The Function of the Intellect

Acts of the Intellect

The chief intellectual acts are three: apprehending, judging, reasoning.

1. Apprehending (or the exercise of simple apprehension) is the act by which the intellect grasps or apprehends an essence. It is the simple act by which the mind knows an essence. When, for example, one learns what a circle is, one knows an essence, and is able to define it. Regardless of the size, color, or location of a pictured circle, one knows what a circle is, what any circle is, what each and every one of all possible circles is and must be. One knows what makes a circle a circle; and that is saying that one knows the essence circle. Again, when one knows what metal is, one knows an essence; one can define this essence and declare what metal as such is and must be to be metal at all. The definition applies with full force and value to iron, or gold, or silver, or platinum, or zinc, or copper, or tin, or any other of the large class of metallic things; and this, whether the metals be considered in larger or smaller amounts, or in the abstract without reference to quantity. In a word, one knows what a metal is, what any metal is, what all possible metals must be in order to be metals. This is saying that one grasps the essence called metal. Now, the grasping or apprehending of an essence is the first complete act of the intellect. It is called an act of apprehension, because it is the grasp or the laying hold of an essence. It is called an act of simple apprehension, because the intellect, in grasping an essence, makes no pronouncements about it, invests it with no affirmations or denials, but lays hold of it and does no more, that is, grasps it simply. The product of simple apprehension, that is, the “grasped essence,” is an, idea or concept.

Sometimes the term apprehension is used to indicate the idea itself as well as the process or act by which the idea is formed. In this case, the idea is called a simple apprehension. 2. Judging (or the exercise of intellectual judgment•) is the act by which the intellect pronounces upon the agreement or disagreement of two ideas which it has formed and holds in comparison. If, for example, I compare my ideas of man and mortal being (that is, being that must die), I find them in agreement, and I pronounce the judgment, “Man is mortal.” Comparing the ideas man and spirit, my intellect perceives lack of agreement, and it pronounces judgment, “Man is not a spirit.” Judgment, then, involves three things, viz.: (a) two ideas in the mind; (b) comparison of the ideas by the mind; (c) pronouncement upon the agreement or disagreement of the two ideas. The first two elements are prerequisite as “materials” of the judgment; the third element is the judgment itself: judgment is pronouncement. Now, pronouncement in this case is predication. One idea is predicated of another as agreeing or not agreeing with it. In our examples, mortal is predicated of man as agreeing, and spirit is predicated of man as not agreeing. The idea predicated of another in judgment is called the predicate idea, or simply, the predicate. The idea of which the predicate is enunciated or predicated is the subject idea, or simply the subject. Notice now that a judgment may be viewed in two ways, viz.: (a) in the scope of its subject, and (b) in the accuracy, completeness, or necessity, with which the predicate applies to the subject.

With reference to the first point (that is, the scope of the subject, a judgment will be classified as univer sal, particular, singular, or indefinite. Thus the judgment, “All men are mortal,” is a universal judgment, for its subject is taken in full scope of meaning, or, as the phrase is, in “full extension.” The judgment, “Some men like music,” is a particular judgment, for its subject is taken in partial extension: some men, not all. The judgment, “This man is my father,” is a singular judgment, for it refers to one individual alone. The singular judgment is also universal, for the subject is taken in its full extension; it has an extension of but one, and if it be taken at all, it must be taken in its full extension.

The judgment, “Men like sports,” is an indefinite judgment, for it does not indicate whether the subject is to be understood in full scope or only in partial extension.

With reference to the second point, that is, with reference to the manner in which the predicate applies to the subject, judgments are specific, generic, differential, proper, or accidental. The judgment, “Man is a rational animal,” is a specific judgment, for the predicate is the species or complete essence of the subject; the predicate perfectly defines the subject.

