On Science and Method

The word science is derived from the Latin scire, “to know.” In its broadest sense, science is any sort of knowledge. In a sense less broad, science is certain knowledge.

In its strict sense, science is that certain knowledge of a thing that comes of the understanding of its reasons and causes. Science, therefore, is knowledge that is root-deep. It is knowledge with how’s and why’s. It is knowledge that results from demonstration.

A science is a body of demonstrated doctrines that relate to one subject and that are available with order, consistency, and completeness.

Science is often contrasted with art. A science is a body of truths; an art is a body of rules. A science aims at truth; an art aims at the beautiful and the good. A science deals with necessary and universal principles; an art is concerned with particular and contingent realities. A man who knows the theory of music, is, in so far, a scientist; a man who knows how to play, is, in so far, an artist.

Every science has a twofold object. The matter with which it deals is its Material Object. The special end and aim in dealing with the Material Object constitutes the Formal Object Quod of the science. The medium through which the Formal Object Quod is attained, the body of principles by the light of which this Formal Object is known, is the Formal Object Quo of the science. The Material Object is the immediate field of quest; the Formal 2ZObject Quod (that is, Formal Object which) is the goal of the science within the field; the Formal Object Quo (that is, Formal Object by which) is the light which makes possible the attainment of the goal.

Sciences are distinguished one from another by their Formal Object, and ultimately by their Formal Object Quo.

Philosophy and theology both deal with God, man, and the world. Their Material Object is one; they are in the same field of inquiry and study. Both sciences seek ultimate causes and reasons for their knowledge of the Material Object; they are much at one in their Formal Object Quod. But philosophy seeks ultimate causes and reasons by the unaided light of Hie human intellect, whereas theology seeks ultimate causes and reasons by the supernatural light of Revelation. The sciences are distinguished one from another by their Formal Object Quo.

Sciences may be variously grouped and divided. In view of the end to which they tend, or which they serve, sciences are speculative or practical. Speculative science aims at enlightenment and culture of mind; practical science aims at action; it is like art in this respect, but it is unlike art in the fact that it seeks the causes and reasons that indicate its conclusions.—In view of their source or origin, sciences are experimental, rational (philosophical) or theological. Experimental science draws its principles directly from the data of sense; rational science draws its principles from reason; theological science draws its principles from Revelation.—In view of their object, human sciences are physical, mathematical, metaphysical, logical, and moral. These sciences have for their respective objects: the bodily world, quantity, abstract being, the acts of the mind, human conduct.

The word method is derived from the Greek met’-hodos, “a way after.” Method is “a way after” truth. It is an orderly mode of procedure in seeking truth.

A method is analytic or synthetic. Analytic method is procedure from particular data to universal principles and laws; it is procedure from known effects to the causes of these effects. Synthetic method is procedure from universal principles and laws to particular data; it is procedure from cause to effect. The analytic method is, for example, the method of the laboratory sciences. Individual data are gathered and observed and subjected to experiment; then the general laws governing such data and their activity are formulated from the observed phenomena. The synthetic method is, for example, that of the grammarian who states a general rule and then proceeds to consider the particular exemplifications and applications of it. The analytic method examines data, and, by induction, arrives at the general law necessary to account for them. The synthetic method states the general law, and, by deduction, justifies it in the particular data which it explains. These methods are not opposed, but supplementary.

Method is orderly procedure, and all such procedure (whether analytic or synthetic) is governed by certain general rules. Then there are special rules for the various types of sciences.

Important General Rules of Method are the following:

1. Begin with the easier and better known elements of the science or subject studied, and proceed towards those that are more difficult and less well known.
2. Let the procedure be gradual and continuous; let the reasoning be without gaps or “jumps”; let the nexus of truths discussed be kept steadily in sight; let the relation of conclusions to their principles or premisses be clearly indicated.

Z. The same grade of certitude is not available in all things. Sometimes it is possible to achieve metaphysical certitude, sometimes physical certitude is obtainable; there are cases, too, where moral certitude is scientific and sufficient. Let the proper and available certitude be sought. 4. Let the procedure be clear, its development as brief as may be without being obscure, its content solidly scientific and not frivolous; let loose opinions be kept apart from clear certitudes. This rule of clarity and consistency requires: (a) Clarity in preliminaries: the point of inquiry plainly determined, the field of study mapped in a general way, the terms accurately defined, (b) Clarity in development: division of the matter into suitable sections—parts, books, chapters, articles; plain and thorough treatment of each part, keeping clear its relation to the matter as a whole, and to what precedes and to what follows; omission of irrelevancies—“hold to the line”; honest facing of difficulties and objections; thorough refutation of notable fallacies.

That good method is useful is an obvious truth. As a man may ramble and wander, and yet come eventually to the city he desires to reach, so it may happen that haphazard readings and studies may give the student a satisfactory knowledge of a science. But the probabilities are that the wanderer will not reach his goal without direction and instruction, and that the student will not acquire a science without good method. Good method is as useful to the student as a road-map to the tourist, or as a schedule of trains to a traveller. The value of method may be summed up in four points: It makes the road to learning easier, surer, shorter, more satisfactory and fruitful. (Numbers refer to pages)

Abstraction, 81 f. natural, 149.

Agnosticism, 174 ff. objective, 14Z.

Anselm, St., 222. philosophical, 149 f.

Appearance Theory, 193 f. physical, 146.

Applied Logic, 2. of science, 148.

Apprehension, 71 f. subjective, 145.

Arcesilaus, 170. supernatural, 149.

Aristotle, 222. Cognition, 16.

Atheism, 174. Cognitive faculty, 30.

Audition, 52 ff. Common object of sense, 46 ff.

Authority, 232. Common Sense, 58 f. as criterion of truth, 134 f. Comte, 175, 220.

Conceptualism, 218, 220 f.

Conceptual Truth, 98 f.

Balfour, 170.

Condillac, 220.

Berkeley, 213.

Conditions of SenseDe Bonald, 135.

Knowledge, 190 f.

Buridan, John, 221.

Conscience, 70.

Consciousness, 70, 209.

Carneades, 170. Contradiction, 143 f.

Cartesian Doubt, HZ f. Credibility, 236.

Central Sense, 58 f. Criteriology, Certitude, 123 ff., 141-231. definition, 2. absolute, 145. division, 8. classification of, 145 ff. importance, 6. common, 149 f. name, 1. definition, 123, 141. object, 4. degrees of, 150 f. Criterion, 126 f. of faith, 148 f. Criterion of Truth, 126-139. metaphysical, 14Z. moral, 146. Deduction, 77, 228 f. 2Z7