly upon the act which he performs in ignorance, and the act has, in consequence, at least indirect voluntariness, and is a human act imputable to the agent.—To illustrate: A careless Catholic suspects that the day is Friday, but fails, through sheer negligence, to make certain; and he eats meat. Now, while the agent does lack knowledge that the day is Friday, he has knowledge of his own ignorant state of mind and of his obligation to acquire knowledge. Failing to make proper effort to dispel his ignorance, he wills to keep his ignorance. But his ignorance is, in some sense, the cause of his violation of the law of abstinence. Hence, he wills this violation in cause. His act has indirect voluntariness, and is a human act for which he is responsible.

third principle : Vincible ignorance lessens the voluntariness of an act. While vincible ignorance does not destroy the voluntariness of an act, it lessens voluntariness, makes the act less human, and diminishes the responsibility of the agent. The agent knows that he is in ignorance, and ought to dispel it, but, none the less, he lacks direct and perfect knowledge of the act itself which is done in ignorance. Hence, his act, while possessing voluntariness, does not possess direct and perfect voluntariness. Voluntariness is, therefore, impaired or lessened.

fourth principle: Affected ignorance in one way lessens and in another way increases voluntariness. Affected ignorance is that vincible ignorance which is directly willed and positively fostered. Yet, in spite of the bad will which it implies, it is still a lack of knowledge, direct and perfect, and, in so far, it lessens the voluntariness of the act that proceeds from it. On the other hand, affected ignorance, being deliberately fostered to serve as an excuse for sin against a law, shows the strength of the will’s determination to persist in such sins. It is thus said to increase the voluntariness of an act, or, more accurately, to indicate an increased voluntariness in the act that comes from it.

b) Concupiscence

The term concupiscence is often used to signify the frailty, or proneness to evil, which is consequent in human nature upon original sin. Ethics does not employ the term in this sense. Here concupiscence means those bodily appetites or tendencies which are called the passions, and which are enumerated as follows: love, hatred; joy, grief; desire, aversion or horror; hope, despair; courage or daring, fear; and anger. We treat here of the passions in general. In the next section of the present Article we shall study in particular the passion of fear.

36i! The passions are called antecedent when they spring into action unstimulated by any act of the will; that is, when they arise antecedently to the will-act. They are called consequent when the will, directly or indirectly, stirs them up or fosters them. To illustrate: the feeling of joy that arises upon the suddenly revealed view of a splendid landscape; the anger that surges in resentment of unjust and offensive treatment; the first feeling of the attractiveness of a suddenly presented fancy or thought, good or evil; the leaping desire for revenge for an unexpected act of cruelty; the first feeling of hatred that comes with the thought or sight of a bitter enemy; the shrinking in aversion from an unpleasant task; the urge to “give up” in despair in the face of crowding difficulties—all these are examples of antecedent concupiscence or passion. These movements Or bodily appetites become consequent when they receive the approval of the rational will. Thus, the passion of anger that arises antecedently when one is insulted, becomes consequent when the feeling is deliberately retained. Thus, the first movement of pleasure (love, joy) in an unwholesome thought or fancy, becomes consequent when the will consents to retain that thought or fancy. Antecedent concupiscence is an act of man, and not a human act. It is therefore a non-voluntary act, and the agent is not responsible for it. Consequent concupiscence, however, is the fault of the agent, for it is willed, either directly or indirectly, that is, either in itself or in cause. The agent is, in consequence, responsible for it. But what of the acts that come from concupiscence? We state the ethical principles in the matter: first principle: Antecedent concupiscence lessens the voluntariness of an act. Some ethicians use “voluntariness” to mean willforce, vehemence or intensity of will-act. These assert that concupiscence increases the voluntariness of an act, and they are right, for concupiscence gives a strong urge to action, and the act that comes from it is more vehement and intense by reason of the concupiscence. But we do not use the word voluntariness in the sense of will-force, or will-intensity; we use the term to indicate the human character of an act, the essence of a human act. We keep human act and voluntary act as synonyms. We say that antecedent concupiscence lessens the voluntariness of an act that comes from it. Voluntariness depends upon knowledge and freedom. Antecedent concupiscence disturbs the mind and thwarts, more or less completely, the calm judgment of the mind upon the moral qualities of an act; hence it impairs the knowledge necessary for perfect voluntariness. Again, antecedent concupiscence is a strong and sudden urge to action, and thus it lessens the full and prompt control which the will must exercise in every perfectly voluntary act; hence it impairs freedom. Therefore, on the score of both knowledge and freedom, antecedent concupiscence lessens the voluntariness of an act, and, in consequence, diminishes the responsibility of the agent. second principle: Antecedent concupiscence does not destroy the voluntariness of an act. Although knowledge and freedom are lessened by antecedent concupisence, they are not destroyed; and the agent’s responsibility, while diminished, is not cancelled. A man may sin, and sin gravely, even though strongly influenced by antecedent passion. Still, his sin is less grave than it would be if committed dispassionately and, so to speak, “in cold blood.” To illustrate: Jones, under the influence of antecedent anger, strikes Smith and injures him seriously. While the voluntariness of this act is lessened by antecedent concupiscence, and while Jones is less responsible than he would be if he struck the blow in cold deliberation, still the act is truly voluntary, and Jones is responsible for it. The reason is that Jones, while upset and disturbed by strong passion, is still master of his acts; he knows what he is doing, and does it freely. Passion may make the control of his acts more or less difficult, but it does not make such control impossible. If the antecedent passion is so great as to make control of the agent’s acts impossible, then the agent is temporarily insane, and his acts are not human acts, but acts of man.’ Here, however, we speak only of human acts as influenced by antecedent concupiscence. third principle: Consequent concupiscence, however great, does not lessen the voluntariness of an act. Consequent concupiscence is willed, directly or indirectly] Hence the acts that proceed from it have their proper voluntariness, direct or indirect. To illustrate: Jones wishes to be revenged on Morris. He plans the act of revenge. He broods upon his wrongs in order to stir himself up, to nerve himself to action. He attacks Morris and injures him seriously. Here we have direct voluntariness throughout. Jones directly wills the act of revenge, and directly wills the anger as a means to the accomplishment of that act. Now, even if he be insane with rage at the moment of performing the act, he is none the less doing what he directly willed to do, and his concupiscence cannot affect the full voluntariness of that act. Again : Smith broods upon wrongs suffered at the hands of Jenkins. He foresees (or can and should foresee) that if he continues to nurse his anger, he will probably be stirred to acts of violence against the person of Jenkins. Nevertheless he continues to brood. He becomes wild with passion, seeks out Jenkins, and seriously injures him. Here the anger was directly willed, and the act of violence was willed in cause with the anger, and in itself at the moment of attack. Even if Smith’s passion was so vehement as to overwhelm his rational control of his acts, —even if, that is to say, the attack itself did not proceed from Smith as a human act,—it was nevertheless willed in cause, and has its proper voluntariness as such: an indirect voluntariness which is in no wise diminished by concupiscence.