The judgment, “Man is an animal/’ is a generic judgment, for the predicate is the genus or essential class of the subject; the predicate defines the subject, but not perfectly; it defines the subject by that part which the subject has in common with another idea: “animal” is part of the essence man> not the whole essence; it is that part of the essence man which man has in common with brutes. The judgment, “Man is rational,” is a differential judgment, for the predicate is that part of the essence man by which it is differentiated from the other essence with which it has a common genus: “rational” indicates part of the essence man, namely, the part by which man is differentiated from the brute. The judgment, “Man is a laughing being” (“Man can laugh”), is a proper judgment, for the predicate indicates something that belongs to this subject and no other, that is proper to this subject alone, although it is no part of the essence of the subject. The judgment, “Man is a reading being” (“Man can read”), is an accidental judgment, for the predicate indicates something that may characterize the subject, although it is no part of the subject’s essence and although there is no necessity of nature requiring that it be associated with the subject. The predicate may happen to agree with the subject. The Latin accidere, from which we have the term accidentalmeans “to happen.” 3. Reasoning is the act by which the intellect works out a judgment in a roundabout way when direct judgment is infeasible. Direct judgment on the agreement or disagreement of two ideas may be baulked by obscurity in the ideas themselves, and in their relation to each other. Then the intellect may be able to discover their relation by calling in a third idea which is clearly known in relation to each of the first two, and, by judging on the known relations, it may resolve the unknown. Take two ideas; call them “A” and “B.” Suppose I am Unable to pronounce judgment; I do not know whether “A is B” or “A is not B.” I now employ idea “C” which I know in relation to “A” and to “B.” Thus then I work the matter out: A is C B is C Therefore A is B or A is C B is not C Therefore A is not B This is an illustration of the process or act of reasoning. It will be seen that reasoning is a means of reaching a final judgment> which is the conclusion of the process. Judgment, therefore^ is the basic thought-process. The idea is an element of judgment; it is simple; it is not thought. Judgment is the thought-process. When direct judgment is impossible, reasoning is employed to render it possible. The quest is for judgment.

When reasoning is developed on the principle that what is true or false of a whole class is true or false of the members of that class, it is called deductive reasoning or deduction. The following example illustrates deduction: All animals are sentient (sentiency ascribed to the whole class animal)

The lion is an animal (lion declared a member of the class)

Therefore, the lion is sentient.

When reasoning is developed on the principle that what is true or false of the members of a class is true or false of the class as a whole, it is called inductive reasoning or induction. Induction is illustrated in the following example: Lead, zinc, iron, gold, silver, etc., are heavier than water Lead, zinc, iron, gold, silver, etc., are all the known metals Therefore, all the known metals are heavier than water.

When all the members of a class are known to have a certain essence, quality, or characteristic, this is affirmed of the class as a whole by complete induction. When some of the members of a class are known to have the same essence, quality or characteristic, and when this knowledge is the result of careful investigation, and when the members in question are thoroughly representative of the class to which they are ascribed, then the induction is incomplete but sufficient. When, however, investigation is imperfect, or the individuals investigated are not adequately representative of their class, then the induction is incomplete and insufficient.

Induction and deduction are not rival processes or methods; they are supplementary. Induction serves the investigator of particular data to the end that, as a scientist, he may reach general truths or scientific laws, whence he may, as a philosopher, reach further and more explicit conclusions.

Ideas

We have already defined the idea as the product of the intellectual act of simple apprehension. The idea is the representation of the essence of a thing in the intellect. It is the representation, the represence, of an essence in the mind. To repeat an illustration already given: when one knows what a circle is, one knows an essence, that is, one knows what makes a circle the thing that it is; one knows what makes a circle a circle. When one knows what metal is, one knows an essence, that is, one knows what makes a metal a metal.

Now, whence does the mind get its ideas? The senses perceive only individual things; they do not perceive bald essences. Each individual thing has its essence, of course, but it is an essence clothed with individual marks, characteristics, and limitations that do not belong to the essence as such. What my senses tell me about a tree, for example, is not a part of the essence tree considered alone. I see that the tree is an evergreen; it is tall; it is rooted in stony soil; it has a rough bark; it bears no edible fruit; its trunk is straight. But I may see another tree which is different in every observed point from this evergreen, and yet the other is just as much tree as the evergreen.

