Hylomorphism

The term hylomorphism is a combination of two Greek nouns, hyle “matter,” and morphe “form.” It is, therefore, a “matter and form” theory. It is the philosophy which seeks to explain the essential constitution of a natural body in terms of a twofold principle, one material and indeterminate, the other formal and determining.

It is supremely important that we understand the name hylomorphism, and the doctrine which it indicates, with full thoroughness. We must carefully avoid taking the terms matter and form in a loose, casual, or colloquial sense. These terms are highly technical, and, in their present use, they must be un- derstood in strictest philosophical meaning. For this reason, it may be allowed us to approach the study of hylomorphism by making a journey of investigation through the wide and intricate domains of those much used and much abused words, matter and form. Perhaps no other words in the English language are more commonly used, more various in meaning, more loosely understood.

I. Matter is a word capable of the widest variety of meanings. Let us look at just a few of these: (a) Matter is often used as a synonym for body; thus we speak of ponderable and imponderable matter, of solid and liquid matter. (b) The word matter sometimes means any object of thought, discussion, study, or experience. Thus a person says, “I have no opinion on the matter”; “We shall take up the matter with the authorities”; “This is a matter of importance”; “Spiritual experience is not a matter for laboratory experiment.” (c) Sometimes matter indicates tmportance, as in the sentence, “It matters very greatly what a man believes” ; “It is no matter whether you be rich or poor”; ‘‘The point you raise is not material to the discussion.” (d) Often the term matter which is literally the opposite of things spiritual, and in contrast with form, is used in close combination with these terms, as in the expressions, “We are interested in spiritual matters”; “This is a matter of the spirit, not the body”; “This is a matter of form”; “These formal matters do not concern me.” Of course, this employment of the term matter is only another instance of its use in the sense explained above under b, but the manner in which careless colloquial usage thus tangles and confuses the term with its opposites seems to call for special notice. (¢) Often matter is used to indicate meaning or information or data as contrasted with the manner or style of expression. Thus one may say of a treatise, ““Many fine words, but little matter’; ““Your matter is satisfactory, but your style is very crude” ; “The matter is all here, but where is the logic that should mark its presentation?”

Now, in our present study matter (and its adjective material) can have but one fundamental meaning, although that meaning has a primary and a secondary implication. Matter, in primary sense, is the basic stuff out of which a bodily being is made. Matter, in secondary sense, is an actual existing body. Thus we have primary matter and secondary matter, or, in the ancient Latin terminology, materia prima and materia secunda. Materia prima or primary matter is usually (and less elegantly) called prime matter. In the system of hylomorphism, the matter considered is prime matter.

Prime matter is the substrate common to all bodily being. A man, a dog, a tree, a molecule of coal, an atom of hydrogen, are all bodily. Each of these realities is a body. Each is an actual existing body. That is, each is materia secunda or secondary matter.

But all the bodies mentioned are bodies. They have something in common, although, as finished realities, they have essential differences. In other words, as secondary matter (that is, individual bodies) they are distinct and different; in point, however, of prime matter they are not distinct at all—one is body as truly and completely as any of the others or as all of the others together. It is only because some determining element (different in each case) has combined with prime mattcr in a substantial way that we have the different bodily substances, viz., the substances of man, of dog, of tree, of coal, of hydrogen. The prime matter which is the common substrate of all bodies, has in itself no determinateness, nothing to make it actual, nothing to make it this or that kind of body, but waits, so to speak, for the coming of the substantial determinant which will give it actuality as materia secunda, a finished body of definite type actually existing. Prime matter is thus the subject of the determining element which gives it existence as a substance. Thus we may define prime matter as follows: “A passive and indeterminate substantial principle which is the subject of all substantial determinations and substantial changes, and which remains changeless in itself under such changes.” The molecule of coal (a secondary substance, that is, an existing body) is made up of prime matter and the determining element or principle which makes it coal and no other substance. Now, burn up the coal, and the secondary substance is changed; it is reduced to ash and smoke. But the prime matter in itself is not changed at all. It supports the change, so to speak; it is the same amount of prime matter which was determined or set in the substantial character of coal; and now it és set or determined as other substances; but it is the same prime matter throughout.

2. Form is a term which, like matter, has a great variety of meanings,—of meanings that are different and sometimes even opposite. Hence we must carefully determine the sense in which the word is to be used in our present study. To illustrate the various senses in which the term form may be employed, consider these few instances of its use: (a) Form is frequently used as a synonym for outline or shape, and we speak of the ovular form of a race-course, or of the symmetrical form of a drawing. (b) Sometimes form means a plan or program, a record, or a questionnaire. Thus, a performer is said to go according to form, a race-horse is judged by the form-sheet, an applicant for a position is requested to fill up a form. (c) The word form is often used for good condition, and a golfer is said to be “in form” or “at the top of his form.” (d) Frequently the term form suggests something unimportant, or something easily done, a requisite but facile unwinding of “‘red tape.” Thus, certain procedures are called “questions of form” or (confusion worse confounded) “mere matters of form.” (e) The adjective of form,—that is, formal, —is often employed to indicate a certain dignity, or a certain decorum involving precise details of dress or conduct. Thus we speak of “formal dress,” of “a formal occasion,” of ‘‘a formal introduction.”

To philosophers, form is a word of tremendous meaning; far from meaning unimportant (as in the phrase, “a mere question of form’) it means the exact opposite. It means something thunderingly important. It means that which determines a thing, sets it in its being, in its essence, in its accidents, in its actuality. Any determining element in a reality is a form, And (as in the present study) when we speak of bodily substances, the term form means substantial form, that which makes a bodily substance an existing reality (that is, an actuality) of the precise essence and nature that we find it. A man, a dog, a tree, a molecule of coal, an atom of hydrogen are all material; they are all bodily, and this fact is due, fundamentally, to their common element or prime matter. But these bodily things erist, they are actual, they have each their own essential or specific kind of being ; each is essentially and substantially distinct and different from all the others. Now, it is the substantial form of man which makes the one bodily being a human being; it is the substantial form of animal which makes this other body an animal; it is the substantial form of plant which makes the third body a plant; it is the substantial form of coal which makes this molecule a molecule of coal and not of any other substance; it is the substantial form of hydrogen which makes this atom an atom of hydrogen and not, for instance, an atom of calcium. That which sets and determines a substance in its actual being, and makes it a substance of this precise kind or essential nature, is its substantial form.