c) Fear

Fear is one of the passions, and is included under the general denotation of the term concupiscence, but it is usual to give it special mention in Ethics, because. it is a very common passion, and we should know in detail its relation to the morality of acts, and because it has a characteristic distinctive among the passions, viz., that it usually ( when it is the cause of an act) induces the will to do what it would not do otherwise. We may, however, present the ethical doctrine on the subject of fear in very short space. Fear is the shrinking back of the mind from danger. More accurately, it is the agitation of mind (ranging from slight disturbance to actual panic) brought about by the apprehension of impending evil. Actions may proceed from fear as their cause, or may be done with fear as an accompanying circumstance. Thus, a soldier who runs to shelter from a dangerous position acts from fear, while his bolder companion who stays at his post may be affected with fear, but it is obviously not this fear that keeps him in the position; on the contrary, he remains in spite of fear. The ethical principle in this matter is: principle: An act done from fear, however great, is simply voluntary, although it is regularly also conditionally involuntary. The principle speaks of an act performed from a motive of fear, an act proceeding from fear, not an act performed with or in fear. A person may have full and unconditioned voluntariness in that which is performed with fear, as, for example, a thief, full bent upon taking valuables from a house at night, proceeds with fear that he may be apprehended; but he does not commit burglary through or from fear. An act performed from fear, however great, is simply voluntary. Of course, we speak of a human act done from or through fear. If fear is so great as to make the agent momentarily insane, the act done from fear is not voluntary at all, for it is an act of man and not a human act. But as long as the agent has the use of reason, his acts performed from fear are simply voluntary. For the agent effectively chooses to perform such an act rather than undergo that of which he is afraid: he chooses the act as a lesser evil, and effectively chooses it. But the act is also regularly involuntary inasmuch as the agent would not perform it in other circumstances; were it not for the presence of an evil feared, the act would not be performed. To illustrate: A man denies his faith to escape torture and death. His denial comes from fear. Hence, according to our principle, the act is simply voluntary, and the man is responsible for the sin of apostasy. Still, since the man would not have denied his faith except for the influence of fear, we discern a conditional involuntariness in his act which renders it less sinful (though it still remains a very grave sin) than it would be were it done in cold deliberation, apart from the influence of fear. The practical conclusion is this: Fear does not excuse an evil act which springs from it. Fear does present a difficulty, but human acts are not necessarily easy acts. Still, the influence of fear makes an act less perfectly human in character, although never to such an extent that the agent is enabled to act humanly and still escape responsibility for his act. The positive (“statute”) law of Church and State usually provides that an act done from grave fear, unjustly suffered, and excited directly in order to force the agent to perform an act that is against his will, is an invalid act or one that may be invalidated. Even though such an act is simply voluntary, it would not be for the common good to allow an act extorted by fear to stand as valid and binding. Thus, a man who is required to sign a contract at the point of a gun, or under threat of blackmail, would not be bound, in positive law, to fulfil the contract.