Again, I can consider tree in the abstract, without reference or advertence to any of the qualities and characteristics of an individual tree; I can consider the essence alone. The mind knows essences; the senses do not grasp essences as such. Where does the mind get its grasp of essences, its ideas? This question is usually discussed under the caption, The Origin of Ideas.

There are four ways in which we can account for the presence of ideas in the mind. These are the following: (a) the senses can grasp all that is knowable about material things, and so-called ideas are only collections of sensations; (b) ideas are inborn 8o KNOWLEDGE (innate) in the mind, either full-blown, or in germ, like seeds in the soil; (c) the mind has the power of abstracting from the material conditions and individual characteristics of sense-findings and of laying hold of the essence which is clothed in them; (d) some power outside the mind imparts ideas to the mind upon the occasion of sensation.

Of these explanations, of the origin of ideas, only the third is tenable. The first we already know to be false, for ideas are more than sensations or collections of sensations. Ideas represent reality that lies beyond sensation, and they represent material things in a manner which is superior to that of sensation.

Nor can it be said that ideas are inborn in the mind. It is unscientific to make this assertion, unless forced to it by the inadequacy of other explanations. We shall have a direct word of criticism to offer on the subject elsewhere. Here it suffices to remark that philosophers have shown that the doctrine of inborn ideas (called innatism) is unsound and fantastic. Similarly fantastic is the unwarranted assertion that some power outside the mind imparts ideas to the mind upon the occasion of sensation; such an explanation is not scientific, but merely poetical and imaginative.

We assert a power native to the mind of apprehending the essential reality which underlies the individual findings of sense. We call this power the INTELLECTUAL KNOWLEDGE 8i abstractive power of the human intellect. It is called abstractive because, in forming ideas, the intellect abstracts from individual marks; it leaves these marks out of account; it does not deny them, but pays no attention to them in the grasp of the reality which underlies them. Thus, in forming the idea triangle from several pictures of triangles drawn on a blackboard, I pay no attention to the size, the position, the acuteness or obtuseness of the triangles, nor do I attend to the color in which they are drawn. I abstract from the “individuating” marks of the concrete pictures; I prescind from these marks; I leave these marks out of account in getting at just what the thing is (that is, the essence) that is clothed here in short white lines, there in long red lines, there in equal green lines. In getting at just what a triangle is (that is, in forming the idea of triangle) I am not concerned with the fact that here is a picture in white crayon, there one in red, and yonder one in green; I am not concerned with the length of the red or white or green lines; I am not concerned with the fact that one picture is on the left, one on the right, and one in the centre; I am not concerned with the fact that one picture is above, one below, and one in the middle. I abstract from these things with which I am not concerned. I am concerned with just one thing: I am alert to grasp what the thing is that is pictured; whether in white, red, or green; whether right, centre, or left; whether above, below, or in the middle. In a word, I abstract from non-essentials to lay hold of an essence.

Thus, by intellectual abstraction, exercised upon the findings of sense, I am enabled to form ideas.

And the ideas are not divorced from outer reality.

Ideas are not creations of the mind. They are the mind’s grasp of basic reality which underlies sensefindings.

Further: the idea may be the mind’s grasp of an essence that is not clothed in sensile individuating marks. What of the idea spirit? What of ideas like unity, goodness, truth, beauty? Our doctrine still holds good. These ideas are not directly abstracted from sense-objects, but they are drawn by a second abstraction from other ideas already formed by abstraction from sense-findings. These ideas are called derived ideas (for they are derived from other ideas already formed), while ideas that are formed directly from sense-objects are called intuitive ideas. Thus sensation plays its necessary part in the formation of all ideas. Directly or indirectly, immediately or mediately, sensation is the ground and working-field of the mind’s abstractive activity. We recall the saying, “There is nothing in the intellect that is not in some manner founded upon sense-data.” To illustrate the manner in which an idea may be derived from other ideas: the idea spirit is derived from the idea INTELLECTUAL KNOWLEDGE 8z body by abstracting from material extension and retaining the note of substance and subsistence.