Of course, man, dog, tree, coal, hydrogen, have accidental forms too. The human being will be of a certain age, sex, size, nationality, condition of health, temperature, location, and so on; at any given moment, he is marked and determined by many points of fact or actuality. But these many and variable forms do not constitute his substance as this kind of actual body. They are accidental forms, not substantial forms. Similarly, the tree will be of a certain size, age, botanical class, location; the molecule of coal will be in a certain place, at a certain time, it will have its certain temperature at any given moment; so too with the atom of hydrogen. But these determinants (that is, forms) do not make the tree, or the coal, or the hydrogen, the substance that each is; they are accidental forms, not substantial forms. It is the commoner doctrine of scholastic philosophers that each individual body has only one substantial form, and a plurality of accidental forms. We must be careful to understand the meaning of the phrase “each individual body.” For what we mean by the phrase is a continuous body. Now, any living body is con- tinuous throughout its living structure; and a lifeless body is strictly continuous at least in its minimumparticles.

We may define substantial form (with which alone we are concerned in our present study of forms) as “An active and determining substantial principle which is the term (that is the goal, the end, the completed being) of all substantial changes in bodies, and which constitutes each individual continuum in its essential actuality.”

Hylomorphism is the doctrine of Aristotle (4 century B.c.), of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), and of Scholastic philosophers generally.

b) TENETS OF HYLOMORPHISM

Hylomorphism is the philosophical doctrine which explains the essential constitution of bodies in terms of a twofold substantial principle, the one principle passive and indeterminate (prime matter), and the other principle active and determining (substantial form).

Hylomorphism teaches that prime matter has, in itself, no determinateness of any kind. It cannot exist alone, for existence is a determinate state of being, and hence a form, whereas prime matter is, in itself, wholly without form, and is contrasted with form. Prime matter is, therefore, pure potentiality, that is, it is an unmixed readiness or capacity for being actualized by on-coming form which fuses with it to bring to existence an actual body of a definite essential kind. But prime matter is not an abstraction of the mind; it belongs to the order of substances, granted it is a highly imperfect substance, indeed the most imperfect substance. For an imperfect substance is one that regularly requires substantial union with some other substance to give it existence in a specific kind of actuality. We may find a homely, and somewhat unworthy, illustration of prime matter in the picture of a citizen who, by reason of sickness or other cause, cannot stand upright; but when supported by a kindly companion, he is quite able to assume an erect posture. The illustration is indeed only a weak analogy drawn from accidentals, but it may be profitably suggestive; it may help in the understanding of the statement that prime matter is not mere nothingness, nor mere abstract possibility, but is a most imperfect substantial reality which requires form to bring it to actuality, that is, to existence in a definite kind of bodily being. Prime matter is, in bodies, the principle of their passivity (that is, their capacity for receiving accidental forms, and also for receiving new substantial form which drives out the old substantial form and induces substantial transformation, as illustrated, for instance, in the burning of coal). Prime matter is thus the principle of the inertness or inertia of bodies, and of what philosophers of an older day called their “indifference” to the forms that might possibly actuate bodies, chang- ing them accidentally or transforming them substantially. Further, prime matter is the principle of the quantity or extension of bodies. For while every substantial form requires a definite minimum of matter for its subject (that is, for constituting a body), and while this minimum quantity of matter will be various for various kinds of bodies, it remains the fact that quantity as such affects the matter rather than the form; this may be illustrated in the fact that a small baby which presently becomes a large man or woman is not changed substantially by the change in quantity, but retains the identical substantial form throughout growth. Rightly, then, do we assert that the prime matter of a body is the proper subject of quantity in the body, and that quantity is the proper accident of the matter rather than an accident of the form. Of course, since prime matter cannot exist alone, but only in an in-formed condition, it is true that it has no quantity on its own account; but the point we make is that im existing bodies (or, if the phrase be preferred, in in-formed matter) quantity is attributable to the matter and not to the form as such, even though the form brings to the matter its actual capacity for quantification, and enables that capacity to be realized in fact.

Hylomorphism teaches that the substantial form, in each individual (that is, continuous) existing body gives to the body its essential or specific kind. It is the substantial form which makes this body a human being; it is the substantial form which makes that body a plant; it is the substantial form which makes that other body a molecule of coal and not some other substance. Further, it is the substantial form of a body which determines its nature or its operating capacity and its active character. For, while it is the compound of matter and form,—the substantial composite which we call a body or materia secunda,—which exercises the operations or activities proper to such a being, it is the substantial form which is the root-principle of these activities. It is the whole man that walks and digests; it is the complete tree that grows. But the man does not walk and digest because he is material, but because he is an actual bodily being of this essential kind, and it is the substantial form of man which makes him so. The tree does not grow because it is material; indeed, many material things (that is, bodies) do not grow; the tree grows because it is constituted as this kind of bodily substance, and it is the substantial form of tree which makes it so. Again, it is the substantial form which gives direction, tendency, finality, to the activities of bodies. We have yet to speak of finality in bodily being and activity, but it is manifest here that,—granted such finality exists,—it is the form and not the matter of bodies which is its root-principle. For the form is the root-principle of the activities themselves, and, in consequence, it is the root-principle of all involved in the activities, such as direction and tendency. Matter in itself is indeterminate and “indifferent,” and hence has not, of itself, any direct influence upon activities or their drive or direction.

About prime matter and substantial form, the following points are to be carefully noted:

I. Prime matter has not in itself any determinateness, and therefore we cannot speak of it as of kinds, or even say, with precision, that it is of one kind. Still, the limitations of language impose upon us the necessity of saying that prime matter is uniformly the same in its nature throughout the various universe. In other words, prime matter, considered alone (although it must be remembered that it cannot exist alone) is a single sort of reality.

