The Ultimate End of Creation

a) TYPES OF ENDS

We have already noticed that there are final ends or causes which lead on to further final ends or causes. There is, in creatural activity, a scale or hierarchy of purposes, some at hand or proximate, others remote, and, in each series of related actions, one is ultimate. Again, ends, considered in themselves, are seen to be desirable on their own account, or only desirable in view of that towards which they may be employed as means. Still again, ends, considered in reference to the appetency or drive of creatures, are simply natural ends, or they are ends known and intended. We shall discuss these types of ends in a series of short paragraphs:

x. An end or final cause is always a good. For a good is defined as anything that can be appetized, gone after, tended towards, sought, desired; in a word, it is an end. Now, a good may lie close to hand; it may be achieved, so to speak, by simply taking it up without ado. Or it may lie further off, and certain measures must be undertaken to lay hold of it. In such case, the measures themselves become desirable, become ends; they are ends which are also means. And in any series of measures to an end, the first to be undertaken is @ proximate end or an immediate end. The others (means and final end) are remote ends. The most remote end is the ultimate end of the series in question. Between the proximate end and the ultimate end lie one or more remote ends, and these are called intermediate ends. To sum up: Ends are proximate or remote. Remote ends are intermediate or ultimate. The ultimate end in any series is the end which gives meaning to the whole series. Similarly, the floor to which a flight of steps leads, and which is to be attained only by climbing the steps, one after another, is the thing which gives meaning to the whole flight ; unless one wishes to reach that floor, one takes none of the steps at all. Now, there is an ancient Latin saying which is almost self-evident, at least to one who has grasped the meaning of ends as here outlined; it is this: Omne agens agit propter finem; that is, “Every agent (doer, performer, acting thing) acts to an end or for a purpose.” And the saying is rounded out by the phrase: et quidem propter finem ultimum, “and indeed to an ultimate end, or for a final purpose.” But what of ultimate ends themselves? Are they, in each case, unrelated to anything other and further? No, the ultimate end of a series of ends is ultimate only in relation to or relatively to that series. It is an end only relatively ultimate. Now, all series of ends, together with their respective ultimate ends, must somehow take being and meaning from a universal tendency towards an end which is ultimate in every conceivable way, that is, towards an end which is absolutely ultimate. It is of this absolutely ultimate end that we shall speak in the next section of the present Article.

2. Anend or a good towards which an agent tends as towards its ultimate end (at least relatively) is something actually or apparently good in itself; it is something aimed at as a desirable object, a thing good to have. Such an end is called, in the old philosophical terminology, a bonum honestum, that is, a thing objectively good in itself and desirable for itself. What serves as a means towards the acquiring of such an end or good, is itself desirable (and hence an end) because it can be used to attain the bonum honestum; such an end is called a bonum utile, that is, a useful good, a useful end; it is a means to the ultimate end. Again, the enjoyment of possessing the ultimate end stirs the agent to achieve that end; hence this enjoyment is itself something sought; it is a good or an end. It is called a bonum delectabile, that is, an enjoyable good or end. Thus when a man enters a hospital to undergo a painful, dangerous, and expensive operation, he chooses the operation, the suffering, and the expense ; these things are chosen as desirable or good; they are an end. But these troublesome things are not chosen for themselves, or as a bonum honestum. No, they are chosen as useful to attain the bonum honestum, which is health and soundness of body, at least in such measure as health and soundness are recoverable in the special case considered. Health and soundness are the relatively ultimate end; pain, inconvenience, expense, etc., are ends (proximate and remote) which constitute the means, and the circumstantial accompaniment of the means, which lead towards the attainment of the ultimate end; they area bonum utile, or useful good or end. And the enjoyment of health and soundness, once possessed, is an end sought and intended by the patient; it is a bonum delectabile, a pleasing or enjoyable good or end.

3. A good or an end may be good and desirable because it squares with right reason, with conscience. Such an end or good is a moral good. An end considered without reference to conscience, without reference to right and wrong, is called a physical good or a physical end. A man who labors to make truth prevail seeks a moral end. A man who strives for health, wealth, or position (regardless of the morality of means employed, whether these be right or whether they be wrong) seeks a physical end, a physical good.