An objection may be put here. If I have ideas, and if ideas are the mind’s grasp of essences, should I not be able to offer a clear definition of every idea that is in my mind? I should be, and I am, able to give some sort of description of every essence grasped by my mind. But ideas do not come suddenly into the clear, distinct, and complete grasp of the mind. Ideas are usually confused at first, and they are brought to clearness and distinctness by studious attention, reflection, comparison, and normally also by instruction. When, by these means, ideas are made distinct, they are capable of being expressed in definition or adequate description.

C) UNIVERSALS An idea is the mind’s grasp of an essence. Now, an essence is usually capable of existing in a plurality of individuals. Thus the essence circle is found in every individual circle; thus the essence man is found in each and every human individual; thus the essence metal is found in every particle of gold, silver, lead, copper, etc.

Taking, for example, the millions of human beings that have existed, do now exist, and will exist in future; adding to these the countless millions that could exist if the Creator pleased, we find that our single idea man includes them all. The idea man (that is, human being) represents the essence that each individual of that vast group of actual and possible beings must have in order to be a human being, or to be thought of as a human being. By reason of the fact that I have the idea man, I know what man is; I can think of man, can know man, regardless of individual differences that mark this man or that (such as sex, age, size, color, name, etc.), and regardless of the existence of this man or that. My idea squares with what each existing human being is, with what future human beings will be, with what past human beings have been, with what possible human beings would be if they existed. In a word, it is a universal idea, and the mind, in forming this idea, has abstracted from all that is individual in men, and has kept only what must be found in each and every man inasmuch as each individual is a man.

Now, a universal idea represents in one single grasp of mind what may be found in a plurality of individuals outside the mind. The question arises: What is this thing that the universal idea represents ?

What is this essence that the mind grasps as one thing, and which is found, or may be found, equally, in a multiplicity of individuals? In brief, the question is: What is the object of the universal idea?

It is an essence, of course; our question does not touch that point. What we wish to know is what sort of thing the object of the universal is.

Recall the distinction made in an earlier chapter between the matter and form of an object of knowledge. The matter of an object is its content, its makeup, its constitution as a thing. The form is the mode in which it is grasped by the knowing-power. In the case of universal ideas, the question is this: does the object of the universal idea exist in matter and form outside the mind? Or does the object of the universal idea exist formally (that is, as to form) as a universal only in the mind? Or is the very matter of the object a figment of the mind?

The object of the universal idea is called the Universal. We employ the capital “U” to distinguish the object from the idea itself. The universal idea is the mind’s grasp of an essence that may be found in a plurality of things; the Universal is the essence which is grasped.

The question of Universals, therefore, amounts to this : Are there universal things in the world of knowables? Is there, for example, a universal human essence, existing as a universal thing outside the mind, which is shared by each human individual, or reflected and represented in each individual? Or are there only individual things in the world of knowables? If so, how account for the universal idea in the mind; how explain the object of this idea?

In a later portion of this manual we shall discuss various doctrines that have been offered on this basic question of knowledge and its validity. Here it will suffice to offer a brief account of the doctrine which we ourselves defend. It is the doctrine of Aristotle and St. Thomas and the Scholastics. It is called Moderate Realism.

The universal idea is one idea. It is, in other words, the idea of one thing. Yet things which this idea represents in essential unity are many or can be many. How can this be? The answer lies in the abstractive power of the human intellect, which we have already discussed. The intellect can grasp, can understand, can know, the many individuals that have the same essence, in a single cognition, in one idea. For the intellect abstracts from individual differences, and grasps that which is not different in the individuals, viz., the essence. Each individual has its own essence numerically, or as an individual. But the essence in individuals of the same species is the one kind of thing. The essence of Tom, Dick, Harry, Mary, Rose, and Jane, is the same human essence in each. It is not the same numerically, for Tom is this human being, while Mary is that, and Harry is another. But it is the same in its exact kind, for Tom and Mary and Harry and the rest, are equally human beings. This fact the mind apprehends, abstracting from individual differences that the senses bring to knowledge. Let us trace out the process by which the mind builds up its ideas when it abstracts from non-essential differences. We shall employ the idea man as an illustration.