2. Prime matter is dependent on substantial form for existence and for specific determination. In other words, prime matter cannot exist unless substantial form combine substantially with it to give it actuality in this or that essential kind of reality in this or that definite individual. For this reason the substantial form is called the principle of specification. It is that which specifies a body; that is, it is the substantial reality which determines the species or essential kind of the body. Now, bodies cannot exist in universal; there is no such thing in nature as an existing body- in-general; for bodies to have existence individuality is required; bodies can exist only as these and those concrete individual actualities. Of course, the mind understands what body means (a body, any body, every possible body) and can define body with a single definition which expresses the essence of all individual bodies, actual and possible. For the mind understands in universal. But, as we have said, concrete existence cannot be in universal, but must be in individual. Therefore, when we say that the substantial form constitutes a body in its specific or essential kind, we say at the same time that the substantial form constitutes the body of that kind as an existing individual body. Still, the fact that this individual body (say, this tree) is this body and not some other individual body of this kind, is due to the fact that the substantial form is united substantially with precisely this matter to which it gives actual quantity, and not with some other “portion” of matter to which it would give actual quantity. In other words, if the substantial form of this tree has actualized prime matter in joining substantially with it to constitute this tree, the same substantial form, in joining with some other “portion” of prime matter, would have constituted another individual tree of this kind, but not precisely this tree. Therefore, although all the actuality of the tree is referable to the substantial form, and even the actual individuality of the tree is so referable, the passive matter has played a part inasmuch as it was precisely this matter which the form actualized. And, being actualized, the prime matter took on quantity, and exists as this precise quantified matter (not necessarily this precise quantity or amount of matter—for the tree grows and does not lose individuality by added size, quantity, or amount). Now, it is as this precise quantified matter that the tree is this individual tree. For this reason we say that quantified matter is the principle of individuation. The old Latin phrase is materia signata quantitate or simply materia signata; that is, “matter marked by quantity,” or “quantified matter,” is the principle of individuation in a body.

3. Substantial form depends, in its own way, upon prime matter. If the substantial form be incapable of existence alone, it requires union with matter to give it existence. Of course, what exists is then ‘“‘in-formed matter,” that is, the composite called a body. But the matter exists in the body, and the form exists in the body, and neither exists (or, in the present case, neither can exist) alone. A substantial form which thus depends upon union with prime matter for its existence is called a material form, not because it has matter in its own make-up, for it has not, but because of its dependence upon matter for existence in an existing body. All substantial forms in the bodily world, with the single exception of the human substantial form, are material forms. For sake of il- lustrating the interdependence of prime matter and material form, consider again the ignoble picture of the citizen mysteriously incapable of standing alone. Now, suppose that his charitable friend is in the same regrettable condition. Neither can stand alone. But, shoulder to shoulder, they both can manage it, and can make their way along the street. An interesting case of “united we stand,” etc. Similarly, prime matter and material substantial form are each powerless to “stand alone” ; neither is a complete substance ; neither is capable of independent or individual existence. But “together they stand” ; together they constitute an actual and complete substantial composite, that is, an actual body.—The human substantial form is, —as philosophical psychology proves,—the spiritual soul. As a substance it is complete; as a man it is incomplete, for the soul is not the whole human being, but only the most noble part of a human being. The soul is not generated, that is, substantially produced by a transformation of existing substances; it is, in each instance, directly created by God. This point is amply proved in psychology; here we cannot enter upon a proof. And the moment of the soul’s creation is the identical moment of its substantial joining with the matter which it makes a human body; technically we say, “the moment of the soul’s creation is the moment of its infusion.” Therefore, the soul does not pre-exist to its body. But the soul endures after leaving its body. Since the soul is spiritual, it is naturally deathless or immortal. It does not depend upon matter for existence since it is not a material form, but a non-material or spiritual form. Hence, the human soul (that is, the human substantial form) does not depend upon matter for its own existence as a soul or for its own proper spiritual operations, but only for existence and function as the actuating form of an existing human being; its dependence on matter is thus extrinsic, not intrinsic.—It is manifest from the foregoing considerations that, whereas prime matter is not diversified as of different kinds, substantial forms are diversified. There are material substantial forms and non-material substantial forms. In this world, the only non-material substantial forms are human souls. In the celestial world the angelic beings are pure forms; they are pure spirits, with nothing material about them in structure or dependency. And, since matter is the principle of individuation,— and angelic beings lack all matter,—the angels are not, strictly speaking, individuated; they are not individuals, but each angel is a species, that is, a distinct essential kind of spiritual substance. The angels are complete substances, both as forms and as essences. Human souls which have been severed by death from their respective bodies are individuated by the real relation which each bears to the quantified matter which it “in-formed” in earthly life—Material forms are diversified as sentient forms, vegetal forms, and mineral forms. The term mineral is ap- plied to the substantial form of any non-living bodily substance.

4. In any actual body, the substantial form is one in itself or actually. Some of the minor substantial forms (sentient, vegetal, mineral) are potentially multiple. That is, the individual body, which is a single continuous quantity, is actuated by only one substantial form, but it may be divided into a plurality of individual bodies of the same species, and each of the bodies so resulting has then its own substantial form. Thus a rose-bush may be cut and divided into several rose-bushes. The undivided bush has only one substantial form actually; but, in the plant in question, the bodily substance is capable of division in such wise that life may be preserved in each of the parts; therefore, the plant has a potentiality or capacity for such division, and its substantial form is said to have a parallel potentiality or capacity by reason of its dependence upon the matter of the plant. Thus we say that the rose-bush is actually one, potentially many; similarly we say that the substantial form of the rose-bush is actually one, potentially many. Substantial forms of the higher type (human souls, and the substantial forms of most animals) are never multiple, either actually or potentially; each of such forms is necessarily one substantial form, having no capacity for division according to division of the body-structure (or mat- ter) on which it, intrinsically or extrinsically, depends.

