Decisive States of Mind

Opinion

When the mind definitely decides for one of two contradictory judgments, having reasons for its decision, but realizing that, after all, the opposite judgment may be the true one, the mind is in the state of opinion. The judgment itself which is delivered in these circumstances is called an opinion. Opinion involves definite pronouncement of judgment by the mind, but the judgment is not wholly sure and connfident. It rests upon real or apparent probability, and the opinion-judgment is called a probable judgment or judgment of probability.

Probability is the weight and force of reasons or motives sufficient to win the assent of the mind, and yet not sufficient to render the assent entirely certain.

Improbability, the opposite of probability, is the weakness and insufficiency of motives and reasons to win the assent of the normal and prudent mind.

Probability is said to be intrinsic when it arises from the very nature of the case in which the opinionjudgment is rendered. Thus it is intrinsically probable that a political candidate who pleads for election to a lucrative office that he may serve his fellow citizens, is not unmindful of his own financial advancement.

Probability is called extrinsic when it rests tipon authority, upon testimony. Thus the opinion of a competent diagnostician on the nature of some internal disorder is extrinsically probable. Extrinsic probability (when it is real, and not merely apparent probability) presupposes intrinsic probability; not, indeed, that one who accepts the authority of the learned must weigh all the reasons upon which their decisions are based, but in the sense that the authority must be known to be competent and honest in the matters involved in his decisions. Mr. Thomas Edison’s opinions and decisions may well be accepted as probable (that is, as probably true) in the department of applied electricity. Mr. Luther Burbank’s statements about the grafting of plants and the blending of fruits recommend themselves as probable opinions. But the fact that a man is an honest and competent authority in one specialized field is by no means a reason for accepting as probable his utterances upon matters about which he has no special knowledge and no recognized competence. Thus Mr.

Edison’s statements about the soul, and Mr. Burbank’s casual comment on theology, carry no weight of motive or reason to win the assent of the prudent mind to recognize them as probable opinions. This is a point for the student of Criteriology to notice and to ponder upon. It is a weakness of the modern mind —perhaps a special weakness of the modern American mind—to regard a notable scientist, or a notable sportsman, or a notable gardener, as a master mind, as one equipped to deliver valuable opinions upon any and all subjects. By all means let us consult our Edisons about electricity, our Burbanks about horticulture, our Tildens about tennis, our Lindberghs about airplanes, and our Macks and McGraws about baseball. But let us avoid the sloppy thinking (it is really no thinking, but silly sentiment) which leads us to accept as probable all sorts of opinions merely because their author is prominent in one department of knowledge or activity. But, above all, let us avoid the stupidity of accepting a person as a universal authority merely because he is prominent in the public eye, prominent in the day’s news, prominent in the field of literature, or in polite society. Opinions are worth only the weight of true authority that is behind them; and authority is worth only what it can show in true and valid reasons for its pronouncements. Let the student of Criteriology show fruits of his training, and when his numbers are multiplied, we shall see a sharp decline in the reverent attention that is now paid to charlatans; we shall see a marked decrease in the number of stupid worshippers that are now to be found in the temples of Shaw, Steffens, Wells, Will Durant, Dr. Watson, and many others.

When the attentive mind, making careful study of the motives of probability, renders its opinionjudgment for that which is seen to be really probable, the judgment is a prudent opinion. Any other opinion is imprudent. “Opinions differ,” says the adage. When this is the case, we distinguish opinions as equally probable, more probable, most probable, or simply probable, according as they rest upon grounds that are equally good, better, or notably better than their opposites, or simply satisfactory to the prudent mind.