4. A good or an end is either natural or known. Creatures that lack knowledge (lifeless things and plants) tend by natural appetency towards what is good for them; this is tendency towards a natural end. Creatures endowed with knowledge are led by sentient appetency or by intellectual appetency towards certain ends, and these seek an end known, and, in the case of man acting rationally, an end intended.

b) THE ULTIMATE END

It is evident that an agent acts towards a last end in each series of connected actions. And to one who thoughtfully considers the matter, reviewing his own experience by way of illustration and proof, it is equally manifest that ends relatively ultimate are always directed to some further end,—the absolutely ultimate end, the end of all ends. This absolutely ultimate end must be, in its own objective character, a single end, not a collection or group; further, it must be the infinite First Being, that is, the First Efficient Cause of all or God. Thus God is rightly called the First Efficient Cause and the Ultimate Cause of all.

Why must the absolutely ultimate end be only one? And why must this one end be the infinite God? Consider that the direction of finite beings to their ultimate end, absolutely speaking, must be the work of an intelligence; we have already proved as much. And we have shown that this intelligence must, in last analysis be the First Intelligence, which is both One and Divine. Therefore, it is the one God who directs creatures to their last end; and He Himself must be the end to which they are directed, since He alone is the eternal and self-subsistent Good. Let us consider some evidence for these facts in greater detail:

I. The ultimate end of all creation, that is, the absolutely ultimate end, must be the end set by the Creator. So much is manifest; for all that a creature has, in being and in activity, is from the Creator. Now, the Creator could not have set for His creatures any absolutely ultimate end except Himself. For, had the Creator intended any other end or good than Himself (which, indeed, could not have even existed before creation), He would have been moved to create by the attraction of this end, this good to be achieved. But here we face a double absurdity. First, the infinite Being would have been affected by a cause distinct from Himself, whereas, as a fact, God is in no wise affected by any cause, nor can any cause exist or have effectiveness except from God; and to say God is self-caused, in being or activity, is a contradiction in thought and in terms. Secondly, if God were moved to create for the achicvement of some good, we should be forced to conceive of God as lacking this good and acquiring it by creating; but God is infinite and lacks nothing, nor can He acquire anything, since He is absolutely and eternally allperfect. Hence it is strictly inconceivable that any ultimate end or good other than God Himself could have been set for creatures.

2. There is no tendency towards an end except as towards a good. Even free creatures, who have the choice of means (which we call “freedom of choice’’) are not free to set for themselves an absolutely ultimate end of their being or activity. Man, in every free-act, seeks what is good, that is, what promises satisfaction, what is discerned as desirable or good to have. Even when he sins, and sins knowingly and perversely, he clothes the object of his choice with the mask of goodness or desirability ; it is quite impossible to choose evil for its own sake and as such, since evil is, by very definition, the absence of good, the absence of desirability. Of course, the choice of evil under the mask of good (apparent good; something sub specie bonitatis) is an abuse of the choosing power, for it is a choice which conflicts with reason whereby a normal man knows that his whole life should be directed. The true use of free-choice, like the inevitable drive of non-free tendencies in irrational creatures, is ever towards the true and real good. Hence it is clear that the ultimate end must be the Ultimate Good, the Supreme Good, the Summum Bonum which leaves nothing beyond that could possibly be appetized or desired. But this Supreme Good can be no other than the Supreme Being, the Infinite Good, which is God Himself.