5. In every living body, the life-principle (soul, entelechy, bathmic force, plasmic energy) is the substantial form. When this form is driven out by the death of the living body, the remaining structure is substantially different from the living body. The corpse of a man is not a man; it is a package of various inorganic (non-living) substances, and naturally tends to break up into these, and so the body decomposes. Hence, a corpse is not a single substance but a mixture of many substances, whereas the living man, actualized by the spiritual substantial form called the soul, is a single, if compound, human substance.

6. Substantial change involves the incoming of a new substantial form and the simultaneous outgoing of the old substantial form, the prime matter remaining. Substances manifest their character by their properties, and when these are wholly changed we know that the substance has changed. When, for example, a living body (whose properties are vital functions, heterogeneity of organically united and interdependent parts) is changed to a dead body (whose properties are non-vital activities, unrelated groupings of homogeneous parts, equilibrium and rest) we know that substantial change has occurred: the living body has been changed into a plurality of lifeless bodies. Again, when hydrogen and oxygen are brought together in due proportions under a proper agency, the gases are changed into water. The properties of water are not the same as those of the gases, and therefore we know that the change is a change of substance; the two substances (hydrogen and oxygen) have become a single compound substance called water. Substantial change is instantaneous. Inasmuch as it is the production of a new substance (or substances) it is generation; the same change, inasmuch as it is the reduction or removal of the old substance (or substances) is corruption. The corruption of one substance is the generation of another, and vice versa.

7. When a compound substance (such as water) is generated by the fusion or substantial union of other substances, we have what is called a compound. A compound is to be carefully distinguished from an accidental mixture, which is the commingling of various substances, each of which retains its identity ; such for instance is the mixture of sand and salt. A compound is a substantial unity. The substantial forms of the elements which are joined together in compound are said to endure in the compound in a virtual manner, but they do not endure there actually. The substantial form of water is a true substantial form, distinct and different from the form of hydrogen and the form of oxygen. But, since water really owes its being and activities to the substantial union of these gases; and since their forms can be readily generated again from the water, it seems that their forces are somehow latently present (that is, potentially present) but not actually present in the water itself. And this potential presence is not a purely passive thing, for the water is capable of being reduced to the gases and, indeed, may be said to have a kind of tendency to such reduction; the potential presence of the elements is a kind of active potentiality. We call this sort of potentiality virtual. Thus we say that the elements in a compound are present in the compound, not actually (for actually the compound is a true substance distinct from the elements) but virtually. More precisely, we say that the substantial forms of the elements are virtually present in the substantial chemical compound.

8. When a new substance is generated, a new substantial form or forms are educed from the potentiality of matter, and simultaneously another form or other forms are reduced to the potentiality of matter. No question here of non-material forms, for such forms are never generated or corrupted. But what is meant by generation as an educing from, and by corruption as a reducing to, the potentiality of matter? This means that prime matter is an imperfectly substantial potentiality, a capacity for the receiving of substantial forms. Prime matter is altogether pas- sive, wholly inert, entirely “indifferent,” as to which form, in any instance, is to be joined with it to constitute a complete body. Yet, under certain conditions, wrought by existing substances (and fundamentally by existing substantial forms) prime matter is rendered proximately apt for the receiving of a certain form, and under the action of existing forms, it actually receives such form. Thus, the new substantial form is said to be educed from the potentiality of matter. The new substantial form is, so to speak, drawn out from prime matter by the activity of existing forms. Thus, under the activities (mechanical, physical, chemical) of hydrogen and oxygen, prime matter (which is actually in-formed by the substantial forms of these gases) is rendered ready for the receiving of the new form of water, and, under the same agencies, actually receives it. At the same instant, the forms of hydrogen and oxygen are reduced to the potentiality of matter, inasmuch as these forms are, so to speak, thrown back into the capacity of matter to have such forms. Yet, since our example concerns a compound which is resolvable again into its elements, the reduction of the forms of the gases to the potentiality of matter is not a complete reduction to pure passivity, but to a state of virtual potentiality. When an animal dies,—to take a further example,—the life-principle (which is the substantial form of the animal) is reduced to the potentiality of matter in the sense that matter which was once a sentient organism, and now is so no longer, can have the substantial form of such a substance, as is proved by the fact that it did have such a form. But the lifeprinciple does not endure virtually in the corpse of the animal nor in the various substances that are gathered together in the “package” we call the dead body ; no, the educing of a sentient life-principle from matter will require the conjoining of new elements (male and female) in a vital process which has nothing to do with this dead body. The life-principle of the animal is wholly removed. Yet it is not accurate to say that it is annihilated, for it is not; the accurate phrase is “reduced to the potentiality of matter.” In the potentiality of matter, of course, there is no actuality of the reduced form; potentiality and actuality stand opposed ; therefore, the life-principle of an animal which is so reduced, does not exist (for existence is a synonym for actuality), but is purely potential.

9. Matter and form (that is, prime matter and substantial form) are to be conceived of as two coprinciples, imperfectly substantial, which are naturally ordinated for substantial union together to constitute a complete bodily substance. Matter and form are not to be thought of as two existing things, each ready for union (as, for instance, hydrogen and oxygen are) with the other. For forms do not pre-exist to the matter which they in-form, nor has prime matter any existence of its own; existence comes with the actual union of the matter and form, and is actively referable to the form.

Io. Since bodies come from other bodies by generation and corruption, it is manifest that to have new bodily substance, we must have old bodily substance; there must be a bodily source for bodily being. But it is equally manifest that the process of generation cannot proceed in an infinite series of bodies from other bodies, and these from other bodies, and these from still other bodies, and so on forever. For an actual infinity in anything limited (like a series or chain of creatures) is a contradiction in thought and in terms. Processus in infinitum non datur, says the philosopher ; that is, “There cannot be a chain—of things or events—that is actually infinite.” Hence, the first bodily beings cannot have come into existence by way of generation, that is to say, by way of substantial change. There is no conceivable way in which finite actuality can come into first existence except by an absolute production, under the action of Boundless Power, no materials or prerequisites or material sources being required. Such a production is called creation. Thus we see the inevitable truth of the terse statement of the Scholastic philosopher, “Bodily substance has its first origin in creation; thereafter, bodies come from bodies by way of substantial change.” c) ESTIMATE OF HYLOMORPHISM