d) Violence

Violence or coaction is external force applied by a free cause (i. e., by a cause with free will; by man) for the purpose of compelling a person to perform an act which is against his will. Thus, the martyrs suffered violence when they were dragged to the altars of idols in the effort to make them offer sacrifice to false gods. Violence cannot reach the will directly. It may force bodily action, but the will is not controlled by the body. Still, the will has the command of . bodily action, and since this command is limited or destroyed for the moment by violence, the will is said to be indirectly affected by violence. Hence, if the will does not exert its command to make the bodily members offer due resistance to violence, it concurs, in so far as such resistance is lacking, in the act done under violence. principle : Acts elicited by the will are not subject to violence; external acts caused by violence, to which due resistance is offered, are in no wise imputable to the agent.

e) Habit

By habit Ethics understands operative habit, which is a lasting readiness and facility, born of frequently repeated acts, for acting in a certain manner. Thus, a man who has always endeavored to speak the truth, has a habit of truthfulness, and it goes against his habit—“against the grain”—to lie. Such a man finds it necessary to make a distinct effort in order to utter a deliberate falsehood. Again, a man who has the habit of lying, finds it very easy to falsify or evade the truth, and it is difficult for him to tell the truth when a lie would prove convenient. Again, a man who has the habit of cursing finds profane words slipping from him with great ease and readiness, while it requires a special watchfulness on his part to avoid uttering them. principle: Habit does not destroy voluntariness; and acts from habit are always voluntary, at least in cause, as long as the habit is allowed to endure. Habit does not destroy voluntariness. The agent is fully responsible for human acts done from what is called force of habit. Even if such acts be in themselves acts of man, the habit itself, so long as it is not disowned, and a positive and enduring effort made to overcome it, is willed as a human act, and its effects are voluntary in cause, and hence are human acts. To illustrate: John has the bad habit of using profane language. He is conscious of this fault. Being conscious of it, he has knowledge of it; and he is free to determine upon overcoming it, or to allow it to endure. Hence, both knowledge and freedom are present, and there is nothing to balk voluntariness. John is therefore responsible for the bad habit as such, and, since it is the cause of the profane words—many of which are uttered without advertence—he is responsible in cause or indirectly for each profane utterance. Now, if John determines to overcome his evil habit, he disowns it; he wills not to utter profane speech. But “He that wills the end wills the means to that end.” Hence, John, to be honest in his will to reform, must consent to ceaseless watchfulness over his tongue. While his good intention endures, and while his watchfulness continues, the profane utterances that “slip out” are acts of man and not human acts, since their cause is no longer willed; and hence they are not imputable to John. But the moment John ceases to be watchful, that moment he consents indirectly to let the habit continue, and his evil words become again imputable, even if they slip from him unnoticed.

Summary of the Article

In this lengthy Article we have studied the modifiers of human acts, and have endeavored to determine their general influence upon human acts. We have studied the following principles, learning how and why each is valid: i. Regarding ignorance i. Invincible ignorance destroys the voluntariness of an act.

ii. Vincible ignorance does not destroy the voluntariness of an act. iii. Vincible ignorance lessens the voluntariness of an act. iv. Affected ignorance in one way lessens the voluntariness and in another way increases it.

2. Regarding concupiscence i. Antecedent concupiscence lessens the voluntariness of an act. ii. Antecedent concupiscence does not destroy the voluntariness of an act. iii. Consequent concupiscence, however great, does not lessen the voluntariness of an act.

3. Regarding fear

An act done from fear, however great, is simply voluntary, although it is regularly also conditionally involuntary.

4. Regarding violence

Acts elicited by the will are not subject to violence ; external acts caused by violence, to which due resistance is offered, are in no wise imputable to the agent.

5. Regarding habit

Habit does not destroy voluntariness; and acts from habit are always voluntary, at least in cause, as long as the habit is allowed to endure.