St. Thomas Aquinas has an interesting word to say on this subject in his book Contra Gentiles (Bk. III, Ch. 17): “The end holds a place of primacy among causes, and upon it all other causes depend for their actuality as causes. For no agent acts except to an end. Now, a further end is the cause for intending an earlier end that leads to it; an agent is not moved to achieve a proximate end except in view of one farther on. And so the ultimate end is the first cause of all. Now, to be the first cause of all is something that belongs to the First Being. God, therefore, is the ultimate end of all things. Hence we read in Proverbs, xvi, 4, ‘The Lord hath made all things for himself,’ and in Apocalypse, xxit, 13, ‘Iam Alpha and Omega, the first and the last.’ ”

It is easy to see that, in any series of final causes, the ultimate cause or ultimate end holds the place of primacy, and that upon it depends the activity of the efficient cause. We must notice further that, without the activity of the efficient cause, the material cause would not be employed, nor the effect given formal actuality. Thus, upon the ultimate final cause the actuality of all other causes as causes depends. For this reason the ultimate end or ultimate final cause is rightly called “the first cause of all’; and it is easy to see that, in its absolute sense, the phrase “‘the first cause of all” must necessarily describe the First Being or

First Efficient Cause. Hence the First Efficient Cause is also the Ultimate Final Cause.

Now, it may be asked how or in what manner is God the Ultimate End of All Things. There must, indeed, be some marked difference between the way in which God acts towards Himself as last end, and the way in which creatures (that is, secondary and limited causes) act to the last end. For creatures invariably seek to attain something which, at the moment, they do not possess; the end invites them; it offers promise; it motivates their activity. But God is infinite ; He lacks nothing ; He seeks to attain nothing for Himself in His own most complete and perfect Being. How, then, can He act to an end?

The simple answer to the seeming difficulty is this: God acts, in His causal operations, to manifest His goodness, and by this manifestation to procure His external formal and objective glory. Notice that the thing which God seeks, so to speak, to “procure” is nothing that belongs to His Being, or is to be taken into His infinite Being; it is something external, and without which God would be God, completely perfect, completely self-sufficing, completely infinite. There is not, as with creatures, a tendency in God to procure something lacking to Himself. No, it is the free choice of God to manifest His goodness outwardly, and, by that manifestation, to have an outward formal recognition of that goodness. Not as a man seeks praise or fame does God act towards Himself as to be glorified. Rather, as Infinite Goodness freely pouring out its immense benefit to creatures; as Infinite Truth shining out to be known (and hence appreciated) does God act; and this activity is to the end that creatures share His goodness ; that creatures capable of formally recognizing and knowing Him may be drawn to Him in loving service and, at the last, in endless happiness. Thus “to draw all things to Himself” does God act towards Himself in creating, conserving, and governing creatures; in other words, God, in His causal efficiency, acts towards Himself as towards the Last End, the Ultimate Final Cause.

Let us utterly avoid the stupid blasphemy of identifying God’s direction of all things to Himself as to their last end with the thing which we condemn in creatures (notably in our fellow men) as selfishness, self-seeking, or “looking out for number one.” A man is condemned of selfishness and self-seeking only when he misdirects his rational activity and seeks false ends. The man who places his whole heaven in repose, wealth, power, influence, pleasure, is called (by a strange twist of language) a self-seeker. But there is more truth in the old saying that such a man is “his own worst enemy”’ than in the saying that “he loves himself.” A man that seeks to save his soul is not selfish, but is merely doing the thing he is made for, and tending directly and rightly towards the last end for which he was created. Nor will normal minds re- gard such a man as selfish in the evil sense; for he will be a man of goodness, he will manifest his love for his fellows, he will be eager and constant in practising the social virtues; in a word, he will be most unselfish in all his relations with others. Yet he will be, at the same time, tirelessly engaged in the quest of that last end which means the complete success of his life and the complete happiness of himself. In a silly cinema, a few years back, one of the actors was made to say with scorn that he could tolerate no “‘salvation seekers” because they were “‘selfish.” But what was this intolerant person seeking? Was he not posing his own ideals (whatever they were) as the ‘“‘salvation” of reasonable men? Yes, he was caught in the inevitable dilemma of every stupid radical who wishes to play God and upset the universe that he may rebuild it on his own plans. One cannot escape the necessity of a goal for any action; every agent acts to an end, and ultimately towards a last end. And well for the agent (if free to choose) that he chooses those means (that is, ends, proximate, remote, and relatively ultimate) which will carry him towards his true last end, and not away from it. But, in any case, it will be the true last end which he will seek, whether he reasonably seeks it by means which really lead to it, or perversely seeks it where reason assures him it cannot be found. The point here to remember is this: it is not selfishness and self-seeking (in the evil sense) that marks the activity of things and of men in their strivings towards their true last end; no, selfishness comes in when the self is deified, and false means are employed which bear one away from the true last end.