Hylomorphism appears to be the only philosophy of bodies that succceds in presenting a satisfactory account of bodily substance tn all respects. That there are points of obscurity in its application to certain phenomena, is readily admitted; but that there are points of contradiction in the system itself, or in its certain application to thoroughly known data, or in its tentative explanation of data which are still obscure, is flatly denied. For more than two thousand years, this system (acclaimed and despised by turns) has remained the only consistent system of all the theories that attempt to account fundamentally or philosophically for the bodily universe. On its record alone, its endurance, its consistency, it merits the deepest respect of scientific and philosophical minds. Indeed, it can lay claim to actual proof,—a negative proof, of course,—in the fact that it alone has maintained itself in integrity, while all other systems (atomism, dynamism, monism) have twisted and changed, and cast off elements and taken them on, and contracted here and expanded there to meet momentary difficulties, and have failed in the end. Argue the point very mildly thus: if all systems of the philosophy of bodies may be reduced to four,— monism, atomism, dynamism, hylomorphism,—and if the first three of these four are found to be patently inadequate and even self-contradictory, while the fourth appears to meet all requirements, and is not, at any point, in conflict with itself or with the data it attempts to explain, then, manifestly, the fourth system is the true one. Thus negatively the position of hylomorphism is established. Of course, hylomorphism does not depend for our respect or acceptance upon this negative proof; it has positive proofs too, and these we shall presently consider. But were the negative proof the only proof available, it would be sufficient to win the assent and approval of clear minds. A man might say, ‘This system is not easy to understand. It is not without many difficulties. But, some philosophy of bodies there must be; the truth is somewhere. And if truth is not to be found in monism, atomism, or dynamism,—as it certainly is not,—then I must accept hylomorphism and give it my interest and effort, so that its obscurities may be cleared up.”

It may be said, “Your old hylomorphists, Aristotle and even the medieval savants, were all wrong in their listing of material elements. They knew nothing of the ninety-four chemical elements we know today. They knew nothing of protons and electrons. They even accepted the transmutation of elements as a fact, and appealed to it to show the real distinction between matter and form. Is it not evident, then, that modern science has upset the hylomorphic theory?” We answer : Granted that the ancients were wrong in their decision about just what substances are elemental, they were profoundly right, and in agreement with modern science, in acknowledging the existence of certain true elements. Indeed, we do not know today that ninety-four make up the complete list of existing elements; on the contrary, we are convinced that there are more which await discovery. But this is a matter of experiment and the disclosing of concrete data, not of fundamental doctrine or theory. Granted that the older hylomorphists knew nothing of protons and electrons (and we know precious little about these things today), and granted that they appealed to the transmutation of elements as an illustration in evidence of a doctrine, this only means that they had not penetrated into the ultimate concrete structure of bodies, and that they mistakenly chose an illustration which does not, in fact, illustrate. But if the proton or the electron be the basic bodily being, it is still a true body, as true a body as the round earth is a body (indeed, truer, in a substantial way, since it is the true fundamental continuum), and still has its matter and its form. And surely no one will claim logic for a denial of a doctrine on the grounds that its defenders have chosen an inept illustration to example its application. The upshot of the question is the constitution of the true continuum. But, whatever this may be, it is manifestly a bodily reality with a definite character and function; in other words it is a material reality with its substantial character or form. Hence the objection given above in quotation marks is no real objection; it is merely apparent in its force; it is the utterance of one who has not thought out the full meaning and the implications of what he wanted to say; it is a statement of a person overeager to object, who allows words to rush out before they are well weighed. In a word, it is an objection, —-scientistic and not scientific,—which aims a heavy blow and beats the air: “Mighty Casey has struck out!”

Many modern objections to the theory of hylomorphism,—and this we say in all charity and humility,—come from a depth of ignorance so profound as to be utterly amazing when one considers the places in which it appears. So eminent a philosopher, —to choose one notable example,—as Mr. C. E. M. Joad, can calmly write and publish to the world such drivel as the following, apparently in an honest conviction that he is presenting fairly the doctrine of hylomorphism (Guide to Philosophy, p. 308 f.): “Among the forms which a material object may exhibit, there is one that St. Thomas Aquinas called ‘the substantial form.’ The substantial form is that which makes the object what it is; in the case of a leaf it would be ‘leafiness,’ in the case of a jug ‘jugginess’ and so forth. A thing’s substance is the union of its materia prima with its substantial form. Any other qualities which it may possess, those, for example, in virtue of which we call the jug white or black, tall or squat, are called accidents, since they are not essential to the jug’s being a jug, and are due to the accidental union of the jug with the forms of whiteness or blackness, tallness or squatness.—The ability of matter to change, that is to say, to take on a new form, arises from what is called its ‘potentiality.’ This potentiality is latent until it is brought into play by an external act. Thus, if St. Thomas were asked to give an account of what happens when water is boiled and turns into steam, he would say that the potentiality of the matter of which water is composed to take on the substantial form of ‘steaminess,’ has been transformed into actuality by the exposure of water to the heat of the fire-—As one reads St. Thomas’s views, one cannot help noticing how the full-blooded Forms of Plato, the inhabitants of a perfect and changeless world, which alone possess the full title to be called real, have been watered down until they have become nothing more than the shaping agencies of the materia prima. That they cannot exist without the matter to which they give shape is clear from St. Thomas’s doctrine of the soul. Man is a combination of soul and body, the body being the substance, which owes its qualities to the imposition of various forms upon the materia prima, and the soul being the substantial form. Conformably with his doctrine of matter and form, St. Thomas insists upon the necessity of the body to the soul, in order that there may be a soul at all. Hence the soul could not survive the death of the mortal body, unless it were provided with a new and glorified body. But it is with precisely such a body that, he teaches, it is provided at death.’—Comment on this addle-pated hodge-podge of little fact and much fiction is hardly needed. The veriest tyro in Scholastic philosophy knows that ‘jugginess’ is not a substantial form,—as though a bit of clay or metal were substantially changed in being shaped into a jug, white, black, tall, or squat. The tyro also knows that when water has been changed into steam, no substantial change has taken place. The first-grade schoolboy will, if allowed, show Mr. Joad where he goes wrong in Thomistic theology, and will explain that the soul can and does exist without a body when a man dies, and that the resurrection of the body is not so prompt and pleasing a business as theologian Joad makes out; nor is the soul ever provided with a new body in the sense indicated in Mr. Joad’s confident explanation of things as they aren’t. Mr. Joad’s amazing ignorance (which may be called,—accidentally and not substantially,—the Joadiness of Joad) covers a good deal of ground in a short series of printed lines. He doesn’t know the distinction between substantial form and accidental form; he doesn’t know the distinction between material forms and non-material forms which are intrinsically independent of matter for existence and proper operation; he doesn’t know the distinction between complete substance and incomplete substance; he calls the human body the substance of a man and inconscionably drags in the soul as a wholly unnecessary substantial form which acts like an accidental form; he fails to make clean distinction between the terms actual and real, and loosely describes the function of form as the bestowal of shape on matter. Now, a man who attempts to set forth the doctrine of hylomorphism must not be afflicted with these points of ignorance and these verbal and mental confusions; if he labor under these handicaps it cannot be expected that he should state the case fairly. Yet Mr. Joad is not to be excused for his ignorance of Scholastic doctrine, for he holds the impressive position of Head of the Department of Philosophy and Psychology, Birkbeck College, University of London.