The student of Criteriology is here advised to take note of two expressions that are heard nowadays upon every side. These expressions are: “an open mind” and “freedom of thought.” The value of keeping “an open mind” in matters of mere opinion is manifest. Where certainty is not available, it is prudent to refrain from espousing any opinion or theory, however pleasing it may appear, as the final word, the ultimate truth. But, as we shall see in a later part of our study, there is a field of certitude as well as a field of opinion. And where certitude is available, whether in science or faith, it is fatuous to talk of keeping “an open mind.” It would be as silly to advise the “open mind” when it is possible for the mind to close with certitude upon truth, as it would be to advise one to go through life with “an open mouth,” with the stupid gape of the imbecile. What should we think of the schoolboy who would say that he regards as most probable the opinion that two and two make four, but that he keeps an open mind on the subject, alert for further possible discoveries? Yet the “open mind” theory is preached universally to-day. Descartes’ universal methodic doubt has degenerated in our times into a universal acceptance of mere opinions and viewpoints as things of value in themselves, and to the practical denial of certitude. In matters of opinion, we repeat, we keep the “open mind”; in matters of truth which is knowable with certitude, we clamp our intellectual jaws tightly upon the solid food of the mind. We deprecate the stressing of the “point of view” when there is question of a knowable “point of fact.” We deprecate the modern sentiment that the “closed mind” is the prejudiced mind, or the mind that excludes all further instruction. We close our mind as we close our jaws—to take in and assimilate something of value. And when another item of value is available, please God, we shall open and close upon that in its turn, and so be ready for the next. The modern critic of certitudes (and particularly the critic of the certitude of faith) seems to believe that one’s mind (or jaws) should be forever open or they will be forever closed, not realizing, it seems, that either the one or the other state must mean intellectual (or physical) starvation. The sane doctrine is, of course, “Here open, here close; now open, now close and retain.” As to “freedom of thought,” the expression ought to mean “freedom of opinion ” Unfortunately, it does not. It comes rather nearer to meaning “slavery of thought.” Our Lord expressed a philosophical truth when He declared, “The truth shall make you free.” The knowledge of truth, certain knowledge, frees the mind of ignorance, strikes off the shackles that hinder its advance, liberates it into wider realms of reality.

One is not freed by doubt; one is enslaved by the short-sightedness and human limitations that impose doubt. Doubt is a burden, not a liberation. Doubt is a thing to be cast off when possible, not preserved in the name of freedom. The person who prates of freedom of thought, regarding himself as superior because he withholds his assent from any doctrine as final (excepting, of course, his own doctrine that there are no finalities!) is not free, but enslaved.

He is as much enslaved as the person who refuses to look at a map or to accept directions in making his way from one city to another. Such a traveller may regard himself as “free” to try all the roads in the world, but he is certainly not free to go to his destination. The man who is free to reach his goal is the man who will liberate himself from ignorance by consulting a reliable map or taking direction from a competent authority.

By all means let us keep an open mind in the field of free opinion, which, by the way, includes the field of the investigator in the unstable and incomplete sciences. By all means let us have freedom of thought when it means freedom to study and weigh motives in the field of mere opinion. But when we may lay hold of a final and unquestionable certainty, let us grapple it to the mind “with hoops of steel.” And when we have not yet achieved certitude in a matter wherein it is achievable, let us not surrender to the weakness and the swank of skepticism: let us work on until we have achieved the indubitable truth. In the direct quest of achievable certitude there is no place for “the open mind” and for “freedom of thought.” There is place only for open eyes and the acceptance of fact.

Certitude

Certitude is the unwavering assent of the mind to known truth. The certain judgment excludes the tentativeness that marks opinion. It is confident, sure, convinced. It implies no fear whatever that, after all, the opposite may be true; indeed, it rigorously excludes such fear.

Certitude is not only constant, confident, unwavering; it is the grasp of known truth. Therefore, strictly speaking, there are no false or erroneous certitudes. The constant and unwavering assent of the mind to what is not true is properly called the state of error, not of certitude. Still, in the language of every day, we speak of being certain of things that are not true, as when we say, “I was sure I was right, I was certain of my position; events, however, have proved me wrong.” Therefore, while there are no false certitudes in the strict sense of the term, there are false certitudes in the less strict sense.

The question of certitude and its possibility is the central question of Criteriology. A detailed study of this question is made in the Third Book of this manual.

Error

Error is the state of mind in which that which is false is judged to be true, or that which is true is judged to be false.

The cause of error is never to be sought in the knowing-power or faculty as such; it is always something accidentally associated with the use of the knowing-power.

Notable among causes of error are the following: intangibility or obscurity in the object of knowledge; surpassing and overwhelming excellence in the object; false teaching; careless acceptance of common and uncriticized opinions; native weakness of mind; defective organs of sense; very active imagination; confusion of sense-knowledge and intellectual knowledge; passion; prejudice; precipitateness of judgment; inordinate predominance of personal preference ; susceptibility to persuasion such as is evidenced in victims of the “high-powered” advertising common in our day.

Summary Of The Article

In this article we have studied the decisive states of mind with reference to truth, that is, the states in which the mind has made a decision, a judgment, and rests in it. So we have discussed opinion, which is constituted by a judgment of the mind, but not by a wholly confident judgment; certitude, which results from a wholly confident and unwavering judgment of the mind assenting to known truth; error, in which the mind exists when it has given wrong judgment, assenting to what is false as though it were true, or rejecting truth as though it were false. We have spoken, in our discussion of opinion, of the fallacies involved in the universal doctrines of “the open mind” and “freedom of thought.”