The Trans-subjectivity of the Object of Knowledge

Meaning of Trans-subjectivity

The object of knowledge is the thing known. This object is either purely subjective or it is transsubjective. If the object of knowledge be knowledge itself, or its elements, accidentals, or dependents, then it is an object purely subjective, that is, it belongs to the subject and has no existence apart from the subject as knowing. Thus, if I make my own ideas the object of my cognizance or knowledge, the object is purely subjective, for my ideas have no existence as such, apart from my knowledge; they are elements of my knowledge. When, for example, I advert, by what is called reflex cognition, to my idea man (that is, human being), considering it either in its content (its make-up, its comprehension) or in its applicability (its extension, its denotation), I have an object of knowledge that is purely subjective. Notice that I am not adverting to the realities that have the essence man, that is, I am not adverting to the actual or possible human beings that have or can have concrete, individual existence in the world of realities outside the mind. I am adverting to my idea man, as such, as an idea. As an idea, my intellectual grasp or concept of man is an element of my knowledge, and has no existence outside my knowledge. It belongs to me, the subject; it depends for its existence as my idea upon me as knowing.

Hence it is a purely subjective object of knowledge.

Again: I may make the object of my knowledge something that is not an element of my knowledge, and yet has no existence as an outer, extra-mental, reality apart from knowledge. Thus I may think of blindness, or darkness, or a square circle. Blindness and darkness are not things, but the lack or absence of things; blindness is the lack of the power to see; darkness is the absence of light; a square circle is a nothing, for it is a combination of ideas that cancel each other (for square circle means “a circle that is not a circle”). But I think of blindness and darkness, I cognize them, as though they were positive realities, like sight and light. And I think of a square circle, I cognize it, as though it were something instead of a mere cancelled concept, and hence nothing.

In a word, my thought of these things as things, clothes them with a kind of objectivity. These things are made objective by my thought of them, by my cognizance of them. The only being or existence which they possess is their “being known,” their existence in knowledge. And they depend for this being (“being known”) upon cognition, that is to say, upon the subject. Thus, when made objects of advertance and cognizance, they are purely subjective in character. Such things as darkness, blindness, square circle, are called logical beings or entities (from the Greek logos, “word,” “speech,” “thought,” “science”) to indicate that they have their existence in and from the mind, the thought, the knowledge of the subject. Logical beings (which Scholastics call entia rationis or entia logic a) are contrasted with real beings, which have, or can have, existence in the world of things independently of the human mind.

To sum up: If I make my knowledge or its elements the object of my cognition, I have an object of knowledge that is purely subjective. Again: if I cognize’logical being, I have an object of knowledge that is still subjective, but less perfectly so. Less perfectly so, because my cognition confers upon logical being an objectivity which it does not confer upon the object of reflex knowledge. For while the object of reflex knowledge (that is, knowledge itself or its elements adverted to by a new cognition by which the subject knows that he knows, or knows his ideas or thoughts) is cognized for what it is, that is, as identified with knowledge itself, logical being is cognized as though it were something apart from knowledge, a real entity outside the mind.

Thus the object of reflex knowledge is purely subjective on the score of both subjectivity and objectivity, that is, as an existence and as the thing known it is identified with knowledge. But logical being is subjective on the score of subjectivity only, that is, it is identified with the subject inasmuch as it has no existence apart from the latter, it has no being except being known. On the score of objectivity, as the object of knowledge, it is cognized as something distinct from knowledge; logical being is not an element of knowledge as an idea is; it is cognized as though it were something independent of knowledge.

So much for the subjective objects of knowledge, that is, for knowables that have no existence apart from the knower. We come now to consider the “outer,” extra-subjective objects that do have, or can have, existence apart from the knower himself.

The objects of knowledge which have their being and existence independently of knowledge are called trans-subjective, Trans-subjective objects do not depend upon the knowing-subject objectively; that is, they are not projected out of the mind itself as though they were things; they are things; they are knowables. They are not dependent on the knowingsubject subjectively, for their own proper being is not being known, but real being in the world of extra-subjective realities.

The world of realities (actual and possible, substantial and accidental) is the trans-subjective world.

It is called Zm^-subjective to indicate the fact that the subject must, in order to possess this world by knowledge, go across (Latin trans, “across”) the chasm that lies between the physical and the psychical, between real being and being known. It is called trans -subjective because it is a world that is knowable and hence has reference to the knowing-subject.

How Knowledge Is Trans-subjective

Trans-subjective objects of knowledge are distinct in being—entitatively distinct—from human knowledge. Human knowledge does not make or project these objects; it receives them. Human knowledge of these things is, therefore, trans-subjective knowledge. Now, there are degrees of trans-subjectivity, and these we must consider in our present study.

An object of knowledge has three aspects, viz., (a) matter; (-) form; (c) presence. The matter of an object is its content, its actual being. The form of an object is the mode in which it exists. The presKNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL 37 ence of an object is its attendance, its being there.