Another typical example in illustration of the vague and misleading,—and often downright erroneous,—presentation of the theory of hylomorphism offered by moderns, is the following comment on the philosophy of Aristotle taken from the textbook called First Adventures in Philosophy by Mr. Virgilius Ferm, professor of philosophy in Wooster College, Ohio (p. 279) : “Thus with matter and form united, we have the hylomorphism which characterizes this system of metaphysics. Thus Mr. X-the-man is the embodied form of which the Young X-theyouth was the matter; the Young X-the-youth is the embodied form of which X-the-baby-boy was the matter; the baby-boy the embodied form and the embryo the matter; and so on. Thus everything in

Nature reveals this process of realization of an immanent working principle, this process of embodying the pattern-possibilities.” It will not take the student long to show the manifold misconceptions under which the worthy professor of Wooster is laboring.

Now, if hylomorphism cannot even be stated with approximate correctness by eminent professors of philosophy, it has little chance of appeal to the minds unfortunate enough to fall under their control. Students of Scholastic philosophy must dispel this lamentable ignorance about the only consistent philosophy of bodies that has survived the mounting centuries. They must, for their own sake and the sake of truth, appreciate their heritage, and guard against misprizing the doctrine of hylomorphism because eminent teachers,—or, more precisely, teachers in places of eminence,—hold it in facile contempt without knowing anything about it. Let the student carefully avoid the Joadness of all the Joads and the mindlessness of many modern minds.

Coming now to the positive evidence for hylomorphism as the true philosophy of bodies, we find at once two cogent proofs available. One of these proofs is based upon substantial change in bodies, and the other upon the extension and activities of bodies. But before taking up the first of these truly conclusive arguments, we must notice a fact. Certain Scholastic cosmologists refrain altogether from appealing to the argument from substantial change (and, indeed, they need not appeal to it, unless they wish, for the argument from extension and activities is quite independent, complete, and sufficient) because they feel that, since it was originally framed, in ancient times, upon the assumption that elements may be transmuted,—a theory no longer acceptable to science,—it has no force of appeal to a modern mind. The ancients did not know of those microscopic and sub-microscopic elements of matter which we call protons and electrons; and their “elements” (air, earth, water, fire) have long been discredited. Even the theory of transmutation of the ancient elements would be now rejected as utterly fallacious by one who, accepting the ancient list, would subject them to experiment and test in a modernly equipped laboratory. Now, say the cosmologists here in question, only a true transmutation of elements (of a proton into an electron, or vice versa) would show with absolute certitude the existence of a real distinction between matter and form. Since such transmutation is not possible, substantial change (which is admittedly a fact) furnishes only an inconclusive argument for the real distinction between matter and form, and had, therefore, best not be used. While the position of these cosmologists can,—if limited strictly to inorganic matter,—be interpreted in such wise as to justify it, such interpretation is not imperative. We still find high value in the argument based upon substantial change in bodies, and we shall not hesitate to use that argument.