1. The mind knows man as something, as a thing,
2. The mind knows differences in things. Thus it sees a difference between man and whiteness, for example, or between man and unity or strength. In a word, the mind knows man as a subsistent thing, as a substance, and not as an abstraction like whiteness, nor as a quality like strength. The mind then conceives man as a subsistent thing.
3. The mind conceives man not merely as subsistent like a spirit, but as bodily. Man is known as a subsistent bodily thing.
4. The mind conceives man not only as a bodily substance like a stone, but as a living thing. Man is known by the mind as a subsistent, bodily, living thing.
5. Not only is man a living body like a plant; the mind conceives him as having senses and sensibility; in a word, as sentient. Thus the idea man presents him to the understanding as a sub sistent, bodily, living, sentient thing.
6. Man is known not merely as sentient like an animal, but as endowed with understanding and will; in a word, as rational. The mind conceives man as a thing which is subsistent, bodily, living, sentient, and rational.

So the idea man is built up. So are other ideas built up. If we were to stop with the fifth point of those enumerated above, we should have the idea animal, that is, a thing that is subsistent, bodily, living, sentent. And that universal idea would be applicable to each and every animal, actual and possible. It would b? applicable even to man, for man is truly animal.

But it would not be completely definitive of man, for man is something more than animal. In the same way the first three notes (thing, subsistent, bodily) constitute the universal idea of body, and this universal idea applies to all things, actual and possible, in the world of material realities. It applies also to man, for man is truly a body; it applies to plants and to animals, for these are bodies. But it does not apply with equal completeness to these things. For plant is something more than mere body; plant is a living body.

And animal is something more than body (and something more than plant), for animal is not only a living body, but a living body endowed with sentiency. And man is something more than body (and something more than living body, and more than sentient body), for man is rational.

Thus, by observing reality, by noting what the senses bring before it, the mind gets at the essences of things. The abstractive power of the mind, joined to its powers of comparison, analysis, synthesis, and reflection, enable the intelligent subject to grasp the basic reality that is clothed in individual differences and material conditions. Thus, though Tom is Tom, and Harry is Harry, and Jane is Jane, the mind gets at the basic thing that makes each and all of them human beings. This one thing the mind holds in its universal idea. This one thing is the Universal.

Now, where does the Universal exist? The answer is twofold. The Universal as such, as to form, as a Universal, exists in the mind. But the Universal is verified in each and every one of the individuals that have the essence which is present to the mind in the idea. Therefore, the Universal, as to matter, not as to its form of universality, exists outside the mind in the trans-subjective world. In the world of real knowables there are only individual things. The mind, knowing these things as universal, does not merely group them, or clothe them arbitrarily with the form of universality; the mind, resting upon the solid foundation of reality outside itself, invests the essences it knows with universality. It is the mind’s mode of knowing, and it is justified in the things known. Thus, while there is no universal essence man (to keep our example) existing outside the mind, the mind has a solid ground and basis for conceiving man universally in the fact that what it conceives is verified in each and every, actual and possible, human individual outside the mind.

The answer, therefore, to the question about Universals is this: the Universal as such exists in the mind, and has its universality from the mind, but it is based on reality outside the mind inasmuch as it is verified (not as a universal but as a thing, as an essence) in each individual that has the essence which the universal idea represents. More briefly: the Universal exists in things, but not in the manner in which it exists in the mind. In matter, the Universal is real; in form, it is mental.

Summary Of The Article

In this article we have studied the three chief acts of the intellect, viz., simple apprehension, by which the idea or concept is formed, judgment, by which the intellect pronounces on the agreement or the disagreement of two ideas, and reasoning, which works out judgments in a mediate or roundabout manner when immediate judging is infeasible. We have studied the idea and its origin in the abstractive power of the intellect by which essential representation is educed from sense-findings. We have discussed the universal character of ideas and have indicated the nature of the Universal. The value or validity of the mental acts will be studied in the Book on Certitude.