Now, when we speak of God, we speak of the Infinite and All Perfect. There can be no conceivable perversion of God’s activity, no seeking of the last end by false means. Hence there can be none of that creatural evil called “self-seeking” and “selfishness” in God. On the contrary, God’s tendency towards Himself in His causal action, is, first and foremost, the wondrous diffusion of goodness and love to His creatures. No “selfishness” there. And by recognizing and proclaiming that divinely manifested goodness, creatures come to their own greatest treasure, their own last end. And so, each in its own way, creatures return to God; thus is He their Final Goal. And thus is God Himself both the Efficient Cause of creatures and their Final Cause; His creative, conserving, governing activity goes out from Himself to return to Himself. He acts towards Himself as towards the Last End.

Another point to remember in passing. All the bodily creatures of God, save man alone, are directed of necessity towards their last end. They achieve it by existing, by their connatural functioning. Man, however, has freedom of choice; that is, he is free to choose the means by which he will seek that Last End which he is not free to alter or transfer. If he perversely abuses his freedom of choice; if he comes to endless woe instead of endless happiness, the changeless Final Purpose of God is in no wise affected or defeated. Man may defeat the plans of God in so far as these affect himself; he cannot defeat them in so far as these are God’s irrefragable designs. In heaven or in hell, the human creature will still manifest the divine goodness, justice, mercy. And if it be in hell that a man must show forth the eternal justice, it is himself that has so determined. It is not God that has destined him to hell or has sent him thither ; it is his own perverse choice, his own free will, foully abused, that has sent him there and keeps him there.

We say, then, that God, in creating the world, intends to manifest His goodness and to procure, by that manifestation, His own extrinsic formal and objective glory. Let us look at the meanings of terms and phrases in this statement:

I. Glory is defined by St. Thomas as clara notitia cum laude ; we may translate this as “adequate recognition and appreciation.” It means that when a thing of excellence is clearly known, and its excellence appreciated with due praise, that thing is glorified or has glory. Now, there is a twofold sense in which the term glory can be understood. First, it may mean the excellence of the thing which deserves praise, whether, as a fact, praise is given or not. A man who has painted a masterly canvas has produced a thing of excellence and has manifested the excellence of his own powers.

This is quite true, whether the canvas is viewed by others or is kept in hiding from all eyes save the painter’s own. The thing objectively or in itself has excellence; so have the powers which executed it. We may say of the painting that it is an excellent (or glorious) piece of work; more justly, we may say of the painter that he has gloriously manifested his own excellence of skill and conception in making the painting. We say of the work that it is (as Father Rickaby puts it) “a credit to the artist.” Being a credit to him, it embodies or manifests his glory. This type of glory is objective glory; it is the glory which accrues to the agent (here, the artist) by reason of the fact that this object (here, this painting) exists as a work which stands to his credit. Hence, the excellence of a work of art or nature is itself the objective glory of the author of that work. But it is not yet glory in full character, full-fledged, rounded out, complete ; in other words, it is not yet formal glory, or glory as such. To be formal, glory requires recognition and some measure of praiseful appreciation of that excellence which is its objective basis. The painter has not formal glory until the painting is seen, is known, and given at least a measure of deserved praise.