I. The Argument from Substantial Change in Bodies—The fact that substantial change occurs in the bodily world is beyond dispute. Living bodies turn to lifeless bodies, inorganic matter undergoes transformations which are manifestly no mere accidental changes, but changes affecting the very nature of the substances concerned in them. We have already noticed that our knowledge of natures, that is, of the very essences and activities of things, is reached by justified inference from the characteristics of being and operation which we observe in the things; in a word, our knowledge of the natures of things is derived from our knowledge of the properties or attributes which the things manifest. As a thing ts, so it shows itself, and so it acts. In so far as a reality manifests unvarying characteristics and operative tendencies, so far it manifests its own inmost character or nature. There is no conceivable way in which the mind can get at the inmost reality and being of things except by this method of reasoning to nature from manifest properties. For properties are so consistently, so invariably, so tenaciously connected with the substances to which they belong, that we say with justice that they flow out from the complete nature of the substances, and are our guides and indicators when we come to ask what the nature (or working essence) of any substance may be. No one doubts that the activity colloquially known as burning belongs to the very nature of fire; and if one is asked what fire is, one tells something of its nature by saying that it is a thing which burns. No one doubts that the substance called a weed is a thing which grows; growth is such a manifest characteristic of the weed, so ceftainly associated with the substance called weed, that, unless blocked, the weed will grow; it is certain to the least observant that the growth of the weed is not some accidental or outer movement like the swaying of the weed in a wind; everybody says that the weed itself grows, it does the thing called growing; it does this in such fashion that one cannot help concluding that the outwardly manifested growth comes from an inner natural tendency as a proper operation. And thus we know something of the nature of the weed-substance inasmuch as we know that it is a thing which grows or a thing which normally tends to grow. Again, nobody doubts that the complex structure of the human eye, and its normal function as experienced by every person who is not blind, manifest something of the natural aptitude and tendency of the eye; that is to say, structure and function give us some clue to the nature of the eye. From proper characteristics and operative tendencies (that is, from properties) we learn to know what natures or working substantial essences are. Now, if we find that a certain substance manifests definite properties, and presently we find that these properties have been changed into different, and even opposite, things, we know with certitude that the substance itself has been changed. We know that substantial change has occurred. When, for example, we see a substance like the weed, which manifests operative tendencies of a vital character (it grows; it takes nourishment; it builds and maintains a unified organism although its parts are many and heterogeneous; it tends towards operation and fruitfulness and never to mere equilibrium and rest), we know that the weed is a living substance. If, presently, the weed no longer manifests any of the vital tendencies mentioned; if it now no longer grows, or is nourished, or holds its parts in organic unity, or operates towards self-maintenance and fruitfulness; if it shows tendencies which are opposite to all these, and inclines to break up into disunited parts, to find equilibrium and rest; then we know that the substance is no longer a living substance but a lifeless substance. We may still call it a weed or a dead weed, but this is a mere imperfection of speech; we know better; we know that it isn’t a weed at all, for a weed is a living thing and this is a lifeless thing. Just so, when a man dies, we speak of the corpse as though it were still a man; we say “He looks natural,” or “He is very thin”; but we know perfectly well that all this is just a kindly, if mistaken, mode of expression; we know that the corpse is not a man at all, since a man is alive, and the corpse has no life. We know in the case of the weed or the deceased man that substantial change has taken place. We know this because the properties which once manifested a living being are no longer in evidence, and the properties which manifest non-living being are now apparent. Summing the whole matter in a few words, we may say: substantial changes actually occur in the world, and they are inevitably recognized by normal minds in the fact that the properties of substances undergo essential changes.

Granted then that substantial changes actually occur, there are only two conceivable ways of explaining them. Either (a) the old substance is utterly annihilated, and the new substance created; or (b) there is some underlying support, some substantial subject, of the change (matter) ; and there is some substantial determination (form) whose acquisition or loss causes the subject to undergo the change.

The first alternative is inadmissible for many reasons, any one of which would be sufficient grounds for rejecting the theory of continuous creations and annihilations. We need not explain these reasons in any detail, but it may be well to mention a few of them. First, then, annihilation is within the absolute power of God alone; so also is creation; this power cannot be communicated to creatures, for they lack the capacity to receive it. Hence, on the annihilationcreation theory of change, no finite substance could induce substantial change in another finite substance ; all substantial change would be due to the direct intervention of Almighty God. Thus the world would be illusory; for the substantial changes found in digesting food, in burning wood, in the combining of hydrogen and oxygen to generate water, and all other substantial changes which we observe as due to the action of creature-agencies, would be due to God’s direct and immediate action, and not to the stomach of a living being, or to the fireman and the flames, or to the chemist and the combined gases, or to any creature-causes. And, if this be so, all our knowledge must be scrapped as worthless, and we must lapse into the self-contradiction of the skeptic. For the existence and effectiveness of creature-causes is as manifest a reality as our own existence or the existence of the world around us; if this be doubted, nothing is certain, and science and philosophy perish together. We cannot admit a theory which involves such consequences. Again, it is the doctrine of philosophers that God, who can annihilate, does not, in fact, annihilate. Further, if all substantial change in the world were due to the direct action of God alone, the equipment of creature-causes for inducing substantial change (such, for example, as the digestive system which substantially changes foodstuffs taken into the stomach) would be meaningless. Yet it is the doctrine of both science and philosophy that Nature does nothing in vain; and our reason assures us that the Infinite Creator (All-Wise as well as All-Powerful) would not,—and in His wisdom could not,—furnish a creature with elaborate and intricate equipment unless that equipment had a meaning. We therefore find entirely unacceptable an explanation of substantial change as the utter annihilation of one substance and the total new creation of another. We are driven, then, to accept the alternative explanation of substantial change, that is, the explanation found in the theory of matter and form, the theory called hylomorphism.

We say that substantial change involves two things, viz., a support or subject of the change, and the acquisition-and-loss which the subject underlies and undergoes. In other words, substantial change involves matter and form. When a continuum of coal (lump or molecule) is burned up, the material substance called coal is changed into other substances called, collectively, ashes and smoke. The coal is not, as we have seen, annihilated and the new substances created; no, there is a bridge to support the change of the bodily being as it passes from one substantial state to another. This bridge is prime matter, the common substrate of all bodies. And, when coal and fire are brought together, the action and reaction which takes place between these two substances, causes the determinate being (or substantial form) of coal to be lost, and,—in the same identical instant, —the new determinations (or substantial forms) of ashes and smoke to be acquired. It is the subject, the prime matter, which undergoes and underlies this substantial loss-and-acquisition. The prime matter which was substantially in-formed as coal, is now the prime matter that is substantially in-formed by the substantial determinants (that is, the substantial forms) of ashes and smoke. Thus we conclude that the bodily substance called coal, as well as the bodily substances called ashes and smoke, are each composed of prime matter and substantial form. These two substantial realities are the root-constituents of bodies ; the ultimate physical and substantial co-principles which make a body a body, and the actual body which it is.