There are three ways in which an object of knowledge (and hence knowledge itself) can be transsub jective : i. An object of knowledge may be trans-subjective in matter only, and not in form and presence. Thus trans-subjective are the objects of intellectual knowledge. My idea man, for example, represents a real essence, an essence which every human being actually has. The thing, therefore, the essence, which my idea represents, is in no wise produced by the mind. In other words, the matter of the object known (viz., the essence man) is trans-subjective. Now, the idea man is one idea, one representation or re-presence in the mind of the essence man, but this essence is common to many. The essence is one in the idea and several in its existence in individual human beings, each of whom has the essence. In a word, the essence man is represented universally and abstractly in the idea, and it exists individually and concretely in human beings. Thus the mode or form of existence which the essence man has in knowledge is not the same as the mode or form of existence which the same essence has in the real or trans-subjective world. Hence, in form, the object of intellectual knowledge is not trans-subjective, although, as we have just seen, it is trans-subjective in matter.

Further: the re-presence of the essence man in the idea is called an intentional presence. The term inztentional, as employed here, has nothing to do with the purposive act of the will which we call intention in ordinary speech. Here the term merely indicates the intent of nature, and, in special, the natural tendency of knowing-powers to possess their object in their own way. Hence, an intentional presence is the presence of an object known produced in and by the knowing-subject. Now, the presence of the essence man in my idea man (that is, in my intellectual knowledge) is an intentional presence due to the tendency or intent of the intellect to lay hold of proper knowables in a manner suited to the nature of the mind. This presence, then, is produced by the mind. But the presence of actual men in the transsub jective or real world is not produced by the mind.

Hence, in presence, the object of intellectual knowledge is not trans-subjective. To sum up: The object of intellectual knowledge is trans-subjective in matter, but not in form and presence, 2. An object of knowledge may be trans-subjective in matter and form, but not in presence. Such are the objects of imagination (or the fancy or phantasy), which is a cognitive faculty, an internal sense. The thing that I imagine,—say a dragon,—may have no existence as such outside knowledge, but its elements have. I cannot construct any imagination-image, no matter how unusual and grotesque, that has not its foundations in actual sense-findings. Imagination may exaggerate or diminish the objects of sense; it may construct fanciful caricatures and cartoons of reality, but the elements of the image are always garnered by the prosaic process of sensation. Thus my imaginary dragon may be such a creature as was never seen on land or sea, but a little investigation will evidence the fact that I have used in its construction only the materials that my senses have furnished.

I may give the dragon the form of an alligator, much enlarged; I may set upon it the head of a horse, wildly exaggerated and distorted; I may color it with the blues and golds of an evening sky, and clothe it with the scales of a colossal fish. Yet in all this I have used only elements furnished by ordinary sensation. For I know what an alligator is like; I have seen one, or I have been told what it is like in terms of comparison with other animals already known to me. I have seen a horse; I have enjoyed blue and gold sunsets; I have seen fishes and their scales. To make my dragon, I have used these ordinary elements, arranging them, exaggerating them, mingling them strangely. The fearsome result, therefore, of the imagination’s activity is not a new creation, but merely a new arrangement and distortion.

In actual content, the object of the image is solidly grounded in outer reality. I am justified, therefore, in declaring that the imagination-image is transsub jective in matter. Further: it is trans-subjective in form. For it is a singular, concrete object, and singularity and concreteness are the marks of the manner, mode, or form in which things exist in the trans-subjective world. But the imagination-image is not trans-subjective in presence. The presence of the object imaged is due to the activity of the faculty, the imagination itself. It is produced by the faculty.

It is an intentional presence, not the real presence which things have in the trans-subjective world.

Therefore, to summarize, we say: The object of the imagination is trans-subjective in matter and form, but not in presence. z. Finally, the object of knowledge may be transsubjective in matter, form, and presence. Such are the objects of the external senses. These objects are not produced by the senses or by the mind of man; they exist in reality; they are trans-subjective in matter. These objects are grasped by the senses as concrete, singular things, and so they are in reality; they are trans-subjective in form. These objects are not summoned up to knowledge by the activity of the senses; they are there in the world of sensed reality; they are trans-subjective in presence.

We conclude this portion of our study by repeating a very important warning. For an object to be transsubjective, it is not necessary that it be outside the body of the knowing-subject, but only that it be outside the knowing-power of the subject, unproduced by the subject, unprojected by the faculty. Objects that are outside the body are called trans-somatic (from Latin trans, “over,” “outer,” “across,” and. 4i Greek soma, “body”); objects that are outside the knowing-power (which is psychical) are called transpsychical or trans-subjective,

Summary Of The Article

In this somewhat difficult article we have discussed the meaning of the terms trans-subjective and transsubjectivity, We have preferred these terms to the far less definite objective and objectivity, for, after all, anything that is known, no matter how it holds its being, form, or presence, is an object of knowledge, and is in so far objective. We have been at great pains to explain the precise meaning of transsubjective as distinct from subjective. We have indicated the degrees of trans-subjectivity, and have found that intellectual knowledge is trans-subjective in matter, but not in form and presence; that the knowledge of the internal senses is trans-subjective in matter and form, but not in presence; that the knowledge of the external senses is trans-subjective on all three points of matter, form, and presence. We shall revert to this subject when we come to discuss the validity of knowledge, and it is most important that it be thoroughly grasped at the outset.