2. Taking glory from another angle, we distinguish it as intrinsic or internal and extrinsic or external. Intrinsic glory is, first of all, the objective excellence which is in a work of art or nature, or indeed in any actuality (and here it is objective but not formal) ; it is also the due recognition and appreciation which a person has of his own excellence (and here it is both objective and formal). The artist produces a work which in itself has excellence ; further, the artist knows his powers and appreciates them ; thus in the work and in the artist we find intrinsic glory. In the work, this intrinsic glory is wholly objective; in the artist, the intrinsic glory is objective and formal. External or extrinsic glory is an outer manifestation of excellence (and then it is objective and not formal) ; it is also the admiration and praise given by those who know and appreciate the manifested excellence (and then it is both objective and formal). The glory of a work as an excellent object is intrinsic and objective. The glory of the worker, self-recognized, is intrinsic, objective, formal. The glory of a work as an expression or manifestation of the worker’s excellence is extrinsic (that is, it is outside the worker) and objective. The glory of the worker, recognized and appreciated in the work, by others than himself, is extrinsic, objective, and formal.

3. God’s intrinsic glory consists in His own supreme and infinite excellence and in the loving knowledge which God necessarily has of Himself. God’s extrinsic glory consists objectively in His admirably fashioned creatures. It is of this objective glory that the Psalmist speaks when he declares that “The heav- ens show forth the glory of God, and the firmament declareth the works of his hands.” God’s extrinsic glory consists formally in the knowledge, love, and praise which His rational creatures give Him on account of His manifested excellence. This is the glory given to God by free-will rightly used; it is given by dutiful men and angels. This is the glory we give to God when we seek to achieve the purpose of our being and “know, love, and serve God.” It is of this formal and objective glory that we speak when we cry, “All for the glory of God!”

4. All the creatures of God are, so to speak, works of the Perfect Artist. They are a credit to Him. In themselves, objectively, they are excellent things. And why? Because, like all works of art, they are outer expressions of the artist’s own ideas. The human painter puts on canvas what his own mind and fancy have first inwardly depicted, and this is true even when the painter employs an outer pattern or model. The Divine Artist finds in Himself the patterns and models. He knows all things perfectly from eternity before they are made. They are made, and indeed they are makable, solely in so far as they are first known eternally in the Divine Mind. Hence, each creature is not only a manifestation of God’s power and knowledge; each creature is also a kind of imitation, and, in its own way, a reproduction of the Divine Mind, of the “archetypal ideas” of God. And, since God is wholly uncomposed, each creature is, in its own limited way, a manifestation of God Himself. Hence creatures have in themselves, objectively, a manifest and marvellous excellence.

5. Creatures less than man, in this world of bodies, have, as their proximate end, their own good; as an ulterior (or remote) and intermediate end they have the good of man; as their absolutely ultimate end they have God Himsclf. Things less than man tend, by their very nature, to maintain themselves in being and to exercise their connatural functions, to achieve their connatural perfections in a rounded and complete way; this is their bonum sibi conveniens, their own connatural good. But these creatures serve man. They furnish him with food, with clothing, with suitable instrumental power in his toil on earth. And, by his study of these creatures, man comes to recognize his own dignity and destiny, and the goodness and perfection of the all-provident God. Thus creatures point out to man the existence of the Creator, the Designer, the Governor of the universe ; they lead man to know, love, and praise God. In a word, creatures less than man serve to manifest God’s glory extrinsically and to lead man to recognize God’s excellence and to give Him formal glory. Thus all things in the bodily world, things lifeless and things living, things sentient and things rational (that is, man himself), exhibit a manifest order which shows forth the power and goodness of God and awakes in man the saving appreciation of His excellence. Thus do all creatures conspire to one great and Ultimate End, which is God Himself to be glorified.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have set forth a classification of ends as proximate and remote, and we have distinguished remote ends as intermediate and ultimate; ultimate ends we have classified as relatively ultimate and absolutely ultimate. We have seen that an end is always a good, and that the absolutely ultimate end must be the supreme or absolute good, the Summum Bonum, or God Himself. After offering argument for this truth, we have considered the manner in which God is sought by all natural bodily beings as their absolutely ultimate End. We have seen that creatures tend to God to glorify Him, and that the Last End of creation, the reason and purpose of the efficient action of the First Cause, is the extrinsic, objective, and formal glory of God.