Take a further illustration. When a living body becomes a dead body, a substantial change has occurred. The living body is a true continuum, while the dead body is not, but is a “package” (which retains for a time the outer “shape” of the living body) that may be called a mixture of mineral substances. Now, the instant of death is the instant of the substantial change here indicated. And this instant is indivisible and immeasurable. For death, like every substantial change, is instantaneous. We sometimes say that a man is dying, and King Charles II is said to have remarked that the process of dying is inconscionably slow; but this is a matter of words. Up to a certain instant the person doomed to death is alive, is a living substance; at that instant he ceases to be a living substance; and the instant is not mensurable or divisible. Death, like every substantial change, is an absolute thing, not subject to degrees; one cannot say, with literal truth, that a person is somewhat alive or rather dead. He is alive or he is dead; there is no “no man’s land” between the two states of being. Yet, though the change be instantaneous, it is a “going over” from one state of being to another, and since the “going over” is no merely accidental thing but a substantial change, it requires a substantial “bridge” for its passing. Now, the term bridge is not to be understood as something which spans a gap (for there is no gap, the change being instantaneous ) but something which affords a support for a substantial process. The living body, substantially changed into a non-living mixture of mineral substances, is an object substantial and material throughout the proccess; at no instant is it pure or denuded matter without any substantial form or forms. Take an illustration in analogy (remembering that it is analogy and not literal exemplification) : a ball of wax is perfectly spherical in shape; now it is flattened into the shape of a pancake. But it is wax throughout; and at no instant is it without shape. Of course, shape is an accident, and change of shape is an accidental change. And the accidental change is successive, not instantaneous; for no matter how quickly force is applied to make the sphere of wax as flat as a pancake, it remains true that the wax goes rapidly through a whole series of shapes intermediate between the spherical and the flat forms. But, these points aside, the illustration really illustrates, because it shows that in change (substantial or accidental) there must be something which underlies the change, which is the subject of the change, which is that in which the change occurs. In substantial change, this underlying subject and support, evists right along, first in virtue of the one substantial form, and then in virtue of the new substantial form (or forms, if the substance is changed into a plurality of new substances). If we weigh the words carefully and are diligent to understand accurately, we may say that every substantial change requires a thing that is changed in the sense that it loses one substantial character and acquires another; and this thing is not changed in the sense that it does not cease to exist. Now, this underlying reality we call prime matter. And the substantial determinant which, at any moment, makes it an existing body of a certain kind, is substantial form, Prime matter is the substrate which is in-formed, and is the subject of substantial changes which occur in bodily being; substantial form is the determinant of prime matter as an actual body of definite specific kind. Prime matter can lose its substantial form, but not otherwise than by the incoming of a displacing substantial form. Substantial change is not intelligible unless we accept the basic constitution of bodies as prime matter and substantial form. Substantial change is a fact. Therefore this fact compels us to recognize the value and truth of the hylomorphic theory of bodies.

2. The Argument from the Extension and Activities of Bodies—That natural bodies are extended or have quantity is a manifest fact to all who accept the universe as actual and substantial, and not as an illusion. And that bodies have activities which flow from their very nature is no less obvious. Now, the mere fact of extended matter cannot even begin to account for proper activities. For matter is in itself inert, indifferent, and consequently the flat opposite of an active principle or source of activities. Bodies have matter, and this alone does not explain their activities; hence bodies must have something determinate and active and substantial (since the activities here considered are no mere receptive states ; they are active or reactive forces and functions) in their essential make-up. In a word, bodies as active agents are inexplicable except upon the recognition of active substantial form affecting and determining passive prime matter.

Take for example the natural activity of burning which we find in the bodily reality called fire. It is an activity, unquestionably, and as such cannot be attributed to the substance of the flames or ignited gases inasmuch as these are material (for matter is the principle of passivity not of activity) ; but this constant, uniform activity is no mere accident of the fire; it inevitably follows upon and comes from the very nature of fire; it proceeds from the very essence of the substantial reality in which it occurs. It has, therefore, a substantial source, an active source which is not matter; and we call this substantial source by the very suitable name of substantial form. Take a further illustration: laboratory science informs us that bodies of certain chemical nature are inclined to combination with certain other bodies according to strictly determined proportions and under definite conditions, and that this inclination is always carried out when opportunity offers. Now, this determinateness of activity in a body cannot have its substantial source in what is itself indeterminate and passive, viz., matter. It must have its source in the determinate character of actual bodily substance; in other words, it must have its source in the substantial form of the active body.

3. A Supplementary Consideration—A living body is generally understood to be more than a collection or composite of parts acting and reacting mechanically, physically, and chemically upon one another. For a living body is something more than the sum of its parts. There is “something over,” something substantial, something other than the body-mass and the body-structure, something which makes the body alive. A scientist will name for you the chemical elements found in a living body,—say one of the simpler plants,—and will determine the exact proportions in which the various elements are here compounded. Yet no scientist, by bringing together the several lifeless elements, can produce a living substance. There is a substantial ingredient of the living plant which the scientist cannot lay hold of and control. Now, the doctrine of hylomorphism holds that the life-principle (that substantial “something over”) in a living body is the substantial form of the living body. It is an active and determining substantial principle which somehow unifies in structure and function a welter of various heterogeneous parts and makes one organic substance of the whole. There is no denying the substantial actuality of this principle, for we see what occurs to the once organic substance when that principle is removed by the death of the living body. Hence, in addition to the matter which is unquestionably present in a living body, there is present also a substantial form which makes the body an actual living substance.

There are some philosophers (even among the ranks of the less wholehearted Scholastics) who say, “Hylomorphism cannot be questioned in the realm of living bodies. But might we not be going too far to say that it is the inevitable truth about the basic physical constitution of lifeless bodies?” To these we may reply that the arguments considered above,— those based on substantial change and on the quantity and activity of bodies,—justify us thoroughly in re- garding hylomorphism as the true philosophy of all bodies, lifeless as well as living. For, view the point from any angle, the last analysis shows us, in every bodily substance, a material reality actualized as a definite substantial type; there are two substantial aspects of a body that call for explanation; and the philosophy of a twofold bodily principle (viz., matter and form) is the only philosophy which affords the requisite explanation.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have defined hylomorphism as the matter-and-form philosophy of bodies. We have indicated the precise meaning of the terms prime matter and substantial form. We have set forth the tenets of hylomorphism, incidentally defining important related matters such as the principle of individuation, the principle of specification, the meaning of complete and incomplete substances, the distinction between material and non-material substantial forms, the unity of substantial forms and the potential multiplicity of inferior substantial forms, the nature of substantial change, the distinction between a compound and a mixture, the manner in which the forms of elements endure in a compound, the mode of the uniting of matter and form, and the production of bodily substance. We have set forth the case for hylomorphism as the one true philosophy of bodies,